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Following the Leader, September .1931toApril .1933
In order to emphasize the general contrast between the
war and post-war international gold standard systems we
stated in Chapter 21 that the existence of a separately defin-
able sterling area after the war was evidence of the decline in
the importance of sterling as a world currency. Nevertheless,
the influence of sterling over the world's exchanges was stiiI
tremendous, and a logical first step in a study of the Disinte-
gration period is to present a statistical picture of this in-j
fluence as reflected in the world's exchange rates, and thus to
justify and give precise meaning to the statement that the
world was divided after September i 931 into a world of ster-
ling and a world of gold.
Such a procedure has definite advantages over other meth-
ods of picturing the disintegration of the international gold
standard. An attempt, for example, to classify the countries of
the world on the basis of the legal provisions defining their
monetary standards after September 1931, or on the basis
the techniques by which their exchanges were controlled,
would not yield very fruitful results. The whole tenor of our
study of the post-war period has shown that classifications olf
monetary systems based upon external forms do not assist
very materially in the analysis of what was happening to the
international gold standard as a world institution.1 Classifica-
tions according to the techniques of management are hardly
more helpful. According to the foot-rule of the writer the rec-
ord of the official regulations restricting the freedom of deal-
1 Cf. in particular our examination of the lack of substantial meaning of out-
ward adherence to the gold standard by periphery countries in Ch. 24 and in
the section on Argentina in Ch.
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ings in the exchanges in various countries, compiled by the
Bank for International Settlements, had reached in October
1937 a thickness of two and a half feet. The student who at-
tempts to thread his way through this maze will find his atten-
tion equally divided between gold standard and non-gold
standard countries. This is shown by a table compiled by Leo
Pasvolsky.2 The interpretation of such a table is subject to




OFF THE GOLD STANDARD AND OLD PARITIES
WITH DEPRECIATED CURRENCIES MAINTAINED ON FULL
Without Official With THROUGH OFFI- GOLD
Control Official CIAL CONTROL STANDARD
Control
Australia Argentina Austria Albania
British India Bolivia Bulgaria Belgium
British Malaya Brazil a CzechoslovakiaDanzig
Canada Chile Estonia Dutch East Indies
Egypt Colombia Germany France
Finland Denmark Hungary Italy
Great Britain Ecuador Latvia Lithuania
Irish Free State Greece Rumania The Netherlands
Mexico Japan Yugoslavia Poland
New Zealand b Persia 0 Switzerland





Union of S. Africa
aThegold standard was never officially resumed after the World War.
b The gold standard was never officially reestablished after the war, but there
was a de facto return to pre-war gold parities.
°Persiahad a silver standard until March 1932, when a gold parity was legally
adopted, although the exchange rate followed the pound sterling.
many difficulties. By no means all forms of exchange control
are embodied in official regulations. Consequently not even
the area within which the gold standard continued to be a
reality as well as an ornament is clearly defined. Moreover, the
currencies of many countries not on the gold standard were
in fact pegged to gold standard currencies in much the same
2 Current Monetary Issues (Brookings Institution, p. 8.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1075
way as were countries nominally on the gold standard. There-
fore such a classification does not reveal the full extent of the
world of gold. Finally, it gives no hint of the relation of the
various currencies to sterling. This can be seen only by a
study of the exchanges.
From April 1929 to April 1933 35 countries left the gold




























these countries according to the single criterion of their de-
preciation in gold would not, however, clearly disclose the
real divisions established in the world's currency system. In
introducing our analysis of the behavior of exchange rates
during the war we drew attention to the very different aspect
of the war-time rates when observed from the point of view
of Zurich and from that of London or New York. Similarly
after 1931 the choice of a base is all important. Many essen-
tial facts concerning the grouping of the world's exchanges
after September 1931 would be obscured by a simple plotting
Bank of Nova Scotia, Monthly Review, September 1933.
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of the depreciated currencies in terms, let us say, of the
French franc. Another method of picturing the behavior of
the world's exchanges has therefore been adopted which car-
ries forward the analysis presented in Chapter i1.
TheBoundaries of the World of Sterling and of the
World of Gold
In an unpublished manuscript on the sterling standard,
Charles Wilson has studied the exchange rates of 36 countries
from the abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain
in September 1931tothe abandonment of the gold standard
by the United States in March Inorder to facilitate
comparisons between these currencies, both as to their fluc-
tuations and their general position in the world system of
rates, he has expressed all the rates in terms of percentage
deviations from the gold parities prevailing before the disin-
tegration of the international gold standard system began.
Since rates on New York are expressed in cents per unit of
foreign currency, and rates on London in units of foreign
currency per pound, he first worked out the reciprocals of the
London quotations and then multiplied these reciprocals by
240 in order to get a series of quotations in the form of pence
per unit of foreign currency. When London rates in this form
are expressed as percentage deviations from the old parities
they become strictly comparable with the New York rates
similarly expressed.
In Appendix Table 5 the exchange rates of the 36 countries
on London and New York as compiled by Mr. Wilson are
given. By plotting these rates and combining those with simi-
lar characteristics, a graphical picture of the grouping of the
nations in accordance with the behavior of their exchanges is
obtained and the boundaries of the world of sterling and of
the world of gold are defined. Before presenting the results
of this procedure two preliminary observations should be
made. First, the classification of countries is strictly on theSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1077
basis of the behavior of the exchange rates, with one excep-
tion. At the sacrifice of strict logical consistency the countries
whose exchanges were kept stable in terms of gold have been
divided into two groups to bring out the area within which
traditional gold standard procedures continued to be observed
without substantial modification. Second, as Mr. Wilson is
careful to point out, a grouping of this sort, based solely on
the behavior of the exchanges, does not disclose the full ex-
tent of the sterling area, if by that term is meant all the coun-
tries bound more closely to Great Britain than to other cen-
ter countries by economic and financial ties.
Sterling Countries
In Chart 61 the sterling-dollar rate, expressed in percentage
deviations from the old parity of 4.8665, is shown monthly
from September 1931 to February 1933. The exchanges of io
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ofthe 36 countries studied by Mr. Wilson were sufficiently
stable in London to repeat in their fluctuations on New York
the pattern of the sterling-dollar rate. There is therefore no
difficulty in classifying them as sterling countries, but they
fall naturally into two groups (Charts 62 and 63).
4Thewriter relies upon the discussion elsewhere, particularly in Ch. to




IIISTERLING STANDARD AND STERLING AREA COUNTRIES
Of the io sterling countries 6 remained completely stable in
sterling as far as their fluctuations were concerned, though
this stability was maintained at different levels for variouspe-
riods. These 6 countries may be sterling standard coun-
CHART 62
SterlingStandard Countries, Exchange Rates on London and New York,
August 1931—February 1933,MonthlyAverages of Daily Quotations





Sterling Area Countries, Exchange Rates on London and New York,
August 1931—FebrUary 1933,MonthlyAverages of Daily Quotations
as Percentage Deviations from Par
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tries. The other 4 were far from stable in sterling; nevertheiess
they showed a strong tendency to conform to the general
of sterling depreciation in terms of the dollar and to move
months together in general harmony with sterling. They may
therefore be classified as sterling area countries.
GOLD STANDARD COUNTRIES ATFRACTED INTO THE STERUNG
GROUP
The io sterling standard and sterling area countries do
include two important members of the British Empire, South




Rates on London and New
York, August 1931—Febru-
ary 1933,MonthlyAverages
of Daily Quotations as Per-
centage Deviations from Par
also were in a sense sterling countries (Chart 64) .UntilDe-
cember 1932 the exchange of the Union of South Africa Te-
mained stable in New York and fluctuated in London in strict
accordance with the rates of other gold standard countries.
But in December 1932 South Africa abandoned the goM
standard and joined the sterling group. The internal conflict
between the gold mining interest and other parts of the South
African economy, to which we refer in Chapters 9 and io, was
renewed in a different form after September i931.By remain-
ing on gold South Africa deprived the gold mines of the sub-
stantial benefits of a high sterling price of gold in London
that they had enjoyed from 1919 to 1924. Pressure from this
50110,
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source was early brought to bear on the government and was
finally strong enough to force South Africa off the gold stand-
ard. Unlike South Africa, Canada did not actually move from
the gold standard to the sterling standard group. In its level
the Canadian dollar remained throughout in a position inter-
mediate between sterling and the American dollar, but in its
fluctuations it reflected faithfully the course of sterling in New
York. Without straining the meaning of the term unduly
both these Empire countries may be classified as gold stand-
ard countries attracted into the sterling group.
From Charts 62—64 it is clear that there were wide varia-
tions in the fidelity with which the sterling countries adhered
to sterling. Mr. Einzig has pointed this out (The Sterling-
Dollar-Franc Tangle, Macmillan, '933, pp. 56—7):
"When ifl 1931 sterling was depreciating fast, at one time the
Portuguese Government decided to prevent the escudo from fol-
lowing it any further. Again, in 1933, when sterling was rising
gradually in spite of resistance by the British authorities, the
Swedish Government considered it inexpedient that the crown
should follow sterling indefinitely in its upward course. Again, in
1932, yielding to the pressure of Danish exporters, the Danish
Government agreed to allow the crown to depreciate to 22.50
from its then rate of 19. Even within the Empire there were no
fixed relations between sterling and other Imperial currencies.
The Canadian dollar fluctuated somewhere half-way between
sterling and the dollar, changing its allegiance from time to time.
Until the end of 1932 the South African pound remained on a
gold basis; while the Australian pound remained remarkably
stable at a 25 per cent discount, the New Zealand pound under-
went a drastic adjustment in 1932. It may be said without exag-
geration that there was hardly one member of the so-called ster-
ling bloc which remained consistently faithful to sterling."
The forces that held these countries in the sterling group were
also very diverse. The motives that pulled South Africa into
the sterling group were certainly not identical with those
which kept Australia within it at a 25 per cent depreciation inSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
sterling, or those that were controlling in the preservation, by
theCouncil Bill System, of thes.6 d. rupee in india.
mark was powerfully influenced in adhering more closely to
sterling than to the dollar by her direct competition with
New Zealand in the British market. Sweden was strongly irii-
fluenced by the fact that a large part of her export trade wasp
at the time England left the gold standard, being carried
by sterling contracts. Some of the sterling countries were
more dependent than others upon London for short and long
term capital accommodation, while some were more in need
than others of the general benefits derived by periphery
tries from a depreciation of their exchanges on the gold stand..
ard countries.
Notwithstanding these diversities, the formation of a ster-
ling group was the outgrowth of long historical tradition and
fundamental trade and financial relationships. In spitethe
psychological and emotional bias of all 'sound money' advo-
cates the world over in favor of gold, many countries, in the
regulation of their exchanges, were obliged to regard stability
in sterling as more important than stability in gold. The
powerful pull of sterling over other countries was written
plainly in the rates.
Gold Countries
Of the 36 countries whose exchanges were studied by Mr.
Wilson, i6 remained in a stable exchange relationship to one
another, and exhibited a common fluctuation in terms of ster-
ling. Since this stable exchange relationship was in harmony
with the gold parities established by law these i 6 countries
clearly fall under the classification of gold countries. Indeed
if they were to be judged solely by the behavior of their ex-
changes according to the rule applied above in distinguishing
between sterling standard and sterling area countries they
would all fall under the classification of gold standard coun-
tries. This designation, however, can be applied strictly to









GOLD STANDARD COUNTRIES AND COUNTRIES PEGGED TO GOLD
Of the gold countries5, the United States, France, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, and Switzerland, constituted a core of genu-
ine gold standard countries. Countries in this group allowed
gold to move in and out as required by gold standard practice,
CHART 65
Gold Standard Countries and Countries pegged to Gold, Exchange
Rates on London, August 1931—February 1933, Monthly Averages of
Daily Quotations as Percentage Deviations from Par
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though even here there were some impediments and modifi-
cations. For example, the Netherlands limited the free export
of gold to countries also on the gold standard, and Switzer-
land was unwilling to purchase gold freely whenever offered
to her. Attached to this central core were 6 Central and East
European countries whose exchanges were kept relatively
stable in terms of the major gold standard currencies by vari-
ous forms of exchange restriction, ranging from the informal
and unofficial control exercised in Italy by the banksto the
rigid and elaborate system of regulation built up in Germany.
These countries have been grouped separately under the
classification, Countries Pegged to Gold. Their exchange
5Cf.'Regulations adopted by the Italian Federation of Credit and Insurance
(in force Sept. 1931—May 1934)';B.I.S.,Foreign Exchange Regulations, 1st
Issue.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1083
rates on London and those of the gold standard countries
proper are presented in Chart 65.
COUNTRIES ADHERING TO GOLD AT DIFFERENT LEVELS
Among the countries included in the gold group on the basis
of the behavior of their exchange rates are some whose re-
lation to gold was similar to that of the sterling area coun-
tries to sterling (Chart 66). Of these five are included in Mr.
CHART 66
Countries adhering to Gold at D?fferent Levels, Exchange Rates on
London and New York, August 1931—February 1933, Monthly
Averages of Daily Quotations as Percentage Deviations from Par
OtYIATION QIVIATIOS
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Wilson's analysis, two in Eastern Europe and the three ABC
countries of South America. All were under a regime of for-
eign exchange control. Argentina and Brazil had already
passed under such control before England suspended the gold
standard and had begun a new stabilization in terms of gold
at a 40 to 50 per cent depreciation. Chile, after maintaining
the old parity until the spring of 1932, fell into line with the
other two ABC countries for similar reasons. This group of
countries, however, at no time followed the fluctuations of
sterling in terms of the dollar. Like Australia in the sterling1084 DISINTEGRATION
group they attempted to achieve an economic balance by a
general depreciation of their exchanges in terms of the cur-
rencies of the center countries, but at the new level they chose
stability in francs and dollars in preference to stability in
sterling.
THE TWILIGHT ZONE
Of the 36 countries 5 fall into neither the sterling nor the
gold group. All these were subject to exchange control and
the behavior of their exchanges clearly indicates that the fun-
damental conditions of membership in a triangular system
of rates as described in Chapter 29 were not realized. Arbi-
trage did not play its accustomed role in determining their
relationship to sterling and to the gold standard currencies.
They occupied a sort of twilight zone between the world of
gold and the world of sterling.
COUNTRIES ATTEMPTING STABILIZATION IN BOTH STERLING AND
GOLD
In Chart 67 the exchanges of Austria, Uruguay, Spain, and
Turkey on London and New York are plotted. The Austrian
exchange on New York remained stable at a very slightly
depreciated level throughout the period, but the rate on
London did not reflect the movement of the sterling-dollar
rate. The Austrian crown did not begin to appreciate rapidly
in sterling until one month after the appreciation of the other
gold standard currencies. When it did, the appreciation was
only about one-half as great as that of the other gold standard
currencies. Then during the first six months of 1932 the
Austrian crown depreciated steadily in sterling until in June
1932 it stood practically 'at par' with both the dollar and the
pound, though in the same month the dollar was at a 331/s per
cent premium over the pound. This position could not be
maintained. The crown continued to be steady in terms of
the dollar, and began once more to appreciate in sterling. ButSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1085
Austriadid not as a consequence join the group of
countries. In February 1933thecrown stood at a 'premium'
of only 15percent over sterling as compared with the 42per
cent 'premium' of the American dollar in London. Nor did
the behavior of the Austrian crown conform to that of the
CHART 67
Countries attempting Stabi-
lization in both Sterling and
Gold,ExchangeRateson
London and York, Au-
gust1931—February1933,
Monthly Averages of Daily
QuotationsasPercentage
Deviations from Par
Canadian dollar, which also failed to share the full apprecia-
tion of the gold currencies in sterling. The Canadian dollar,
as has been shown, experienced a substantial depreciation in
dollars and also followed the fluctuations of sterling in New
York closely. This was not true of the crown, and the be-
havior of this exchange can be accounted for only by the
elimination of arbitrage. The behavior of the Spanish, Uru-
guayan, and Turkish exchanges, which were more completely
stable in both London and New York, shows the presence of
the same phenomenon in even more marked degree.
RAILS ON NEW 'IORP.
ON
me.. CACNANCE RATES ON LONDON
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COUNTRY DEPRECIATING IN BOTH STERLING AND GOLD
Japan continued as a member of the gold standard group for
only two months after September 1931, but when she aban-





Country depreciating in both
Sterling and Gold, Exchange
Rate on London and New
York,August 1931—Febru-
ary 1933,MonthlyAverages
of Daily Quotations as Per-
centage Deviations from Par
The common depreciation of the yen in both dollars and
sterling until November 1932, while these two currencies
were fluctuating in terms of each other, places Japan also in
the twilight zone (Chart 68).
The Grouping of the Nations
In bringing about this division of the world's currencies two
major forces were at work: (i)the economic pressure that
led to the disintegration of the gold standard facade at the
periphery; (2) the breakup of the nucleus to which the rest
of our discussion of the Disintegration period will be devoted.
As a result of the operation of these two forces the former
international gold standard system was divided into a world
of sterling and a world of gold whose boundaries, as disclosed
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of 36 Countries according to theBehaviorof Their Exchanges
September 1931—April
GOLD COUNTRIES




















2) Sterling Area Countries
Norway Sweden
Finland Denmark
3) Gold Standard Countries attracted into the Sterling Group
Canada Union of South Africa
COUNTRIES ATFEMPTING STABILIZATION IN BOTH STERLING AND GOLD
Uruguay Turkey
Spain Austria
COUNTRY DEPRECIATING IN BOTH STERLING AND GOLD
Japan
The Sterling Exchange and the London Price of Gold
The simplest and most general single statistical measure of
the new exchange relationships established among the center
countries by the breakup of the nucleus is the open market
price of gold in London. In Chart 69 and Table 79 the fluc-
tuations in the sterling-dollar, sterling-franc, and sterling-
reichsmark rates and in the London open market price of
gold from September 1931 to December 1933 are indicated.io88 DISINTEGRATION
To show the relation of the gold price to the three rates, the
four series are presented for the first Tuesday of each month
and in the following form: the pound sterling is expressed
as a percentage of its par value in the three currencies and the
Bank of England's buying price for gold is expressed as a
CHART 69
Relation of London Price of Gold to American and Continental Exchange





percentageof the market price. These figures reveal the close-
ness with which the London price of gold corresponded to
the exchange rate of sterling in that one of the three cur-
rencies in which its depreciation was the greatest. The omis-
sion of other gold standard currencies, such as the guilder and
the Swiss franc, and the presence in the bullion market at
certain times of a demand from hoarders prevent this corre-
spondence from being exact.
In conjunction with Chart ii,presentedin connection
with the discussion of the role of New York as a residual
buyer of gold from 1919to1924, Chart 69 completes a
graphical presentation of the depreciation of sterling in terms
of gold during the post-war period as a whole. These two
charts may serve as a text for further emphasis upon the chang-
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falls surrounding its interpretation. As pointed out in Chapter
io, the London open market price of gold from 1919 to 1924
was based upon the New York T/T parity price, and whatever
affected the sterling-dollar exchange affected the price of gold.
Basically, the fluctuations in the gold price reflected the great
TABLE 79
Relation of London Price of Gold to American and Continental
Exchange Rates, September 1931—December 1933,FirstTuesday
BANK OF ENGLAND
BUYING PRICE OF
POUND STERLING AS PERCENTAGE OF GOLD AS PERCENT-
PAR IN AGE OF MARKET
FrancsReichsrnarksDollars PRICE
'93'
Sept. gg.8 100.4 99.8 ioo.r
Oct. 79.3 83.2 79.6 78.4
Nov. 76.4 77.0 76.6 76.1
Dec. 67.8 67.9 67.8 67.9
1932
Jan. 68.g 69.7 6g.i 69.3
Feb. 70.9 71.4 70.9 71.0
March 71.3 71.6 7i.6 71.6
April 76.9 77.8 77.6 77.5
May 74.7 75.4 75.3 75.1
June 75.0 75.9 75.5 75.4
July 72.7 73.4 72.9 72.9
Aug. 72.2 72.3 72.2 72.6
Sept. 71.4 71.6 71.5 71.6
Oct. 70.9 71.1 71.0 71.1
Nov. 67.6 68.o 67.8 67.7
Dec. 66.o 65.5 65.8 65.7
'933
Jan. 68.8 68.5 68.6 68.6
Feb. 70.7 70.5 70.4 70.6
March 71.3 72.4 70.6' 71.0
April
May 68.2 70.' 8o.o 68.o
June 69.3 71.0 82.6 69.3
July 68.5 69.2 92.4 69.1
Aug. 68.4 68.3 91.7 68.5
Sept. 65.0 64.7 93.8 65.0
Oct. 63.4 63.3 97.9 63.3
Nov. 63.9 63.7 99.2 63.7
Dec. 67.2 67.0 104.9 67.4
Calculatedfromdata published in the Bankers', Imsurance Managers' and Agents'
Magazine; The Economist; Financial News
March 14.1090 DISINTEGRATiON
process of economic readjustment between Great Britain and
the United States to which we gave the general caption, the
Dance of the Price Levels. They did not reflect accurately the
position of sterling in the world system of exchange rates, for
in those years the currencies of the center countries other
than Great Britain were not bound in a stable exchange rela-
tionship under the gold standard. Depreciation in gold, as
measured by the difference between the Bank of England
buying price and the London market price, meant deprecia-
tion in dollars alone. The pattern of the world's exchanges
could be brought out only by the type of analysis given in our
section on Following the Leader in Chapter ii. After Sep-
tember 1931 the London price of gold was based on the T/T
parity price of that gold standard country whose exchange on
London happened to be highest. When the dollar was weak in
Paris, as in October 1932, it was based upon the sterling-franc
rate,° and when the franc was weak in New York, it was based
on the T/T parity rate on New York, unless both dollars and
francs were weak together in terms of some other gold stand-
ard currency. As long as England was the only center country
that had left the gold standard, and the boundaries of the
worlds of sterling and of gold were fixed as shown in the
preceding section, then the fluctuations in the London price
of gold did give a definite measure of the position of sterling
in the world system of exchange rates, allowance being made
for the depreciation of certain periphery countries in terms
of sterling. After April 1933, when the United States left the
gold standard, the bid of those wishing to buy gold in London
and ship it to the United States for sale to the United States
Treasury was no longer effective in the London market.
After that date, the London price of gold was based upon the
buying prices of the countries still remaining on the gold
standard, and the exchange rates of their currencies on Lon-
don. So predominant was France in this group that the franc
parity price became in fact the basic price in the London gold
6SamuelMontagu & Co., Weekly Review, Oct. i8, 1932.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1091
market (Chart 69). Under these circumstances the sterling
price of gold, though still a measure of sterling depreciation
in gold, once more ceased to be a true indication of the place
of sterling in the world's currency system.
The observer of the history of the world's currencies who
examines his subject from the point of view of gold is forced
under such circumstances to make sudden shifts in his base of
observation, whereas an examination of the central foreign
exchange triangle as a whole provides an approach that neces-
sitates no such shifts. In considering the period September
1931toApril 1933,however,no great practical difference
arises in approaching the problem from the viewpoint of
sterling depreciation in gold, or that of the common move-
ment of two legs of a major foreign exchange triangle, the
third leg of which is a rate between two gold standard coun-
tries. In either case the first step is to examine British policy,
and the second, to study its repercussions upon the world of
gold.CHAPTER 31
The Reorientation of British Policy after
September 1931
Thesuspension of the gold standard wasfollowedby a re-
markable reorientation of British economic and financial
policy. Like Candide, Great Britain resolved to accept, with-
out rejoicing, the results of the concatenation of past events
and to cultivate her garden. This garden was an extensive
one. It consisted, first, of the home market; second, of the
wide, but no longer world-wide, area of dominant British
financial and economic influence. Four major tools were used
to cultivate it: the abandonment of free trade principles, the
forging of closer economic ties with the countries within the
sphere of British influence, the provision of cheap and abun-
dant credit, and the control of the sterling exchange.
The techniques adapted to this new attitude were devel-
oped in the empirical way characteristic of British tempera-
ment. In no field was this more true than in foreign exchange
policy. In discussing the post-war changes in the London
money market we said that it was characteristic of the peculiar
British business genius to work out by trial and error a
method of doing business that gave satisfactory results and to
experiment no further. It was by an analogous process that
gradually, after September 1931, a profound, and in view of
the preceding history of British finance, an epochal change in
the British attitude toward the international gold standard
was worked out.
Easing the Shock
The decision to leave the gold standard was probably made at
the Bank of England on Wednesday, September i6, or on the
1092STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1093
followingday. The Bank then took the view that the mount-
ing withdrawals had exhausted its reserves, for it regarded the
gold that still remained as earmarked for the repayment of its
foreign credits. Friday, Saturday, and Sunday were spent in
preparingfor the actual suspension on the following Monday.
The B.I.S. and other central banks were notified, a duty very
distasteful to the Bank of England because of the losses about
to be imposed upon its foreign depositors. By an inconvenient
coincidence, the London Stock Exchange on September ag
held itsfirst Saturday morning session in fourteen years.
Selling was active and all prices fell heavily. On Saturday
afternoon the Stock Exchange Committee was notified of the
impending action, and arranged to close the House on
Monday and Tuesday. The Bank, being apprehensive that
runs would follow the suspension, informed the clearing
banks on Saturday after closing and arranged for them to
obtain additional cash to send to points where it seemed
likely to be needed. The Bank was also apprehensive lest the
idea should spread that a low rate of sterling was pleasing to
it, for its chief concern was not to gain advantages for British
export trade by exploiting the new situation, but to conserve
the international utility of the London money market. This
concern was expressed both in the terms of the official
nouncement of the suspension of the gold standard and in the
preparation of certain measures for defending sterling under
the first shock of that announcement.
The note of defense and the note of reassurance were there-
fore strongly accented in the following passages of the
government's official statement of September
"HisMajesty's government have no reason to believe that the
present difficulties are due to any substantial extent to the export
of capital by British Nationals. Undoubtedly the bulk of the
withdrawals have been for foreign account. They desire, however,
to repeat emphatically the warning given by the Chancellor of
the Exchequer that any British citizen who increases the strain on
the exchanges by purchasing foreign securities himself or assisting
others to do so is deliberately adding to the country's difficulties.
The banks have undertaken to cooperate in restricting purchases1094 DISINTEGRATION
by British citizens of foreign exchange, except those required for
the actual needs of trade or for meeting existing contracts, and,
should further measures prove to be advisable, His Majesty's
government will not hesitate to take them.
S S S S • S S • .
HisMajesty's government are securing a balanced Budget, and
the internal position of the country is sound. This position must
be maintained. It is one thing to go off the gold standard with an
unbalanced Budget and uncontrolled inflation; it is quite an-
other thing to take this measure, not because of internal financial
difficulties, but because of excessive withdrawals of borrowed
capital. The ultimate resources of this country are enormous, and
there is no doubt that the present exchange difficulties will prove
only temporary."
The measures of defense were the imposition of high interest
rates, the enforcement of exchange restrictions, and the re-
striction of speculative activity on the London Stock Ex-
change. On September 2 i Bank rate was raised from 41/2to6
per cent, and market rates immediately followed. On the next
day the following brief Treasury Order was issued:
"The Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, in pursu-
ance of Section ' ofthe Gold Standard (Amendment) Act,
1931,herebyorder that until further notice purchases of foreign
exchange or transfers of funds with the object of acquiring such
exchange, directly or indirectly, by British subjects or persons
resident in the United Kingdom shall be prohibited except for
the purpose of financing
i)Normaltrading requirements
2)Contracts existing before September 21, 1931
3)Reasonable travelling or other personal purposes."'
The Stock Exchange was closed on September 21 and 22.
Since this resulted in the appearance of a Street market, trad-
ing was resumed without restriction on Wednesday, Septem-
ber 23. The next day gilt edged securities were sold heavily
and equity shares rose. The action of the market was ap-
parently interpreted by the Treasury as evidence of public
1B.I.S.,Foreign Exchange Regulations, 2d Issue.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1095
apprehension and fear of currency inflation. Three days later
the Committee, probably at the suggestion of the Treasury,
prohibited all dealings except for cash.2
The life of the three defensive measures was roughly five
months. Bank rate was reduced from 6 to 5 per cent on
February i8 and from 5 to 4 per cent on March io, 1932. No
elaborate code governing private dealings in the exchanges
or obliging foreign exchange to be cleared through official
agencies was promulgated, and not even a beginning was
made toward the regulation of international commerce for
the purpose of conserving foreign exchange. The exchange
regulations were issued under temporary powers and were
directed against speculative transactions tending to depress
the pound and against the flight of capital. They were soon
relaxed in practice and were officially withdrawn on March 2,
1932. The restrictions on the London Stock Exchange were
relaxed and finally abolished even earlier. By November i6,
1931 the Treasury's fear of panic selling by the public was
sufficiently allayed to allow the partial removal of restrictions.
The Committee felt able to permit the resumption of deal-
ings for the Account, but still prohibited option business and
carrying over from one Account to another. That this was at
the suggestion of the Treasury may be inferred from the ac-
tion of the Glasgow Stock Exchange which decided at this
time to permit continuation business, but was compelled to
rescind its decision "at the request of the Treasury." B Just be-
fore Christmas option business was again permitted, and on
January 26, 1932 the normal procedures of the London Stock
Exchange were fully restored.
The Defense of Sterling, September 1931
to February 1932
The disappearance of these defensive measures marked a
genuine turning point in the history of the pound sterling.
By March 1932 the special obligations incurred in defense of
The Economist, Sept. 26, 1931, pp. 572, 576; Jan. 30, 1932, p. 246.
8lbid., Nov. 14, 1931, p. 922.iog6 DISINTEGRATION
the gold standard were paid off or provided for. The experi-
ment of the gold exchange standard without a focal point was
liquidated. The home market had received the stimulus of a
protective tariff. British industry had begun to taste the sweets
of an undervalued exchange. The boundaries of the sterling
area were disclosed. Confidence in sterling was reestablished.
These developments profoundly influenced the sterling ex-
change. They account for the fact that in March 1932 there
was a remarkable change from a policy of defending to one of
controlling sterling. This may be made clear by a brief re-
view of the forces playing upon sterling during these five
months.
On Monday, September 21, 1931, the foreign exchange
markets of the world were very nearly demoralized. Quota-
tions for sterling were almost nominal. The market in London
was very thin and such quotations for francs and dollars
against sterling as were available were established in Paris and
New York. The spread between cables and demand was at
times very wide, and fluctuations were extremely erratic. This
condition continued for several days, as is evidenced by the
accompanying quotations for sterling in New York given in
the Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
Sterling Rates in New Tork, September 18-26, 1931
DEMAND CABLES
Closing,Friday, Sept. i8 4.85k
Range Saturday, 19 4.84*Q 4.85+* 4.84* © 4.85.14
Monday, 21 3.70 @4.35 3.85 @ 4.32*
Tuesday, 22 4.05 @4.25 4.12 @ 4.22
Wednesday, 23 4.07 @4.20 4.09 @ 4.14*
Thursday, 24 3.79 @ 3.93k 3.80 © 3.94*
Friday, 25 3.46 @ 3.84* 3.543.85
Saturday, 26 3.78 @ 3.86 3.79 @ 3.87
The situation, in fact, was characterized by confusion and
uncertainty rather than by a concerted large scale offer of
sterling. Many transactions were kept off the market by the
common policy of the London banks and acceptance houses
in opposing bear raids on sterling and flights of capital. TheirSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
policy was to deal only with their own clientele in both spot
and forward exchange transactions, to discourage the sale
foreign currency notes, to refuse to sell exchange to clients
who did not offer proof that the transaction was of a purely
commercial character, to refuse all requests of stock brokers
for foreign exchange except to settle debts incurred before
September 2 i, to carry out no foreign exchange transactions
for foreign account that would produce sterling overdrafts, to
review alloverdraft and acceptance facilitiesoffered to
foreigners and to prohibit the transaction known as 'forward
swaps.'The formal exchange restrictions of the Treasury
were an official statement of, and sanction behind, this
policy. The restrictions on speculation on the London Stock
Exchange supported it. In the main, however, it was effective
because it did not have to withstand the great and sustained
pressure of a genuine flight of capital. The authorities were
not able to discover any seepage of British capital abroad by
devious channels, and the way in which British subjects met
all the requirements of the government in this respect was
very impressive.
The first week of wild fluctuations in the exchanges was
followed by a week of relative dullness with sterling quoted
around 3.90, a depreciation of about 20 per cent. The situa-
tion seemed, however, still rather precarious. A large amount
of foreign balances and foreign held acceptances still re-
mained in London subject to quick withdrawal unless con-
fidence in sterling could be maintained. These were estimated
by The Statist in its issue of October 3, 1g31(p. 455) at
about £125 million: £80 million of French official balances
and bills, £5 million of private French balances and bills, £io
million of private American balances and bills, and £30
lion of other foreign assets. If confidence in sterling could be
restored there would be a strong motive for keeping these
assets in London. Their withdrawal would have meant the
actual realization of large paper losses and destroyed all
4Financial News (London), Sept. 23, 1931.1098 DISINTEGRATION
prospect of benefiting from a later improvement in the rate.
The possibility of extending the £'a°million and
American credits secured to defend sterling was also bound
up in the question of confidence in the pound. So also was
the capacity of London to prevent the crisis from causing ac-
ceptance and other international financial business from
being shifted to New York and other centers. For these
reasons the 6 per cent Bank rate was of peculiar importance,
for it was a sign of a determination to resist incipient infla-
tionary influences. The whole tenor of British official and
banking comment was intent upon reinforcing this impres-
sion, and pressure was brought to bear quietly but firmly to
prevent any sudden increase in prices.
The weakness in sterling immediately after the abandon-
ment of the gold standard was added to by the effect of ster-
ling depreciation on the movement of gold from South Africa.
For several weeks produced gold was held back in
South Africa until it could be determined whether, under
existing marketing arrangements(cf. Ch. 19), the gold
producers could secure the full benefits of the 'premium'
that appeared in the price of gold. As employed in South
Africa the term tpremium' on gold meant the difference be-
tween the market price of gold and Bank of England buying
price. During Restoration the existence of such a 'premium'
had played a great role in the South African economy.5 At
that time, however, the South African pound had followed
sterling, and the 'premium' was translated into a larger num-
ber of South African pounds received by the gold producers.
After September 21, 1931 the situation was quite different.
•South Africa remained on the gold standard and the South
African pound appreciated in sterling approximately 6to
Cf. W. A. Brown, Jr., England and the New Gold Standard (London, King,
1929),pp.22—6, 75—82, 127—30, i8i—6.
O Asshown in Ap. Table 5, the South African exchange appreciated in terms
of sterling less than did the American dollar, and consequently was at a
small discount in terms of the dollar. The appreciation of the London
market price of gold over the standard price was correspondingly greater thanSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1099
thesame degree that the market price of gold rose above its
statutory price. Consequently ifthe gold producers had
changed their method of marketing their product and,
steadof selling their gold to the Reserve Bank of South
Africa, had sold it directly in the bullion market, as they did
from 1919to1924, they would have received more sterling,
but on remittance home their 'gain' on the 'premium' would
have been offset by their 'loss' on the exchange. As far as
meeting their South African costs of production was con••
cerned they would have been in the same position as before,
but they would have benefited by the higher sterling value
of their product so far as they used the proceeds to purchase
equipment in England or to remit dividends to London, This
would also have been true, however, had they continued to
sell their whole output to the Reserve bank of South Africa,
for they would have received the same number of South
African pounds as before, and these South African pounds
had an increased power to purchase sterling. It soon became
evident, therefore, that nothing was to be gained by altering
the existing marketing arrangements as long as South Africa
remained on the gold standard. The technique of handling
South African gold in London, in fact, remained entirely
unchanged except that no Reserve Bank gold was sold to the
Bank of England whose bid was not competitive, and that
the sales were no longer carried out on Tuesday of each week
but were spread throughout the week. This was a natural
consequence of wide daily fluctuations of the sterling ex-
change in terms of gold currencies.
The interruption of the gold flow from South Africa was
therefore short. When shipments were resumed they came
forward in about the same volume as before the abandon.-
ment of the gold standard (Table 80), but were not regularly
the appreciation of the South African pound. Moreover the South Afric2-
London rate, as fixed by the London banks, did not follow the often sub-
stantial day to day changes in the market price of gold. The relation de-
scribed in the text was therefore only approximate.1100 DISINTEGRATION
made available for sale in the open market until March
1932,? being bought for the most part by a 'special buyer.'
This special buyer was undoubtedly the Treasury, which was
under obligation to accumulate in advance the resources
needed to meet the £8o million French and American credits
secured in September as the final measure taken in defense
TABLE 8o
Major Components of the Gold Movement through London
October 1931—February 1932 (millions of dollars)
ALL
OTHER
SWITZER- BRITISH SOUTH COUN-
U.S.A. FRANCEHOLLANDLAND INDIA AFRICA TRIES
1931
Oct. 1.' —6.7 —9.4 —2.5 8.3 21.6 3.1
Nov. —4.6 —63.5 —14.1 —9.9 26.5 i6.o 4.1
Dec. —7.5 —25.9 —4.5 —18.3 22.8 20.1 .5
1932
Jan. —4.1 —64.9 —3.5 —.2 45.9 17.0 2.5
Feb. 2.2 —52.7 —7.5 —3.7 30.6 2o.8 3.9
March —.1 —40.8 —3.4 —7.3 24.3 20.6 4.1
Total —13.0 —254.5 —42.4 —41.9 158.4ii6.i 18.2
Total Net Exports, $59.' million
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1933, p.
of the pound as a gold standard currency. This did not mean,
however, that England's gold income from South Africa no
longer supported the sterling exchange. It did so in a special
way when utilized by the Treasury to build up balances
abroad. The export did not necessarily follow at once upon
the import or go necessarily to the same destination as if it
had been sold in the open market. Table 8o strongly suggests
that during October the major portion of gold imported
from South Africa was temporarily detained in England.
By this time, however, England was already in receipt of a
substantial gold income from another source. India remained
a sterling-standard country, and the rising sterling price of
gold in London was consequently translated into a rising
rupee price of gold in India. All the forces promoting a gold
TSamuel Montagu & Co., Annual Bullion Letter, 1932.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1101
export movement from India were greatly strengthened (cf.
Ch. 23) .Largeshipments were sent to London. Much of this
gold was sold forward, so that the support given the sterlirg
exchange was felt before the gold itself arrived in London.
By the beginning of October 1931 the rapid decline in
sterling encountered a double check. The export of
capital from August to September 21 had been considerable,8
but in less than two weeks after the suspension this move-
ment was reversed. As early as the last days of September
British insurance companies and investment trusts and other
foreign holders began to sell securities heavily in New York.
Time loans placed in New York by British interests were
allowed to mature and the proceeds remitted home, and
French rentes were also being sold and the proceeds sent to
London.9 The main influence, however, in strengthening
sterling was the covering of the bear position built up before
September 21, which amounted to between £40 and £60
lion. The Bank of England took advantage of this bear
covering and began to accumulate dollars and francs to meet
its foreign loans. This was the beginning of the Bank's activity
in smoothing out daily fluctuations in the sterling
The technique employed was both to buy and sell, but to buy
more than it sold, and was a revival of the methods used by
the Dollar Exchange Account in accumulating dollars to
meet the American war debt payments. The Treasury was
still able to operate in the market, and did so to accumulate
francs and dollars to meet its own obligations, but its trading
funds were now limited tO £25 million and therefore could
not be an effective stabilizing factor when the market was
active and daily transactions were occasionally as large as £10
million or more. The tendency of the sterling exchange was
upward during October (Chart 70), and at the end of the
month confidence was further restored by the announcement
that the Bank of England had arranged to pay £20 million
SCf.Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Sept. 26, 1981,p.1967.
Samuel Montagu & Co., Weekly Review, Oct. i,1931.1102 DISINTEGRATION
of the £50 million credits obtained in France and America in
advance of the due date, November 31, and to extend the
balance for another three months. Payment was partly made
by a shipment of £15 million in gold taken from the Bank's
reserve, which was reflected in a loss of reserve of this amount





,By this time, however, another new element had entered
the situation. On October7 Parliament had been prorogued
and on October 27 a new national government pledged toa
protective tariff policy was overwhelmingly elected to office.
This election was followed by a great increase in the importa-
tion of goods to escape impending tariff charges, and at the
same time the cost of imports was being increased by rising
prices for cereals, cotton, and wool. Sterling consequently
was again weakened, but the government acted immediately
to counteract the import movement. On November ig an act
known as the Abnormal Importations (Custom Duties) Act
was passed giving the Board of Trade the power to place an
additional duty up to ioo per cent of the value of the article
on a wide variety of commodities if it was satisfied that im-
ports were in 'abnormal' quantities. Empire goods, however,
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percent duty on many articles, went into effect on November
25.
Sterling was at this under seasonal pressure, the 'as-
normal' imports did not at once cease to cause offers of ste:-
ling, and the effect of exchange restrictions in other coui-
tries was already seriously impeding the remittance home of
the proceeds of British exports. In addition, the contineiriit
was still alert for any signs of inflation in Great Britain. 0i
November 30, 1931 fears that there would be a further in-
crease in the Fiduciary Issue at the Bank of England resulied
in withdrawals of foreign, especially French, funds. Coming
on a weak market this contributed to a sharp decline of
ling which on November 30 closed inNew York at 3.43. Thfs
decline itself gave rise to further fears of inflation, and the
next day sterling fell to 3.27. This sharp decline, carrying the
depreciation in gold currencies to 33 per cent, took place in
a very thin market. The turnover was small and
small transactions moved the rate substantially. On Decem-
ber 3 sterling was strongly supported by one of the Big Five.
Speculative sales ceased and the decline was checked,
December 14 sterling was very strong and reached 3.461,4,
movement caused by a sudden drive against the dollar owing
to fears of unfavorable news to be disclosed in President
Hoover's forthcoming budget message to Congress. On
cember 19 sterling again declined sharply, falling i 11/2 cents
in one day and closing at 3.34. This decline was due to the
reaffirmation by the American Congress, in ratifying the
Hoover Moratorium of June, that the United States was
unalterably opposed to any reduction or cancellation of war
debts. This was followed by an almost equally sharp recovery.
Clearly the prestige of the pound was still far from fully
established when the sterling-dollar rate—usually the broad.
est exchange market in the world, capable of taking care of
very large transactions with very small concessions in price—
could be moved about in this fashion by relatively
speculative dealings. The weakness of sterling, however, was1104 DISINTEGRATION
partly due to causes directly connected with a restoration of
its international prestige. A portion of the Bank of England's
foreign credits had still to be paid off, and during the Decem-
ber declines the Bank of England was probably a seller in the
market." Again in January and February 1932, when seasonal
factors were in favor of sterling and a rising tendency ap-
peared, this was counteracted by further official sales. Funds
were being accumulated first by the Bank and then by the
Treasury also to repay their French and American credits. By
this time, however, the situation was changing rapidly, and
a series of constructive steps soon put an entirely new com-
plexion upon the whole foreign exchange position.
On January 28, 1932 the Bank of England announced that
arrangements had been completed for the repayment of the
remaining £3° million of the August French and American
credits without further drafts on the Bank's reserve. Early in
February the bullion brokers announced that they were
willing to purchase sovereigns from the public at market
prices and before long exports of gold obtained from this
source were taking place at the rate of Li million per week.'2
Early in February also a new tariff bill was passed which
established a general protective tariff of io per cent ad
valorem and other duties, and which was equipped with
various 'fighting' provisions. This measure came into effect
on March i. Finally it was announced on March 2 that ar-
rangements had been made to pay £43 million of the £80
million French and American credits three months before
their due date. Simultaneously the official exchange re-
strictions were dropped.
Immediately following the announcement concerning the
Treasury credits large amounts of dollars and francs were
bought on 'special' account, and the general feeling was that
as soon as these purchases were completed sterling would go
TheFipancial News infers this from a rise of million in acceptances
bought for foreign central banks by the Federal Reserve banks (Dec. i6, 1931).
12 SamuelMontagu & Co., Annual Bullion Letter, 1932,andWeekly Review,
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up and a long period of easy money would begin. The signai
that they were completed was given on Tuesday, March 8,
whenSouth African gold was once more made available in
the open market and was taken for France. On March g the
bulk of the Treasury credits was repaid.13 A rapid inflow
foreign funds followed at once. Sterling immediately rose 7
percent, money became very easy in London, and on March
io Bank rate was reduced from 5 to 4 per cent.
The period during which sterling had to be defended
against the consequences of the shock of leaving the gold
standard thus ended abruptly. With remarkable suddenness
a new phase of British currency history began and witha
new British attitude toward sterling depreciation.
The Control of Sterling, March to December 1932
On December 4, 1931, when sterling stood in New York
3.35, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke of the
depreciation of sterling in terms entirely free from any
emphasis or outlook at variance with tradition: "I have no
doubt," he said, "that foreign holders of sterling balances
who have been taking their funds away from London will
presently find that they have made a bad bargain. I see no
reason why depreciation in the value of sterling should be
substantial or prolonged."Thewithdrawals of sterling
balances referred to by Mr. Chamberlain had included a large
scale liquidation of gold exchange standard balances 15and
had helped to substitute for the last traces of sterling
SamuelMontagu & Co., in their Weekly Review, April 7, 1932,said:"Of
the $200,000,000bankingcredit arranged last August in favor of H. M. Treas-
ury for the purpose of strengthening the sterling exchange, $150,000,000was
paid off on March g, $30,000,000onMarch 29,and$20,000,000Ofl April5.
The U.S. Treasury does not cancel the credit which will consequently remain
available till August 29,next,should occasion arise. Credits totaling Fcs.
5,000,000,000werearranged in France in August. Half of this amount con-
sisted of banking credits which have already been paid off. The other half
was in the form of one-year Treasury Bonds, and cannot therefore be repaid
before maturity."
'4Ibid.,Jan. 7, 1932(ouritalics) -
15 Cf.Ch. 32,TheFate of the Gold Exchange Standard.iio6 DISINTEGRATION
valuation a definite undervaluation in many currencies, in
particular, in dollars.'6 At this time no strong economic inter-
est was opposed to an improvement in the rate. The chief, if
not the only concern of the Bank of England and the Treasury
about the economic, as distinct from the financial, effects of
sterling depreciation was lest it should increase the cost of
living. They had not, nor had anyone in England, expected
gold prices to decline as sharply as they did under the shock
to confidence occasioned by Great Britain going off the gold
standard. Consequently the decline in sterling was more
fully offset by falling gold prices than was expected. The gen-
eral trend of retail prices before September 2 i had been
downward, and after that date cost of living had not risen
very much, but a low exchange rate was still thought to be
undesirable from this point of view. The first substantial rise
in sterling, in March 1932, was therefore not opposed on
economic grounds. On the contrary, it was greeted with jubi-
lation as evidence that the pound was about to resume its
ancient role as a world currency and that London was to con-
tinue as a great international financial center. As the rise
continued, however, this jubilation gave way to another feel-
ing. When, on March 31, 1932, sterling touched 3.80 in New
York, Samuel Montagu and Company expressed this feeling
as follows:
"Sentiment which was all against this country at the end of last
year has turned in our favor, and large amounts of foreign money
have been offered in this market; the problem is how to keep
sterling from rising at too rapid a rate to be healthy." 17
16 Withthe breakup of the nucleus almost insuperable obstacles were en-
countered in making any estimates of under- or overvaluation of sterling. Such
estimates usually assume, by implication at least, that the comparison is with
dollar prices, but much the largest part of British trade, and the most sub-
ject to competition, was with countries outside the dollar area. From the
point of view of British exports the most important sterling rates were those
with Empire countries and Western Europe. Though recognizing these diffi-
culties fully, N. F. Hall condudes that in November and December 1931
sterlingwas undoubtedly undervalued somewhat. The Exchange Equalisation
Account (London, Macmillan, Ch. VI, passim, especially p.
17 Montagu& Co., Weekly Review, March 31,1932 (ouritalics).STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1107
Apprehension lest sterling continue to rise was partly, if
not wholly, based on disappointment at the effects of a low
exchange rate in stimulating British exports. The protective
measures taken by other countries in the form of tariffs,
quotas, and exchange restrictions, increased costs due to
higher sterling prices for imports, and the lack of any ex-
change advantage within the wide sterling area were all
combining to counteract the expected stimulus to exports.
Great Britain was already encountering the obstacles that
prevented world production for export from showing any
improvement in 1932 as compared with 1931. These are
described by the World Economic Survey, 1932/3 (p.86):
"Exchange instability has...beena disturbing influence [on
production]. In some of the countries which abandoned the gold
standard the export industries received an immediate, but in
most cases, temporary stimulus. The stimulus was limited by
further falls in prices, increasing trade restrictions, and the gen-
eralization of currency depreciation. On the whole it was the
home markets which were best sustained in the countries which
abandoned the gold standard."
There were also grounds for believing that if an under-
valuation of sterling had existed at the close of '93' it had
been eliminated by the rise of the pound from a 30 per cent
to a 20 per cent depreciation. This was the view of N. F. Hall,
who based his belief partly on the initial fact of an overvalua-.
tion at the time sterling left the gold standard and partly on
the subsequent effect of continued declines in prices in gold
standard countries while the influence of high cost imports
was being felt in the British price structure.'8
In addition, certain technical considerations made a further
appreciation of sterling caused by a continued inflow of
foreign funds seem undesirable and even dangerous. Mr. Hall
has described these as foflows (op. cit., p. 38):
"In the absence of 'speculative' influences, the spread between
spot and forward rates in the exchange rate between any two
18 op. cit., p.iio8 DISINTEGRATiON
large money centers ought to cancel out SUCh differences as may
exist between their money rates. When the premium on the for-
ward dollar is less than that which is necessary to offset a rate of
interest higher in London than in New York, there must be a
speculative position in spot sterling. The only period after the
suspension of the gold standard when the forward dollar was at a
sufficient premium to equalize realizable earnings in London and
New York was at the end of November and early in December
1931.Thereafter,the forward rate tended to go at a discount and
the discount increased as the spot rate rose. The size of the dis-
count meant that balances in London must also have risen quite
substantially and that the exchange risk involved had not been
covered. As the forward contracts matured some fall in the rate
for spot sterling was inevitable, so that the general external value
of the pound was extremely unstable. The fall in spot sterling
caused by the covering of the unbalanced forward contracts
might, if it was allowed to develop unchecked, have caused a sec-
ond withdrawal of balances from London, and in consequence, a
rise of bill rates there. To prevent disturbances on a large scale
occurring, steps had to be taken to fortify confidence in the pound
so that balances bona fide required in London, and not present
there only in anticipation of a further rise in sterling, should not
be frightened away."
The rise in sterling in the spring of 1932 therefore pro-
vided substantial grounds for a transition in foreign exchange
policy from one of defending to one of controlling or manag-
ing sterling.
Exchange Control through the Bank of England, and the
Concept of Gold as Standard and Gold as Reserve in England
In April 1932 the rising trend of the sterling exchange re-
ceived a definite check (Chart 70), and there was evidence
in the published statements of the Bank of England that this
was at least partly due to sales of sterling by the Bank. Under
the Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1928 foreign exchange
had been inclLided for the first time among the securities
against which Bank of England Notes could be issued(cf.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1109
Ch. 19). This foreign exchange was included in the item
'other securities' in the Issue Department. From September
23, 1931 to February 24, 1932 this item declined £26 million,
while the item 'other government securities' in the Issue De-
partment increased by a corresponding amount, indicating
that the Bank was disposing of its foreign exchange. From
February 24 to June ithe general movement of these two
items was reversed, 'other securities' in the Issue Department
rising £62 million and 'other government securities' falling
correspondingly. During March there was a gradual change,
indicating purchases of foreign exchange by the Banking De-
partment, their exchange for government securities at the
Issue Department, and probably the sale of the government
CHART 71
Bank of England, Selected Balance Sheet Items
September 1931—JUly1932
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securities in the market to offset the domestic effects of the
purchase of foreign exchange. In March 'other securities' in
the Banking Department increased substantially, suggesting
further accumulations of foreign exchange by the Bank.
These last inferences cannot be drawn with confidence, for
the securities items on the balance sheet of the Banking De-
partment are very diverse and their net movement reflects
the resultant of many different types of transaction. They are1110 DISINTEGRATION
borne out, however, by the clear indications of a substantial
transfer of foreign exchange from the Banking Department
to the issue Department in April (Chart 71). During that
month sterling ceased to rise and the very substantial changes
in the securities held by the Issue Department were attrib-
uted by the market to the Bank's foreign exchange opera-
tions. In their Weekly. Review, April 21,1932, Samuel
Montagu and Company said (our italics):
"The Bank of England Return continues to show heavy changes
in the securities of the Issue Department. In the last three weeks
Other Government Securities have fallen from £240,864,396 to
£208,680,635 and Other Securities have risen from £19,314,668 to
£51,486,758. The securities items in the Banking Department
have also varied considerably. This week government securities
have increased £2,229,000 while Other Securities have fallen
£11,620,961. All these changes are generally assumed to be occa-
sioned by the Bank's operations in the foreign exchange in behalf
of the Treasury and itself."
Intervention in the foreign exchanges by the Bank of Eng-
land on such a scale as a permanent policy encountered seri-
ous technical and psychological difficulties. At least six such
difficulties may be distinguished:
i) When the Banking Department sold government securi-
ties to make room in its portfolio for foreign exchange, or to
offset the domestic effects of its purchases of foreign exchange,
it diminished its power to deal effectively with purely domes-
tic credit control problems in the future. Part of its portfolio
could not be sold to contract credit at home without simul-
taneously strengthening sterling abroad. These two aims
might often be jointly desired, but not necessarily so at all
times and in all circumstances.
2) To the extent that the issue Department sold government
securities to the Banking Department and received foreign
exchange in return, it had to assume an exchange risk on a
portion of the assets against which Bank of England Notes
were issued. To the extent that the Banking DepartmentSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD11R11
bought and retained foreign exchange it had to assume an ex-
change risk on a part of its portfolio. This exchange risk was
of a twofold character:
a)the risk involved in the possibility of a general
tion of sterling in terms of the group of currencies held by
the Bank so that the Bank could not sell any of its foreign
exchange holdings without taking a loss in sterling;
b)the risk involved in the possible depreciation of one or
more of the foreign currencies held by the Bank in terms of
other foreign currencies, as well as in sterling.
As long as the world was divided into a world of gold and
a world of sterling the exchange risk taken by the Bank was
of the first type alone. But to the extent that there was a pos-
sibility that some gold standard country in whose exchange
the Bank had invested might become detached from the
world of gold, the Bank had to assume a risk of the second
type also. This was similar to the risk involved in the
ment of Operating a Gold Exchange Standard without a
Focal Point, which had brought actual losses to many centra'
banks after September 1931andhad ended that Experiment.
3) The Bank could escape from the particular exchange risk
involved in the holding of individual foreign currencies by
converting its foreign exchange portfolio into gold.
ever, it could not thus escape from the general exchange risk
of the first type as long as the London market price of
was a function of the sterling exchange rate in gold standard
currencies. The Bank, moreover, under the terms of the Gold
Standard (Amendment) Act of September i931, could
vert foreign exchange into gold only by assuming a
keeping loss in sterling in exchange for a hidden asset. At
the moment of conversion, this bookkeeping loss and this hid-
den asset were equal. If, however, the price of gold in the
market were to fall below the market price prevailing when
the gold was bought, the hidden asset would become less than
the bookkeeping loss. If the market price of gold were to re-
turn to an equivalence with the Bank of England's statutory1112 DISINTEGRATION
buying price, then the hidden asset would entirely disappear
and there would be no offset against the bookkeeping loss.
This requires some explanation. The Gold Standard (Amend-
ment) Act of had simply relieved the Bank of England
of its obligation to redeem its notes in gold bullion at a
fixed price in sterling. It had not changed the definition of
the sovereign asi 13.00 1 grains of fine gold. It did not em-
power the Bank of England to buy gold at above its statutory
price. It restored the position existing from September 1919
to April 1925 under which England was operating a domestic
gold standard. The Bank of England reserve was expressed in
terms of the pre-war gold sovereign, and being so constituted,
it became a limiting fund pure and simple. As such it con-
tinued to be used in the technical administration of British
credit policy. It was subject to arbitrary increase or decrease
by purchases or sales of gold at the Bank's initiative, but the
Bank's proportion was in no way influenced by changes in
the sterling market price of gold.'9 Therefore if the Bank
wished to convert its foreign exchange into gold, or to buy
gold instead of foreign exchange, it could do so only by pay-
ing for the gold at market prices and carrying the gold on its
books at the statutory price. A bookkeeping loss had to be ab-
sorbed by this transaction, but the gold could be sold again
at market prices. As long as the market price was not less than
the price at which the gold was bought, there was an offset in
the form of a hidden asset. But the London market price of
gold was a function of the sterling exchange on countries that
still maintained the gold standard obligation of buying all
gold offered at a fixed price and were able to outbid the Bank
of England in the bullion market. By converting foreign ex-
change assets into gold therefore, the Bank of England could
not escape an exchange risk, for the loss in the sterling value
of the gold bought by the Bank of England as sterling appre-
ciated in gold standard currencies was a foreign exchange
Cf.Ch. 9, Gold as Reserve.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
phenomenon.20 The only exchange risk eliminated was that
incurred by holding particular currencies, for the holding
gold gave the Bank of England a claim on that gold
currency which at any given moment happened to be strong-
est in terms of sterling.
The possibility of an ultimate revaluation in sterling
allthe gold held by the Bank of England provided a source
from which all these possible losses could be made good—
not only the losses on gold purchased at prices higher than
that at which such a revaluation was made, but also losses on
holdings of foreign exchange. It did not alter the fact that the
Bank of England could not escape an exchange risk by pur-
chasing either gold or foreign exchange as long as sterling
was not held in a stable relation to the world's principal cur-
rencies.
4)If the Bank of England did convert its foreign exchange
holdings into gold or bought gold as a result of its operations
in the control of the foreign exchanges, it could do so only by
reducing its Fiduciary Issue or by increasing the proportion
of the Banking Department. Mr. Hall points out that this
"might have been interpreted to foreshadow a change in in-
ternal conditions." That is, it might have interfered with the
effectiveness with which credit control was administered in
England with the aid of a fixed or arbitrarily altered gold re-
serve used as a 'limiting fund.' But that would have followed
also had the Bank been able to purchase gold at market prices
and to carry it at cost in its accounts. In that case, indeed, the
Bank's intervention in the exchange market would have left
even greater traces on its return, and the psychological reac-
tion of the public might have placed even greater difficulties
in the Bank's way.
5)Since the Bank's operations in the exchange market
would have had to be indicated, however obscurely, in its.
published statements, the size and general character of the
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steps taken against speculators would have become public,
and the secrecy necessary for their effectiveness would have
been partly lost. Indeed, the interpretation of the Bank re-
turn might, under these circumstances, itself have given new
fuel to speculative enterprise, though whether the encourage-
ment to speculation would have been greater than that cus-
tomarily induced by the Bank's traditional reserve is a matter
of opinion.
6)If the Bank of England had been permitted to buy gold
at market prices, certain questions would have arisen in cal-
culating the distribution of profit as between the Issue De-
partment, whose profits go to the Treasury, and the Banking
Department, whose profits go to the proprietors of the Bank.2'
This difficulty, though real, was minor and was ignored when
the Bank's gold holdings were actually revalued at market
under the Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1939 under which
profits and losses were charged to the Exchange Equalization
Account and transferred in gold to or from the Issue Depart-
ment. It was not on such minor grounds that revaluation of
the Bank of England's gold was postponed, but because the
Bank shared the view of Mr. Chamberlain that the suspension
of the gold standard was merely temporary.
The essential meaning of these various difficulties may be
compressed into a single sentence: the use of the Bank of
England's gold reserves as part of the technical administra-
tion of a managed currency system was inconsistent with their
use as part of the technical administration of a system of for-
eign exchange control. It was impossible to administer suc-
cessfully through the same agency and at one and the same
2i Op.cit., p.25. The list of difficulties encountered by the Bank of England
in carrying out exchange control operations given by Mr. Hall contains four
points. Allhavebeen incorporated in the text but with a different emphasis
and in some cases with a different interpretation. The writer feelsthat
Mr. Hall fails to go to the root of the matter when he takes it for granted
that the Bank of England could have escaped all exchange risk if it could
have bought gold at market prices. This would have been more straightfor-
ward bookkeeping but would not have changed the real value of the Bank's
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time a managed domestic gold standard and a form of inter••
national gold bullion standard with varying export and im
port points. An escape from this dilemma was found in the
creation of an agency outside the Bank of England to carry
out such interventions in the foreign exchange market as
were determined upon, but not as the result of abstraction.s
like those formulated above, or for the purpose of attaining
any preconceived 'equilibrium rate' for sterling.
The Establishment of the Exchange Equalization Account
All through the late autumn of i931 and early spring of 1932
the Bank of England had been accumulating dollars and
francs and steadying sterling as an incident to fulfilling its
ligations to those from whom it had borrowed. When it had
obtained all the dollars and francs needed for this purpose its
special interest in the exchange market was lost, but its gen-
eral interest remained, as did the personnel assembled and
the procedures developed for intervention in the market.
When the gold standard was suspended an Exchange Com-
mittee had been formed at the Bank, which was in regular
consultation with the Treasury representative who visited the
Bank every Friday in connection with the weekly tenders of
treasury bills. A committee from the market also came weekly
to the Bank to consult about the exchanges. It was therefore
a natural suggestion that when the Bank's own reasons for
intervening were no longer present, the work that it had car-
ried on in close association with the Treasury and the market
should be continued. Since the funds in the old Dollar Ex-
change Account were inadequate, a new government account
with larger resources was clearly desirable. The Exchange
Equalization Account thus came into existence in much the
same empirical way as other London money market institu-
tions and practices in the past. Its establishment was an-
nounced by Mr. Chamberlain in his Budget speech of April
19, 1932. In this speech Mr. Chamberlain completed his
lution from a grim defender of sterling against those whoiii6 DISINTEGRATION
thought its depreciation might be "substantial and pro-
longed" to an advocate of keeping sterling down and keeping
it steady. Accepting the thesis that world conditions ruled
out the possibility of an immediate return to the gold stand-
ard, he pointed out that since Great Britain had succeeded in
balancing her budget and repaying foreign credits the tide of
liquid capital was setting strongly toward her shores. This,
he said, was flattering to British vanity but seriously embar-
rassing to trade, and so far as it represented no permanent
improvement in the balance of trade,it was dangerous.
"Therefore," he concluded, "I have been driven by the force
of events to this conclusion: that if we are to avoid violent
and perilous fluctuations in our currency, especially those
which are due to these speculative operations; if we are to
enable this country to function effectively as the main inter-
national 'centre' of the world, then it is essential for us to
hold adequate reserves of gold and foreign exchanges, in or-
der that we may meet a sudden withdrawal of short-dated
capital and that we may check and repel these speculative
movements. I propose to wind up the old Exchange Account
and to use the assets as the nucleus of a new account, to be
called the Exchange Equalization Account. I propose to ask
the Committee to give me powers to borrow up to £150,000,-
000 for this account. The details of assets in the account will
not be published, but they may take various forms, either
gold or sterling securities or foreign exchange."
The Exchange Equalization Account thus provided for
did not come into existence officially until June 24, 1932.
Unofficially it probably began to operate some time earlier.
There was, consequently, from May to July a transition in
the Bank's relation to the foreign exchange market from di-
rect intervention to indirect intervention through the in-
formal predecessor of the Equalization Account, and finally
to a retirement from this form of activity and a transfer of
its remaining foreign exchange holdings to the Account. Dur-
ing this transition the Bank took steps to give to its returnSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
theappearance of normality and strength. These transactions
can be traced with some assurance, but not of course with cer-
tainty, on its balance sheet.
Immediately after the government's decision to establish
the Account was announced, sterling declined substantially
against the gold currencies, reaching 3.633,74 on April 26. But
in the following week the passage of the Goldsborough Bill
by the American House of Representatives, instructing the
Federal Reserve system to restore prices to the 1926 price
level, caused sterling to rise sharply in New York. This rise
was counteracted by 'official' selling of sterling,22 and the next
week, as shown in Chart 71, 'other securities' in the Issue De-
partment rose sharply while 'government securities' fell cor-
respondingly.28 The Bank of England was evidently buying
foreign exchange but at this time it also began to convert a.
part of its foreign exchange holdings into gold. For some
weeks previously the gold in the open market had been taken
for "an undisclosed destination," and it is probable that the
Bank was carrying out these transactions with the Treasury
rather than directly in the market. This operation continued
for some weeks, being reflected in the Bank's return in an
increase in gold, and a simultaneous decline in 'other securi-
ties' and rise in 'government securities' in the Issue Depart-
ment. In the last week of May sterling was strong in New
York because of continued failure of the United States to
balance its budget, and the now familiar indications of sallies
of sterling by the Bank of England reappeared temporarily in
the Bank return (Chart 71) ,24 The conversion of foreign ex-
change into gold by the Bank was not interrupted, however,
22Samuel Montagu & Co., Weekly Review, May 5, 1932.
28Samuel Montagu & Co., commenting on the Bank return for May ii, said:
"Theheavy increase of £12,035,388 in Other Securities and decline of £12,-
035,143 in Other Government Securities in the Issue Department ...isat-
tributable to foreign exchange transactions." Ibid., May 12, 1932.
24Samuel Montagu & Co., commenting on the Bank return of June i, said:
"Other Government Securities in the Issue Department have declined £8,894,-
195 and Other Securities have risen £8,896,857, presumably owing to foreign
exchange transactions." Ibid., June 2,1932.iu8 DISINTEGRATION
and was reflected during the next two weeks in a continued
replacement of 'other securities' by 'government securities'
in the Issue Department.25 When these gold purchases had
completely replaced the gold parted with in November 1931
to repay foreign credits they ceased, but the Bank continued
to part with foreign exchange. The presumption is that this
foreign exchange was transferred through the Treasury to
the new Exchange Equalization Account. Apparently the
Account took over the remaining foreign exchange held by
the Bank in the first week of July, a transaction clearly indi-
cated in Chart 71.TheBank of England statement of July 6
therefore marked a complete 'return to normal' in external
appearance. The management of the domestic gold standard
through the Bank of England was no longer complicated by
efforts to prevent undesired fluctuations in the foreign ex-
change.
This duty was now completely entrusted to a new govern-
ment account authorized to deal in the foreign exchanges so
as to preserve an orderly market and to prevent undue day to
day fluctuations, and managed for the Treasury by the Bank
of England. The Bank's exchange committee was continued
after the Account was put into operation. The Treasury was
permanently represented on it, but only important changes in
policy were referred to the Chancellor of the Exchequer who
was visited by the Governor of the Bank about twice a week.
The Account was empowered to hold as its chief assets gold,
foreign exchange, sterling deposits, and treasury bills. At its
inception £150 million in treasury bills were allocated to it,
but some of these were exchanged for sterling deposits and
foreign exchange almost at once. In addition, a certain
25SamuelMontagu & Co., commenting on the Bank of England return for
June 8, said: "It would appear from the current Bank of England Return
that the official holdings of foreign exchange declined by £4,964,175 this being
the amount of the fall in Other Securities in the Issue Department, while
Other Government Securities have increased by approximately the same
The reduction mentioned above is probably connected with the in-
creased gold holding." Ibid., June 9, 1932.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1119
amount of foreign exchange held by the Treasury and re-
maining from the old Dollar Exchange Account was turned
over to it. The Account actually began operations with about
£120 million in treasury bills, about £30 million in deposits
obtained as Ways and Means Advances from Other govern-
ment departments, and about £25 million in foreign ex-
change obtained from the Treasury. One of its first acts was
to reduce its treasury bills and add to its foreign exchange by
taking over about £32 million in foreign exchange held by
the Bank of England (Chart 71).
The ability of the Exchange Equalization Account to alter
the distribution of its assets by shifting from any one of the
four forms in which its resources were chiefly invested into
any of the others made it an extraordinarily flexible instru-
ment of financial policy. It is very doubtful whether the full
extent of this flexibility was realized at the time the Account
was established, for the fundamental transactions of the Ac-
count were simple, and it was established for the particular
purpose of keeping sterling from rising. When the Account
was used for this purpose its basic procedures were as follows:
i) The first and most important step was to buy foreign ex-
change and to sell treasury bills in the market to get the neces-
sary sterling. These operations were nearly simultaneous.
Since the Account kept its deposits with the Bank of England
this was a transaction without effect upon 'bankers balances'
at the Bank. The Bank of England funds paid out in the
purchase of the exchange were withdrawn by the sale of treas-
ury bills. If the treasury bills were sold to banks, then the
effect upon the credit superstructure was to increase bank
deposits, and since bank reserves were unchanged, to reduce
the cash ratio of the banks.26 If the treasury bills were sold to
the public, the effect upon the credit superstructure was to
leave deposits unchanged. Since the reserves also were Un-
2°Cf. Barclays Bank Ltd., Monthly Review, July 1936: The Exchange Equal-
isation Account and the Demand for Sterling, p. 4, col.p. 5, cot. I.1120 DISINTEGRATION
changed, the whole transaction was neutral in its influence on
the credit base and on the credit superstructure.
As far as the English banking system outside the Bank of
England was concerned, these were precisely the effects of a
gold import carried out under gold standard conditions by
private arbitrage and offset by Bank of England open market
operations.27
2) Having purchased foreign exchange and sold treasury
bills the Account was free to convert this foreign exchange
into gold. This transaction was neutral as far as the British
banking system was concerned. The sale of the foreign ex-
change reduced the purchasers' deposits and reduced 'bank-
ers balances at the Bank of England,' while the purchase of
the gold increased the deposits of the sellers of the gold 28
and replenished 'bankers balances.' The transaction was also
neutral in the foreign exchange market. The sale of the for-
eign exchange constituted an increased demand for sterling,
but the purchase of the gold deprived sterling of the support
it would have had if the gold had been exported. The con-
version, however, eliminated the exchange risk assumed by
the Account whenever it increased its portfolio of particular
foreign currencies, though not the exchange risk to which it
was exposed by a fluctuating sterling price of gold. It gave the
Account not a claim on particular currencies, but an option
on that gold standard currency which at any moment hap-
27 Cf. Ch. 4, The Support of the Foreign Exchanges during the War in its
Relation to the Supply of and Demand for Bank Credit, where it is pointed
out that gold imports, when made by banks and not by customers of banks,
do not reduce deposits as other imports do. Therefore the deposits created
by the banks when they buy the foreign exchange with which to pay for the
gold stay in the system. If the central bank then carries out offsetting opera-
tions by selling securities, the credit superstructure either increases or re-
mains unchanged. If the securities are sold to banks, then the new deposits
continue in existence, for when banks buy securities from a central bank
they charge no one's account, merely changing their own assets from one
form to another. If, however, the central bank sells securities to the public,
then the accounts of the purchasers are charged, and the deposits resulting
indirectly from the gold import are canceled.
28 In the case of South African gold there would be one intervening step.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
pened to be most valuable in terms of sterling.29 The conver-
sion, moreover, constituted an actual import of gold into
England, so that the sale of treasury bills, the purchase of
foreign exchange, and the conversion of foreign exchange
into gold together constituted the equivalent of an import of
gold into England under gold standard conditions, offset in
its influence on the domestic banking system by open market
operations.
3) Having sold foreign exchange and purchased gold, the
Exchange Equalization Account was free to sell all or any
portion of this gold to the Bank of England. Such sales
creased the reserves of the Bank; whether they affected 'bank-
ers balances' or not depended on the administration of the
Account's own balances, included in 'public deposits.'
4) Having increased its balances at the Bank of England by
sellinggold to the Bank, the Account had the option of either
retaining them or investing them in treasury bills. If it re-
tamed them the sale of gold to the Bank did not affect 'bank-.
ers balances,' and as far as the credit superstructure was con-
cerned, the transaction was without substance, for it did not
influence the lending power of the commercial banks or
affect their deposits. Its importance was psychological. It com-
pleted the various steps by which the outward appearance of
a gold import carried out by private arbitrage but offset by
open market operations was reproduced under conditions
when the gold standard was abandoned. If, however, the Ac-
count followed the usual practice of other government de-
partments, the Bank balances would not be retained, but
would be invested in treasury bills. The treasury bills so pur-
chased were not, however, taken from the market, but bought
'through the tap' (cf. pp. 1138—9), that is, from the Treasury.
Such purchases left the amount of 'public deposits' at the
Bank unchanged, but increased the available funds of the
Treasury itself and therefore made possible a reduction
the amount of treasury bills offered to the market at the next
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tender. An increase in Bank of England funds made available
to the banks as a result of treasury bill purchases by the Ac-
count followed therefore indirectly and after a delay of a few
days and came to them through government expenditures
not offset by sales of treasury bills by tender which would
have been necessary had the Account not bought bills
'through the tap.' This was the customary procedure when
the Account sold gold to the Bank, and as long as it was fol-
lowed such sales were no longer neutral so far as 'bankers
balances' were concerned. The effect of the whole series of
transactions, beginning with the purchase of foreign ex-
change, was to increase the Bank of England reserve, to in-
crease 'bankers balances,' to leave the amount of treasury
bills in the hands of the banks and the public unchanged,
and to increase bank deposits. The effects of a simple gold
import by private arbitrage under the gold standard were
fully reproduced.
Purchases of gold by the Bank of England from the Ac-
count when the gold standard was suspended were a purely
arbitrary increase in the reserve fund used to limit the
amount of credit made available under a managed currency
system. If the Bank's policy was to increase the credit base by
liberal discounts or open market operations, then such pur-
chases could make this possible without a reduction in its
proportion or an increase in its Fiduciary Issue. If 'its policy
was to offset other deflationary forces at work in the banking
system, such purchases could accomplish this purpose also.
For example, after 1935 the deflationary effect of an increas-
ing circulation upon the reserves of the clearing banks was
anticipated by transfers of gold from the Account to the Issue
Department.
If the gold was sold to the Bank at its statutory buying
price the Account absorbed an actual loss in sterling equal
to the difference between the Bank's statutory buying price
and the market price, and by so doing had a moral claim to be
reimbursed at some future date either by buying back theSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
gold at the statutory price or by sharing in the profits of some
future revaluation. It had a legal claim also under the Fi••
nance Act of 1932 which provided that upon the winding up
of the Account all profits on gold made by the Issue Depart
ment should go to the Account or be used for debt extinction.
In this analysis it has been assumed that in selling treasury
bills in order to obtain the means of purchasing foreign ex
change or gold the Account would deal only with banks or
with the public so that its operations in this respect would
not influence the banking system except for a possible altera..
tion in the cash ratio. These assumptions have been made in
accordance with actual practice, for there is no centralization
of the operations of the various government departments in
respect of their dealings in treasury bills. When government
departments have a surplus of Bank of England funds to in-
vest in treasury bills they 'tap' for them; when they need to
dispose of treasury bills for cash they either let them run off
or sell to the market. They do not, furthermore, deal in treas-
ury bills directly with one another or with the Bank of Eng-
land as principal, although there is no theoretical or techni-
cal reason making such dealings impossible. British practice
is flexible enough to take advantage of them if a situation that
seems to call for such action arises. For the sake of complete-
ness, therefore, the money market effect of sales of bills by the
Account directly to the Bank or the departments in order to
get funds with which to buy gold or exchange should be set
down. In that case the efforts of the Account to keep sterling
from rising would have the effect of increasing 'bankers bal-
ances at the Bank of England' and increasing bank deposits.
They would affect the banking system outside the Bank of
England in the same way as an ordinary import of gold under
gold standard conditions by private arbitrage. It was also as-
sumed in the foregoing analysis that when the Account sold
gold to the Bank and invested the proceeds in treasury bills,
it bought these treasury bills 'through the tap.' But this as-
sumption also need not have been made. These bills might1124 DISINTEGRATION
have been purchased from the Bank as principal or from
other government departments, in which case the effects of a
gold import under gold standard conditions offset by open
market operations would be obtained.
The above analysis applies only when the Account was be-
ing used to keep sterling from rising. The Account, however,
had not long been established before it was called upon to
support sterling. In this situation the operations described
above were reversed. The same extraordinary flexibility was
still possible, but there was one fundamental difference. The
scope of the operations of the Account on this side of the
market was limited by the amount of gold and foreign ex-
change previously accumulated rather than by its capacity to
borrow in sterling. Its procedures when being used to sup-
port sterling may be described in a more condensed form, as
they are merely the converse of those already described:
i) The first and most important step was for the Account to
sell gold or foreign exchange or both and to buy treasury
bills. This transaction did not affect the amount of 'bankers
balances at the Bank of England.' If the treasury bills were
bought 'through the tap,' that is, indirectly from the market
as a result of a reduced offer of bills at the next tender, then
the effect of the whole operation upon the credit superstruc-
ture would depend upon whether the reduced holdings of
the market were in the holdings of banks or in those of cus-
tomers of banks. If of banks, then there would be a decrease
in bank deposits and, bank reserves remaining the same, an
increase in the cash ratio of the banks, because the deposits of
the buyers of gold or exchange would be reduced without any
corresponding increase in the deposits of those whose treasury
bills had been paid off. If of customers of banks, then the de-
posits of these customers would be increased and the net ef-
fect of the operation on the credit superstructure would be
neutral.
As far as the English banking system outside the Bank of
England was concerned, these were precisely the effects of a.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1125
gold export carried out by private arbitrage under the gold
standard, and offset by open market operations.
2)In order to replenish or increase its stock of gold the Ac-
count might purchase gold from the Bank of England. This
transaction would be without influence upon the commercial
banking system, but would reduce Bank of England reserves
and give the total transaction the same outward appearance as
a gold export under gold standard conditions offset by open
market operations. It would, from a psychological point of
view, justify a contraction of Bank of England credit, if on
other grounds such a contraction was part of the Bank's credit
control policy. If the gold bought by the Account from the
Bank were bought at the statutory price the Account would
realize a profit in sterling. If it had previously sold the gold
to the Bank, the position would be the same as if it had con-
tinued to hold it from the moment of its original purchase.
3) Having bought gold from the Bank the Account might be
content to allow its balances to remain depleted by the
amount of the puchase, or it might sell treasury bills to re-
plenish its account. If it sold treasury bills, then the total
effect of the transaction would be the same as an ordinary
gold export under gold standard conditions carried out at the
statutory price. Both the credit base and credit superstructure
would be contracted.
As in the analysis of the operations of the Account in pre-
venting sterling from rising, this analysis has made certain
assumptions as to procedure in accordance with actual prac-
tice. Theoretical completeness requires, in this case also, that
the money market effects that would follow if these assump-
tions were removed be stated. It has been assumed that the
treasury bills bought by the Account with the proceeds of
its sales of foreign exchange or gold were bought 'through
the tap' and therefore at one remove from banks or customers
of banks. They might, however, have been bought from the
Bank of England or from other government departments. In1126 DISINTEGRATION
that case the whole transaction would have the effect of an
ordinary gold export under gold standard conditions. It has
further been assumed that if the Account bought gold from
the Bank and replenished its balances by the sale of treasury
bills, it would sell these bills to the market. But it might re-
plenish its balances by selling bills to the Bank itself or to
other government departments. In that case the effect of the
whole transaction would be the same as a gold export under
gold standard conditions offset by open market operations.
The above analysis indicates that the authorities could so
use the Exchange Equalization Account as to harmonize its
activity in the foreign exchange market with the administra-
tion of any desired domestic credit control policy. The posi-
tive economic functions fulfilled by the Account may now be
examined. Within the limits imposed by the size and distribu-
tion of its resources the Account was an effective instrument
for accomplishing certain things that had previously been ac-
complished by other techniques of the London money
market. Its functions were a mixture of old and new. In part
it was a new way of doing old things and in part it was a way
of doing things that were new in themselves. This may be
brought out as follows:
1)TheExchange Equalization Account provided a substi-
tute for short term capital movements induced in the pre-
war gold standard system by inter-money market interest rate
differentials. It fulfilled in a measure the functions of interest-
arbitrage in equalizing interest rates internationally and
smoothing out fluctuations in the exchanges. Before the war,
and to some degree after the war also, when sterling was
strong in the exchanges, interest rates in London were likely
to be relatively low. Hence there was a motive for an outward
movement of short term capital from London. It became
profitable to borrow in London, remit the proceeds abroad,
and employ them in other money markets. Such an outward
movement of short term capital tended to make interest ratesSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1127
rise in London and fall elsewhere, and also to weaken ster-
ling. When sterling was weak the operation was reversed.
The intervention of the Exchange Equalization Account to
check a rise in sterling or to prevent a decline was a planned
and controlled short term international capital movement
which had similar effects. When sterling was strong, the Ac-
count borrowed in London by selling treasury bills, used the
proceeds to buy foreign exchange, and held them in foreign
money markets in the form of gold and working balances. It
was an equalizer of interest rates, though in this respect fully
effective in only one market, and it smoothed out fluctuations
in the exchange. When sterling was weak the Account re-
versed the operation. In doing so, however, it was limited by
the amount of its foreign assets, whereas private capital move-
ments from abroad to London could be swelled by borrowing
abroad. The effectiveness of the Account in taking the place
of short term capital movements in acting as an interest rate
equalizer and steadying influence in the exchanges was there-
fore likely to be greater when sterling was strong than when
sterling was weak.
There was, furthermore, one fundamental difference be-
tween pre-war conditions and those prevailing when the Ac-
count was established. The former regulating mechanism had
to a large extent become the thing to be regulated, or at
least an important part of it. Under the new conditions, in-
ternational short term capital movements responded so
largely to other motives, far more powerful than the desire
to take advantage of interest rate differentials, that they no
longer offset other items in the balance of payments which
were responsible for substantial interest rate differentials and
exchange fluctuations. They became themselves a source of
such differentials and fluctuations. Instead of being the allies
and instruments through which discount rate policy was
made effective, they became the objects against which such
policy was directed. Hence the Account assumed an economic1128 DISINTEGRATION
function which had not only been left unfulfilled by private
short term international capital movements, but had also
been rendered more difficult by such movements.
Mr. Hall points out that when sterling was strong because
of an inward flow of capital, and the increased balances of
foreigners were as a consequence seeking employment in
London, then the sale of treasury bills and purchase of ex-
change by the Account constituted, in effect, a sale of treasury
bills to foreigners 'through the tap,' without allowing the
inward movement, of capital to affect British interest rates or
the sterling exchange. When sterling was weak because for-
eigners were withdrawing their investments in sterling the
purchases of treasury bills by the Account and the sale of for-
eign exchange neutralized the effects of these withdrawals.
Mr. Hall says: "The Account, in fact, is simply a device which
puts Treasury Bills 'on tap' for foreigners, and permits them
to increase or decrease their holdings without unduly in-
fluencing the sterling exchange." 80Itwas undoubtedly this
service of the Account that dominated the thought of the
authorities at the time of its foundation, but once having the
instrumentality in operation, they did not fail to explore its
other possibilities when the situation changed. It seems to
the writer a serious error to neglect the general capacity of
the Account to fulfil the functions of a mobile international
loan fund, whether the disturbances to be corrected arise
from private capital movements or from other causes. The
sales of treasury bills by the Account were by no means re-
stricted to periods when foreigners were investing in them,
nor were its purchases restricted to periods when foreigners
were selling bills.
2) The Treasury, through the Account, was able, when ster-
ling was strong, to acquire a fund of foreign exchange and
gold which was, in effect, a reserve against the foreign liabili-
ties of the London money market, additional to, and inde-
Op.cit., p.24 (ouritalics)STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1129
pendent of, the 'reserve'heldby the Bank of England. By
separating the reserve against foreign liabilities from the
bitrary limiting fund restricting the expansion of domestic
bank credit, an important new technique of currency man-
agement was introduced. When sterling was weak the British
authorities no longer relied on the reversal of interest arbi-
trage, gold arbitrage, and security arbitrage transactions, the
use of the gold reserves accumulated by the Bank of England,
and the general influence of a high Bank rate on the marginal
elements in the British balance of payments to correct the sit-
uation. They now used foreign assets and gold held by the
Treasury for this purpose.
3) Though the establishment of the Account did separate
the function of holding a reserve against foreign liabilities
from the function of holding a reserve against domestic obli-
gations, the separation was not absolute. It was a separation
that was subject to the will of the authorities, as shown in our
account of the extraordinary flexibility of which the manage-
ment of the Account was capable. The Exchange Equaliza-
tion Account was in fact a direct descendent of the whole
'offsetting' policy of the Bank of England which had, in a
large degree, insulated the British credit system from the di-
rect impact of international influences, and which we have
analyzed in our account of the Typical Year of the Bank of
England, 1922—193 1, in Chapter 19 and elsewhere. At no
time was British credit administration divorced from inter-
national considerations. In the formulation of credit policy
these were always important, often dominating. But in the
execution of policy the pre-war so-called 'automatic' connec-
tions between the international movement of funds and the
credit base and credit superstructure were broken. From 1922
to 1931 the technical device for accomplishing this \vas open
market policy. After July 1932 the technical device was, again
'Reserve'is here placed in quotation marks because the old connotations of
the term are not in harmony with its new uses.1130 DISINTEGRATION
subject to the limitations imposed by the size and character of
its assets, the Exchange Equalization Account.
4) The acquisition by the Exchange Equalization Account
of a stock of foreign exchange and the conversion of a part
into gold at various market prices created a strong interest on
the part of the Treasury in seeing to it that the price of gold
in sterling should not go below the average cost at which the
gold held by the Account was bought. It was in the highest
degree unlikely that the government would ever go before
Parliament and show a loss in sterling, that is, a loss to the
taxpayer, arising from the operations of the 'Account. The
sale of a part of the gold of the Account to the Bank of Eng-
land created a vested interest by the Treasury in the poten-
tial profits of a future revaluation of the Bank's assets. The
whole question of the terms and conditions under which
England might in future return to the international gold
standard was influenced by this very simple and often neg-
lected fact.82
5) The announced purpose of the Exchange Equalization
Account, reiterated upon many occasions, was to smooth out
fluctuations in the exchanges, but not to impose any general
level or to engage in competitive exchange depreciation. It
must, nevertheless, be recalled that the inconveniences to
trade caused by a rising sterling exchange were the primary
reasons assigned by Mr. Chamberlain in the Budget speech
quoted above for the establishment of the Account. In the
spring of 1933 the operations of the Account made possible
substantial increases in the Bank of England gold reserve, and
were a major factor in determining the 'general level' of ster-
ling, though other motives greatly influenced its policy at that
time. Finally during the World Economic Conference the au-
thorities sounded out the market to ascertain the amount of
sterling that would have to be sold to bring the pound to a
substantially lower level than then prevailed. The Exchange
82cf. çh.Rationalizing the Behavior of Hoarders and Exchange Stabiliza-
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EqualizationAccount, in fact, became one of many tools
used in the experimental and empirical development of
Great Britain's general financial policy.
Refunding the 5 per cent War Loan, the Control of Foreign
Lending, and the Support of Sterling
During the entire Experimentation period and even before,
neither the Bank of England in carrying out its discount rate
policy nor the Treasury in administering the public debt had
been able to escape the horns of a serious dilemma. Being
constrained, for reasons already set forth at length, to pursue
a 'deposit-attracting' policy, and to offer her securities,
ticularly her short term government debt, at prices attractive
to foreigners, Great Britain could not relieve her Budget by
large scale refunding operations in her long term public debt
on a basis profitable to the taxpayer. Nor could she fund any
large part of her short term debt except by assuming the o13-
ligation to pay a high rate of interest for a long period in the
future. On the other hand, the existence of a large floating
debt was an obstacle to a policy of very high interest rates de-
signed to force a deflation sufficiently severe to free Britain
from dependence on short term foreign funds. Even if all
other objections to such a policy had been overcome, the in-
creased cost of service of the short term debt would have con-
stituted an almost insuperable barrier. The exigencies of
credit control and foreign exchange policy limited the free-
dom of the government in the field of fiscal policy in one way,
and the exigencies of fiscal policy limited the freedom of the
Bank in another. During the first quarter of 1932 this difficulty
was overcome. Ever since 1930 discussion had been active con-
cerning the possibilities of refunding the 5 per cent War
Loan, and early in 1931 the judgment of the City had been
that the best that could be hoped for was a 41/4 per cent
version, or 4 per cent if business conditions improved.
fore the opportunity of balancing the Budget by a 3½per
cent conversion after the suspension of the gold standard1132 DISINTEGRATION
was eagerly seized upon by the Bank and the Treasury. This,
rather than the promotion of trade, was the dominant motive
for the inauguration of an easy money policy. The economic
advantages of such a policy, however, were increasingly
stressed when it became clear that the strongly held view of
the City, that a revival of the domestic market and economic
recovery without a revival of foreign loans was impossible,
was being contradicted by events.
On June 30, 1932, one week after the Exchange Equaliza-
tion Account had officially come into being, Mr. Chamber-
lain announced that the £2,000 million 5 per cent War Loan
would be repaid on December i, 1932. Holders were offered a
new security bearing 31,4 per cent interest and not subject to
redemption for 20 years. Those who signified their intention
of converting, or more accurately, continuing in the new se-
curity, before July 31, were offered a bonus of Li per cent,
and those who did not signify their intention of converting
before September 30 were deemed to have assented. The con-
ditions of success for this gigantic operation were three:(i)
to create easy money conditions and to convince the investing
public that these conditions would continue for a long time;
(2) to clear the way for the government in the capital market
by eliminating as far as possible all other demands for long
term funds; tokeep the foreign exchanges stable.
No steps taken to achieve any one of these objectives could
be without influence upon the other two. In particular, to
keep foreign exchange rates stable it was necessary to con-
vince both British nationals and foreigners that the begin-
fling of a period of easy money was not to be a prelude to
inflation in England. The continued failure of the Bank of
England to request any further increase in its Fiduciary Issue,
the efforts of the authorities to prevent a rapid rise in prices,
and the whole policy of imposing heavy taxes and maintaining
a balanced budget all contributed to give the needed assur-
ance on this head. With these safeguards against an adverse
psychological interpretation of its policies, the Bank began toSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
promote easy money conditions as soon as the necessity of de-
fending sterling had passed. As shown above, the reduction
of Bank rate from its crisis level of 6 per cent was begun by
two successive reductions of 1 per cent on February i8 and
March io, 1932. On March 17 the rate was reduced to 31/2
per cent, on April 2 1 to 3 per cent, on May i 2 to 21/2percent,
and finally on June 30, the day on which the refunding was
announced, to 2 per cent. In May and June bankers balances
increased substantially, and in order to prevent any appear-
ance of stringency the Bank of England increased its gold
holdings (Chart 73).
To supplement the effect of easy money and abundant
credit every effort was made to prevent competing demands
for capital from appearing in the market. It was, for example,
at this time that the Bank of England first exercised its veto
power over the transactions of the Bank for International
Settlements in the London money market. The most impor-
tant step taken in this respect, however, was the imposition of
an informal but effective embargo on new capital issues. This
embargo was publicly proclaimed in the typically British
form of an inconspicuous and soft-spoken paragraph in Mr.
Chamberlain's speech announcing the terms of the conver-
sion to the House of Commons:
"I am sure that anyone who may be contemplating the issue of
new capital in the market in the early future will forbear from
coming forward for a few weeks while this great operation is pro-
ceeding and that the authorities in the city of London will co-
operate in this necessary object."
This prohibition was faithfully adhered to until the end of
September 1932, when the conversion lists were closed. It
was then announced that no further restrictions on new issues
were necessary except on foreign loans, and on all optional
replacements of existing securities by new issues involving
either underwriting or an invitation to the public to sub-
scribe to new shares. In January a further relaxation was1134 DISINTEGRATION
announced, oniy foreign issues and optional conversions of
trustee issues remaining under control.33
As far as foreign issues were concerned, therefore, the "few
weeks" postponement of which Mr. Chamberlain spoke
lengthened into years. The embargo on foreign lending at
the time of the refunding operation was, from the domestic
point of view, part of the government's determined effort to
eliminate competing demands when the Treasury was in the
capital market on a great scale. From the foreign exchange
point of view it was a particular episode in an established
policy of supporting sterling and correcting the British bal-
ance of payments. From the more general viewpoint of Brit-
ish financial and economic policy it was part of England's ac-
ceptance of a restricted, though still very extensive, field of
international financial influence.
Foreign lending in the London market, already severely
limited (Ap. Table 4), had practically ceased when the con-
fidence crisis spread to England in July 1931. With the easing
of money rates and the improvement in sterling in the first
half of 1932 there was a slight revival, but this was exclusively
in loans for the Empire. India was the chief borrower but, in
addition, the Canadian provincial governments returned to
the London market. No overseas issues outside the Empire
were placed in London during the first six months of 1932.
The money market sanctions that enforced this embargo
were the same as those behind the restrictions in force at the
time of the return to gold in The economic sanctions
were those imposed by the state of the British balance of in-
ternational payments. The memorandum of the British dele-
gation to the League of Nations Institute for Intellectual Co-
operation, upon which we have already drawn in our discus-
sion of the new position of London in world finance after
the war, describes the position:
"[at the time of the confidence crisis] a suspicion, which had
88TheNew Capital Market, Midland Bank Review, Oct.—Nov. P. 5.
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arisenearlier in the year, that the international balance of pay..
ments of the United Kingdom was definitely adverse, hardened
into a certainty. Thus it became imperative to discontinue the
business of foreign lending, no longer simply on grounds of
porary financial expediency, but on consideration of serious fi-
nancialmaladjustment; it has now (March 1933)beenpro-
scribed for an indefinite period under authority of the Bank of
England, whose embargo has, in fact, the full force of govern-
ment action."
With the imposition of the general embargo on new issues
in June 1932 control of foreign lending became a recognized
Treasury function. In January 1933 most of the restrictions
on the placing of new capital issues, other than foreign, were
removed, and the Treasury at that time formally defined
'foreign issues' as: "issues on behalf of borrowers domiciled
outside the Empire, or issues the proceeds of which would be
remitted directly or indirectly to Countries outside the Em-
pire." In May 1933 the Treasury announced that the Chan-
cellor viewed with disfavor, as "not in the public interest,"
purchases from foreign holders of large blocs of securities,
whether issued by British or foreign undertakings for resalle
in England by public issue or otherwise, and hinted that pri-
vate investments abroad were not at that time desirable.86
The new capital embargo of June 1932, therefore, marked
a stage in the development of a policy of Empire preference
in the export of capital, and a rigid adherence to the
that the proceeds of foreign loans should be spent in Eng-
land. Under this policy even Empire borrowing was severe]ly
restricted when new capital was involved, though refunding
was freely permitted. In the last six months of 1932 only one
substantial Empire loan, other than refunding loans, was
placedin London—a large South African government issue.
Even this was not put on the market until after the War
British Memorandum 2,Part11, Recent British Measures affecting Inte7-
national Finance.
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Loan conversion lists were closed. When, in August 1933, the
Dominion of Canada returned to the London market as a
borrower by placing a £15 million issue, the prospectus con-
tained these all important words:
"No part of the proceeds of this issue will be remitted directly or
indirectly to countries outside the British Empire."
One further stage in the development of this policy may be
mentioned here, though it does not fall within the period
being discussed. With the development of closer ties between
England and non-Empire sterling countries, the policy be-
came one of sterling area financial preference, rather than
strictly Empire financial preference. This is illustrated by
loans to Denmark and Argentina ini Exceptionswere
also made when clearly in Britain's interest, such as the Aus-
trian Loan in 1933, the proceeds of which were used chiefly
to repay the Bank of England advance to Austria of June
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The complete stoppage of all new foreign lending in
July, August, and September 1932 (Ap. Table 4) was only
one of three special measures taken to prevent fluctuations in
the exchanges during these three critical months. The other
two were the inclusion in the terms of the conversion offer of
a bonus of £1 per cent to those signifying their intent to con-
vert before July 31, 1932, and the use of the Exchange Equal-
ization Account.
N. F. Hall (op. cit., pp. 39—40) has clearly described the
connection between the bonus offered for early conversion
and the anxiety of the government lest the conversion opera-
tion itself give rise to exchange fluctuations. Under the terms
on which the War Loan was originally issued, three months'
notice of the government's intention to convert had to be
given.
"This meant that on September 1st, unless special steps were
taken to prevent it, all this War Loan would become the equiv-
87R.B. Stewart, 'Instruments of British Policy in the Sterling Area,' Political
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alent of a three-months sterling bill bearing interest at a rate
5 per cent per annum. lilt would have been a very attractive hold-
ing for foreigners on and after September 1st as they could
the exchange risk involved by a purchase of three-months
dollars. In the absence of other influences, this might have meant
a big upward movement in the sterling exchange in the early
autumn of 1932 followed by an equally rapid fall at the end of
the year. Power to prevent this disturbance occurring by exchange
control through the Exchange Equalisation Account must have
greatly strengthened the authorities in preparing their plans.
This factor in the situation also helps to explain why the much
criticised bonus of Li per hundred pounds of stock was paid to
those who gave notice of their intentions to convert before the
end of July 1932. The effect of this bonus was to give approxi-
mately the same profit to holders as that which they could obtain
by selling their holdings as soon as they became a three-months
maturity. The attractiveness of holding non-assented stock to con-
version as a three-months bill practically disappeared. As much
could be made by claiming the bonus as by holding non-assented
stock to maturity as a bill. The bonus must, therefore, have
played an important part in securing the success of the conver-
sion operations. It reduced almost to nothing the supplies of
non-assented stock which might have been useful material for
exchange operations. It was, therefore, a powerful ally of the
Exchange Account in reducing to a minimum the exchange dis-
turbances which would otherwise have been associated with these
operations."
The Decline of Sterling and the Depletion of the Foreign
Assets of the Exchange Equalization Account
That the Exchange Equalization Account stood in need of
allies in keeping sterling steady became apparent in August
and September 1932. During June and July sterling exchange
tended downward. The rate on New York, after holding
steady at about 3.67 during May and the first part of June,
fell to a level of about 3.54, at which it again remained
stable for about a month. At the beginning of August it de-
clined to about and at this rate was once more kept1138 insi NTEGRATION
fairly stable until the middle of October, when a rapid fall
occurred. A decline of this type in a series of steps is charac-
teristic of an exchange with a weak underlying trend but arti-
ficially supported.88
Some indication of the activity of the Exchange Equaliza-
tion Account during the early months of its operation may be
derived from the behavior of the so-called 'tap bills outstand-
ing.' British treasury bills are issued partly by public tender
and partly to government departments 'through the tap.' A
government department finding its balances increasing may
'invest' these in treasury bills issued for this purpose. A gov-
ernment department finding its balances drawn down may
replenish them by selling treasury bills to the market or by
letting them run off. Working balances of the various de-
partments are thus kept from fluctuating very greatly and
the government deposits at the Bank of England are largely
mobilized in the Exchequer Accounts. The instrument for
keeping these public deposits at the Bank within the limits
desired by the Bank and the Treasury is the variation in the
weekly amount of treasury bills offered by tender. This varia-
tion is continually influenced by changes in the amount of
treasury bills held by government departments. When the
Exchange Equalization Account was it was as-
signed £150 million in treasury bills. This was not a transac-
tion similar to the ordinary issues 'through the tap,' for these
bills were not bought from the Treasury by the Account by
tender of Bank of England funds, but once the operation of
the Account began, the practice of other government depart-
ments with reference to treasury bills was followed. The Ac-
count had a stock of bills which it could sell, and when it
wished to increase this stock for any reason it 'tapped' for
more, When the Account or any other government depart-
ment purchases bills from the Treasury through the 'tap'
The behavior of the French franc in 1926 was of this type; cf. Ch. if,,
Layingthe Foundations for Future Power in the Gold Standard System,
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there is a change in the composition of 'public deposits' at
the Bank that makes possible a reduction in the next issue of
tenderbills. When a government allows its holdings of treas-
ury bills to run off, there is a change in the composition of
the 'public deposits' that makes necessary an increase in the
next offer of tender bills. When it sells treasury bills to the
market, there is no change in the Exchequer Accounts and no
immediate change is required in the amount of the next
tender. Such sales, however, reduce the market's eagerness to
buy at tender and may influence the terms on which the
government can borrow, and as the market's increased hoLd-
ings mature in due course, there is a change in the Exchequer
Accounts that makes necessary an increase in the amount of
later tenders. This is the same effect as if the bills had ma-
tured in the hands of the departments.
The method by which the amount of 'tap bills' outstanding
at any one time is usually calculated is to subtract a 13-week
moving total of successful weekly tenders for treasury bills
from total treasury bills outstanding. Subject to certain time
lags, this method seems to be fairly satisfactory. It allows for
the effects both of the replenishment of departmental port-
folios 'through the tap' and for their depletion by the con-
version of 'tap bills' into market bills because, as shown above,
both these operations influence the amount of tender bills
offered. If it did not take account of the second factor
would merely measure the amount of treasury bills outstand-
ing that had originally been issued through the tap, not the
amount of 'tap bills outstanding.'
Using this method, H. J. Sarles has presented figures for
tap bills outstanding, from which the values for July 1932
to April
89inTable 8i are taken. These figures help to
throw some statistical light upon the operations of the
89TheEnglish Equalization Account, unpublished ms. Since his study was
concerned with general trends Mr. Sarles did not feel it necessary to
allowance for the time lag of from three to six days between the allotment
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change Equalization Account, though subject to strict reserva-
tions. The effects of the operations of other departments are
included in the figures., and the Issue Department of the
Bank of England on occasion 'taps' for bills. When, for ex-
ample, a large government long term issue is offered to the
TABLE 8i
Tap Bills Outstanding, July 1932—ApTil 1933,byweeks (millions
of pounds)
W E E K
1932 FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH FIFTH
July 238 238 236 231 226
August 220 259 262 258
September 281 288 285 282
October 284 283 276 267 255
November 249 255 248 232
December 246 275 277 266 268
1933
January 265 246 238 227
February 223 211 217 213
March 208 199 206 220 227
April 234 234 224 219
SOURCE:H. J. Sarles,The British Exchange Equalization Account, unpublished ms.
publicand is not readily absorbed by the market, the Issue
Department may take a portion of it. Gradually as the market
becomes more receptive, the Issue Department may sell these
long term bonds and replace them by 'tapping' for bills. The
Exchequer Accounts are replenished from the market via the
Issue Department, and the next offer of tender bills is re-
duced, reserve funds flowing back to the banks in this way.
Tap bills outstanding are increased. Such transactions are
probably the most serious drawback to the use of changes in
'tap bills outstanding' as indications of the operations of the
Exchange Equalization Account, for the routine operations
of other government departments are as a rule of moderate
size. Since, however, from the outset, the payments made to
and received from the public by the Exchange Equalization
Account were very large, the changes in its holdings of treas-
ury bills were very large also and were consequently theSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
dominant influence in the behavior of 'tap bills outstanding.'
The Exchange Equalization Account does not seem to have
actively supported the exchange immediately after beginning
its operations. Indeed, the decline in 'tap bills outstanding'
during July and the first week in August of about £' 8 million
is a statistical indication, though far from a statistical proof,
that the Account was parting with treasury bills and adding
to its foreign exchange holdings. An increase of £68 million
in 'tap bills outstanding' from the first week in August to the
second week in September indicates that the Account had
reversed its position and was coming to the support of ster-
ling.
At this time sterling was being kept stable at about a 30
percent depreciation in terms of the gold currencies. This
was a return to the position prevailing during January and
February 1932 just before the rise in sterling that led to the
establishment of the Account. At this level, however, sterling
was under pressure, owing to the position of the current
merchandise and current invisible items in the balance of
payments, and to an outward movement of capital.
In November 1932 the Midland Bank Review reached the
conclusion that ordinary current transactions in the balance
of payments were still showing a deficit. Imports were indeed
restricted by the decline in the exchange and by new tariffs
but, for reasons given above, exports did not expand. The
Review estimated that up to October 1932 the adverse mer-
chandise balance was about £90 million less than in the
preceding year, but that this was not sufficient to offset de-
clines in other current items. Shipping income and interest
and dividend receipts from overseas continued to fall. A
special and important cause of loss of overseas revenue was
the declining demand for sterling by insurance brokers. Be-
fore the war Lloyds and others wrote insurance policies in
currencies other than sterling and remitted the premiums
home regularly. Sterling policies were also written all over
the world and the premiums remitted to London. Since Sep-1142 DiSINTEGRATION
tember 1931,however,the practice of writing dollar and
other foreign currency policies had greatly declined and at
the same time the practice of accumulating the premiums
abroad to build up reserve funds in the currencies in which
they were written developed, while the trend of legislation
in the American states made the carrying on of insurance
business by British companies more and more difficult. By
the summer of 1932 only a small amount was being remitted
home. In addition, the amount of gold received from India,
though it continued substantial, began to decline, and the
special gold exports from domestic circulation became a mere
trickle.
Upon this weak foundation was superimposed an outward
movement of capital which was encouraged by the easy money
policy rigorously pursued in London. Preoccupied by fiscal
considerations the Bank and the Treasury underestimated
the effect on the exchanges of the remittance abroad of the
proceeds of cash redemptions of the 5 per cent War Loan.
They relied upon the patriotism of British nationals and
upon the self-interest of foreigners who might be afraid to
remit at a low rate of exchange and thus lose all chance of
future sterling appreciation. Foreign war loan holdings
amounted to about £200 million, and many of these were
converted into cash and remitted abroad. The fanfare of a
patriotic campaign to vindicate the British government's
judgment that British credit was now on a a½percent basis
did not appeal to foreigners and the Exchange Equalization
Account had itself made sterling unattractive as a speculative
medium. In its November—December 1932 issue the Midland
Eank Review wrote:
"Another factor [in the decline of sterling] has been the tendency
foreigners to exchange into other currencies the sterling re-
alized by sales of War Loan or due to them on the date of re-
demption. It is impossible to estimate the force of this influence,
but probably tens of millions of pounds sterling have been added
to the supply in the foreign exchange markets on this account.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1143
Thesales have been concentrated within a relatively few months
and may therefore be presumed to have exercised considerable
weight against sterling."
The easy money policy in London, moreover, carried London
rates below those in New York. This was not the appropriate
relation for a country with a weak and sinking exchange.
encouraged an outward flow of capital, and also influenced
the forward exchange markets in a way unfavorable to ster-
ling. The position in this market, as Mr. Hall shows, was
completely reversed in May and June. The high discount on
forward dollars disappeared, tending to bring the realizable
earnings from forward purchases into line with interest rates
in New York, thus indicating that the uncovered sterling
balances of speculators for the rise were being liquidated.40
Finally the declining trend of sterling was in itself an induce-
ment to withdraw part of the very large amount of foreign
capital still temporarily employed in London to avoid further
exchange losses.
Hardly more than two months, or at most three, after fts
official beginning, the Equalization Account therefore found
its role in the exchange market reversed. The limitations of
its powers to support sterling became evident under these ac-
cumulated pressures. The Account had had little opportunity
to acquire a very substantial volume of foreign assets and gold
over and above those it had obtained at the outset. Even these
had been depleted by sales of gold to the Bank of England
in July and August. The size of the increase in 'tap bills
outstanding' in August and September suggests that the drafts
upon its foreign resources were very heavy. In the middle of
October they were nearly exhausted according to the testi-
mony given by 0. M. W. Sprague before the Banking Com-
mittee of the United States Senate.41 A difficult decision had
to be made, for opinion was divided as to the probable dura-
tion of the pressure. The more pessimistic view prevailed and
Cf.pp. 1107—8supra;Hall, op. cit., pp.
TheEconomist, March 3, 1934,p.46; Hall, op. cit., pp. 48, 51.1144 DISINTEGRATION
support was withdrawn. Sterling fell from 3.44 on October
ii to 3.3o on October 25. In November the renewal of British
war debt payments was under negotiation, and the uncer-
tainty produced by this conflict was clearly reflected in the
exchange. Sterling again dropped, from 3.32 on November
15 to 3.15onNovember 30.Adecline in the amount of 'tap
bills outstanding' suggests that the Account was accumulating
fresh foreign reserves as sterling fell. At the low point sterling
was again supported and 'tap bills outstanding' rose sharply.
On December 15, 1932theBritish Treasury paid £28.9
million in gold to the United States on account of the war
debt. The Treasury purchased gold valued in the market at
this amount from the Bank of England, paying for it, how-
ever, at the statutory price. The government paid for the gold
in treasury bills, of which £19.6 million went to the Bank
and million to the Exchange Equalization Account
which had previously borne the loss involved in sales to the
Bank, and now reaped the profit of purchases from it at its
statutory price. The gold was earmarked at the Bank of Eng-
land for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which in
turn turned 'over gold at the United States Treasury.42 The
Bank's gold reserve was as a result once more reduced to the
amount held immediately following the payment of £15
million in gold on account of foreign credits in November
1931(Chart72). With the ending of uncertainty regarding
this payment and the completion of the refunding operation,
and with some official support, sterling had already begun to
rise. At the turn of the year the New York rate was 3.33.
The Critical Decisions of January 1933
InJanuary 1933 a profound change in the international
position of sterling suddenly presented the management of
the Exchange Equalization Account with an entirely new
set of problems, and the line of action then adopted had con-
sequences so far reaching that it may be regarded as a critical
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turning point in the history of the Disintegration period. The
decisions made at this time however were not clear-cut, pub-
lic, and formal like those of 1927(cf. Ch. i8). They were
made in the ordinary course of business without explicit
consideration of long run consequences, and have often been
misinterpreted in the light of later events to which they di-
rectly contributed, but which they were not intended to
bring about.
The recovery of sterling, which began with the announce-
ment that the American war debt installment would be paid
in gold, became very strong after the payment was actually
made. Toward the end of December and in January seasonal
factors began to turn in favor of sterling. In view of the low
level to which the pound had fallen business men all over the
world were anxious to cover their sterling requirements well
in advance. Foreign balances that had been withdrawn in
1932 were built up again.43 At the same time sterling area
countries were building up their sterling balances depleted
in the early years of the depression.44 Speculators, especially
on the continent, assured of a rising trend in sterling, began
to take substantial long positions in sterling.
The Exchange Equalization Account was, in consequence
of this suddenly altered situation, in a position to increase
its foreign assets very considerably. It was at the same time
eager to increase its sterling assets, and in January suggested
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that its resources should
PaulEinzig, op.cit., pp.65—6.
44 "In the last nine months of 1929 Australian London funds were drawn
down by over million; Indian official sterling reserves fell by £4o million
from the end of 1929 to 1931; New Zealand's sterling funds previously per-
haps Lbmillion or more were practically exhausted; the National Bank of
Egypt's sterling holding wasreducedfrom £30 million early in 1929 to L'5
million in 1931.... Thereestablishment of sterling area balances started
in the autumn of and by the spring of 1934thesesterling reserves had
increased by over £200million—some£50millioneach for Australia and
India, £20 million each for New Zealand and South Africa, and so on."
B.I.S., 9th Annual Report, April z, i938—March 3', 1939(Baste,May 8, 1939),
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be increased. The Chancellor requested that this increase be
postponed until after his Budget Speech. This was done, and
in the Finance Act of 1933 the powers of the Account to
borrow in sterling were enlarged by placing at its disposal a
further £200 million in treasury bills. Meanwhile, the Ac-
count was able to increase its sterling resources by converting
foreign exchange into gold, selling gold to the Bank of Eng-
land, and investing the proceeds in treasury bills as described
above. This coincided happily with the need felt by the Bank
of England to build up its depleted reserve. Though the
decision to increase the resources of the Account was made
in January, the increase actually occurred in April immedi-
ately after the United States had left the gold standard. It
therefore had the appearance of being a weapon specially
provided to fight a battle of competitive exchange deprecia-
tion with the United States. This impression was accentuated
by preceding active and regular intervention by the Account
which had prevented the dollar from rising, as evidenced by
the decline in 'tap bills' early in 1933, the course of the ex-
changes, and the unanimous opinion of the market. For
several months the sterling-dollar rate was prevented from
rising above 3.45, though many observers were of the opinion
that in a free market it would have gone to 3.80 or even 4.00.
There is no doubt that the speculative movement was en-
couraged and the pound made unusually attractive to poten-
tial buyers of every sort by the intervention. Competitors of
British exporters can hardly be blamed for seeing in the situa-
tion a deliberate effort to foster British export trade. Yet the
Account was not actuated by a desire to undervalue the
pound as a stimulus to exports. The Bank had not received
from its friends in the United States any intimations that a
rise in the rate would be welcomed in America, and in its day
to day operations in the market the Account found itself the
counter-party of the purchases of sterling by speculators for
the rise, and the source of many of the speculators' profits.
Its managers were subject to the innate tendency of menSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1147
operating a trading fund not to let themselves be beaten by
speculators. This human, if unstatesmanlike consideration, af.•
fected the judgment of the Account, and must be given due
weight in interpreting the course of sterling. It affords a
ther example of the tendency of the British to follow market
instincts rather than analytical judgments in the execution of
financial policy. At this critical juncture these instincts proved
an unsafe guide. Had they been given less weight, sterling
would have risen further and the divisive and destructive
debates of later months concerning competitive exchange
depreciation would have been less bitter.
The English Credit Base and Credit Superstructure
after September 1931
The transition traced in the preceding sections from a policy
of defending to one of controlling sterling had its reflection
and its parallel in the field of domestic credit control. Be-
tween September and April '933 the long and steady
opposition to any increase in the credit base came to an end
and the credit base and credit superstructure were both raised
to higher levels. The manner in which this was accomplished
marks a further step in the development of the art of currency
management in Great Britain. The provision of the new
machinery of the Exchange Equalization Account gave the
government and the Bank power to decide whether and to
what degree the domestic credit structure was to be influ-
enced by the international movement of capital and the be-
havior of the exchanges. At the same time, the external forms
of the gold standard were retained as a. convenient sanction
for the enforcement of credit control policy. This was a
change in technique of the first order, which differed from
the methods of credit control of 1925—31 nearly as much as
the latter differed from the pre-war techniques. Yet it is an
error to draw these contrasts too sharply, for neither the
techniques of 1925—3 i nor those of 1932—33 broke wholly
with established tradition.1148 DISINTEGRATION
Building up a New Gold Reserve
Chart 72, on which the forces playing upon the 'reserve of
notes and coin' of the Banking Department from September
1931toMarch 1935aredepicted, brings out clearly that the
reserve was influenced, first, by a series of special gold trans-
actions carried out at the initiative of the Bank rather than of
CHART 72
Bank of England, Factors
affecting the Reserve of the
Banking Department,Sep-
ternber 1931—March 1935
the market, and, second, by a steadily rising trend in the note
circulation modified by seasonal factors. This rising trend in
circulation, attributable in large part to the growth of conti-
nental hoarding, was a major change in the problem con-
fronting the Bank of England. For years the joint stock banks
had been aided in their resistance to a credit restriction policy
on the part of the Bank by a declining trend in circulation.
Now, on the eve of a period when the Bank was initiating
and promoting a policy of abundant credit and easy money,
a rising trend in circulation appeared. Thebehavior of the
circulation continued therefore to be an obstacle in the way
of Bank of England policy.
During the last quarter of 1931 the combined effect of the
use of Bank of England gold to repay foreign credits and a
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seasonal increase in the note circulation depleted the Bank's
reserve £24 million, or about 42 per cent. For the next four
months gold holdings remained steady and the reserve fluctu-
ated with the seasonal movements of the currency. In the
summer of 1932 the Bank began to purchase gold, and the
reserve began to rise, subject, of course, to the same seasonal
influences. These masked somewhat the rising trend in the
circulation, which, it is clear from Chart 72, was robbing gold
purchases of a part of their effectiveness. When in December
1932 the Bank gave up gold to the Treasury in payment of
the December installment of the American war debt,45 and
at the same time circulation increased to meet year end needs,
the reserve was heavily drawn down. In January 1933 the
effect of the gold transfers to America was largely offset by a
return flow of currency. The Bank's reserve and proportion
were still relatively low in February 1933 (Table 82) but full
advantage was taken of the opportunity which then arose for
building up a new gold reserve.
It had been one of the outstanding characteristics of the
pre-war management of the international gold standard
through London that the Bank of England did not pursue a
policy of gold accumulation, but, on account of England's
'gold income,' was able to administer its responsibilities with
a small gold reserve. In 1933, more than a year after the gold
standard had been abandoned, the Bank broke completely
with this ancient tradition and embarked purposefully upon
a policy of gold accumulation. In three months, from Feb..
ruary to April 1933, it purchased sufficient gold not only to
make good the amount used for the war debt payment and
to offset the effect of a continued rise in circulation, but also
to lift the reserve of the Banking Department to the general
level of from £70 to £80 million. The Bank's gold holdings
jumped from just over £120 million to just over £180 million
In this instance the use of monthly averages is unsatisfactory and the trans-
action appears as if it were spread over two months in Chart 72.Thesame
observation applies to the discussion of balances' on p. i155.
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but as they increased, the position of the Bank became a less
important, and the position of the Exchange Equalization
Account a more important factor in the Bank's purchases
from the Account.
During the following year the reserve continued under
pressure from the circulation (Chart 72), but this was partly
offset by further moderate gold purchases, and the new level
TABLE 82











September 43 39 49
October 40 41 48
November 33 40 51
December 24 25 43
SOURCE: Bank of England, Statistical Summary
of reserves was on the whole well maintained. By its gold
purchases the Bank was enabled to encourage an increase in
'bankers balances' and at the same time to increase its pro-
portion, as shown in Table 82. It was able to reap all the
psychological advantages that could be derived from a Bank
statement strong and 'sound' according to the ancient tra-
dition of the gold standard.
The Credit Base
InChapter i g we emphasize the fact that the effectiveness of
Bank of England credit control policy was dependent not only
upon changes in the total amount of Bank of England credit
but also upon its distribution between 'public deposits,'
'other accounts,' and 'bankers balances,' and that the whole
technique by which 'public deposits' and 'other accounts'STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD115k
were kept stable from 1923to1931 was a major, if incon-
spicuous, element in credit policy during those years. With
the additional complications introduced into the administra-
tion of 'public deposits' by the dealings between the Bank,
the Treasury, and the Exchange Equalization Account, and
the influence of large inter-central bank credits upon 'other
accounts,' this aspect of British credit control policy became
even more important. The task of tracing its evolution in the
Bank's statements was also made more difficult. However,
one conclusion can be drawn from the behavior of 'public
deposits' during and after 1932 that somewhat simplifies the
task of interpretation. Notwithstanding large sales of gold
by the Treasury and later by the Equalization Account to the
Bank of England, 'public deposits' showed no trend, and
fluctuated within the range of £'° million to £25 million. It
is, therefore, proper to conclude that Bank of England bal-
ances secured by the Treasury and the Account by the sale of
gold were invested in treasury bills. This conclusion is in
harmony with the general practice of government depart..
ments in the employment of their cash resources. Upon this
assumption a general account of the forces playing upon
bankers balances at the Bank may be given with the aid of
charts of the type previously used for the same purpose
(Charts 73 and 74).
In our account of the English credit base under emergency
measures in Chapter iweindicate that about three fourths
of the effect of the drain of gold from the Bank of England
during the confidence crisis in the summer of 1931 was offset
by Bank of England credit, leaving 'bankers balances' in
September '93' about Li' million less than in June
and that the provision of foreign credits in defense of sterling
during this period resulted in the first substantial increase in
'other accounts' since 1920.Duringthe first five months fol-
lowing the abandonment of the gold standard the position
existing prior to July 1931 in both these respects was restored.
The export of gold to pay a portion of the Bank's foreign1 152 DISINTEGRATION
credits in November 1931 was accompanied by a decline in
'other accounts' of an approximately equal amount, leaving
'bankers balances' and 'public deposits' unaffected.48 This
foreign payment in gold therefore had no deflationary effect
upon the credit base in England. The Bank was at the same
CHART 73
Bank of England, Assets and Liabilities























time beginning to increase its holdings of foreign exchange,
as indicated by a growth in 'other securities,' but until De-
cember 1931thissmall operation was apparently offset by
46DuringNovember a rise in 'public deposits' and a decline in 'bankers
balances' of equal amount took place. Since there was no appreciable change
in the circulation, or open market dealings by the Bank, these may be at-
tributed to routine Treasury operations.
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other security transactions. In any event it was quantitatively
not very significant. In December 1931, however, the Bank
provided so lavishly for year-end requirements by further
increases in 'other securities' and by purchases of government
securities that 'bankers balances' were built up seasonally
CHART 74
Bank of England, Securities
in the Banking Department,
September 1931—April 1935
withoutthe usual seasonal expansion of 'discounts and ad-
vances' at the Bank (Charts 73 and 74). After the turn of the
year a continued increase in 'other securities' together with a
fresh reduction in 'other accounts' indicated substantial pur-
chases of foreign exchange by the Bank and the use of part of
these purchases to repay foreign credits. Whether this inter-
pretation is correct or not, the two operations together added
to 'bankers balances,' 'public deposits' meanwhile showing no
upward trend. 'Bankers balances' were further built up by
the usual seasonal return flow of currency. Consequently, the
Bank was able to make an exceptionally large reduction of1154 DISINTEGRATION
£36 million in its holdings of 'government securities' in Jan-
uary and February 1932, and still not fully offset the year-end
increases in 'bankers balances.'
In the first quarter of 1932, therefore, bankers balances
were restored to the level of June 1931and,for the time be-
ing, 'other accounts' ceased to be an active influence upon
the credit base. The portfolio of the Banking Department,
however, was left in a very unusual condition. Of a total of
£86.9 million in 'securities' held in March 1932, £43.9 mil-
lion were in 'other securities,' probably largely foreign ex-
change, and only £43 million in government securities. This
put the Bank in a rather inconvenient position for carrying
on open market operations without influencing the ex-
changes, and in April, as shown in Charts 74 and 71,about
£20 million of 'other securities' of the Banking Department
were exchanged at the Issue Department for 'government
securities.' This did not affect 'bankers balances,' but was
another step in restoring the Bank's balance sheet to a more
normal condition. The subsequent transfer of the foreign
exchange of the Issue Department to the Exchange Equaliza-
tion Account, though passing through the accounts of the
Banking Department, did not affect the balance sheet of that
Department and consequently is not indicated in any of the
charts presented in this section.
With the transformation in the foreign exchange position
during March 1932 the Bank took definite steps to promote
easy money in order to prepare for the refunding of the War
Loan. 'Government securities' in the Banking Department
increased more than 'other securities' declined, indicating not
only a change in the character of the portfolio but genuine
open market purchases as well. In May on a small scale, and
in June on a larger scale, the Bank also began to buy gold
from the Exchange Equalization Account or its informal
predecessor. Upon the general assumption made at the be-
ginning of this analysis, the Bank of England balances thus
created were invested in treasury bills. Therefore in May andSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1153
Junethe effect of an import of gold by the Bank of England
under gold standard conditions supported by open market
operations was achieved by the new techniques.
By these means a second step was taken in lifting 'bankers
balances' at the Bank of England to higher levels. Over the
year end they had been raised from £65 million to £75
million. They were now increased to a general level of about
£85 million. In December 1932 the reserve of the Banking
Department was reduced £20 million in connection with the
payment on the American war debt, and the Bank purchased
£20 million in government securities to offset the effect of
this gold export. During December the only other important
changes affecting 'bankers balances' were a decline in 'public
deposits' and a seasonal increase in circulation of about equal
size and therefore without net effect. In January 1933 'bank-
ers balances' were temporarily increased by further security
purchases, a return flow of currency and an increase in 'dis-
counts and advances' reaching the high level of £113 million.
In February they declined £20 million as a result of the
repayment of the 'advances' and a sharp increase in 'govern-
ment deposits.' Though they were substantial, the movements
of 'government deposits,' 'note circulation,' and 'discounts and
advances' were fluctuations about a constant level. The in-
crease in 'government securities' was of a different character
and was the factor responsible for raising the level of 'bank-
ers balances' by approximately £10 million. This completed
the series of three steps by which 'bankers balances' were in-
creased from about £65 million to about £95 million or
roughly 45 per cent. The balance sheet of the Banking De-
partment, however, had again assumed an abnormal aspect.
'Government securities' were now exceptionally high, stand-
ing in January at nearly £100 million while the 'reserve of
notes and coin' had fallen to just under £40 million and the
proportion to 25 per cent.
At this juncture the weakness of the franc and the dollar
in terms of sterling offered an opportunity of restoring the1156 DISINTEGRATION
Bank's return to a 'normal' condition without reducing the
general level of 'bankers balances.' During February, March,
and April 1933 the Bank of England bought from the Ex-
change Equalization Account over £60 million in gold at its
statutory price. These great purchases are not reflected in the
movement of 'public deposits.' The Account must therefore
have purchased treasury bills with the proceeds, thus pro-
ducing the effect of an ordinary gold. import under gold
standard conditions not offset by open market operations.
The Bank of England, however, sold £26 million in govern-
ment securities from its portfolio, thus completely reversing
its purchases of December and January. Notes in circulation
increased £'7 million and 'public deposits' £'° million. The
increase in 'bankers balances' was therefore offset to the ex-
tent of £53 million, leaving a net increase of £7 million and
bringing them up to £100million.At this level the rising
trend in 'bankers balances' ceased (Chart 73).Inthe sum-
mer of 1933 'other accounts' at the Bank were built up by the
accumulation of Bank of England deposits by the French
government in preparation for repayment of a Bank of Eng-
land credit of £30 million granted in April (cf.p. 1278) ,but
the effect on 'bankers balances' was offset by open market
purchases of securities. These were not reversed when 'other.
accounts' fell with the repayment of the French credits but
remained in the hands of the Bank. Consequently, a con-
tinued rise in the note circulation was prevented from caus-
ing any pressure on 'bankers balances' that might have
interfered with the fundamental easy money policy of the
Bank.
Charts 71—4disclosevery clearly the main features of the
reversal of credit policy which followed the abandonment of
the gold standard. Before March 1932,whensterling was still
being defended, 'bankers balances' were built up by drawing
down 'other accounts,' that is, by the expenditure of part of
the Bank's foreign exchange holdings. Thereafter the mecha-
nism of the Exchange Equalization Account and its informalSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD 111157
predecessor, in combination with open market operations,
was used to produce the effect of a steady import of gold. This
is indicated graphically by the rise in the top line in Chart
and by the absence of any trend in the Bank's holding
of securities. The connection established under the gold
standard by the market between the domestic credit structure
and the international movement of goods and gold was
broken, but another type of connection completely subject
to the will of the financial authorities had been substituted
for it. By this new technique total Bank of England credit
was increased sufficiently to take care of a rise in circulation
of million, to eliminate borrowing by the market from
the Bank almost completely, to increase 'bankers balances'
£40 million, and at the same time to raise the Bank's pro-
portion to about 45 per cent.
The Credit Superstructure
The change in credit control policy that followed the restora-
tion of confidence in sterling in the spring of 1932 was re-
flected in the position of the London clearing banks by a
resumption of the movement in their principal assets and in
their total deposits that had begun in 1930 (Chart 75 A). As
far as the credit superstructure was concerned 1931wasan
interruption in the behavior pattern characteristic of the
British banking system during periods of depression.47 The
movement of total deposits was downward from December
1930 to February 1932, though reflecting seasonal variations
in 'discounts' of a type previously described fully. The cause
of this decline was chiefly a gradual and prolonged fall in 'ad-
vances.' 'Investments,' 'discounts,' and 'money at call and short
notice' changed very little, though these three items were all
slightly lower in February 11932 than in February '93'. 'Cash
and at the Bank of England' also declined slightly, though not
enough to influence the general appearance of this line on
Cf. Ch. 27,PartIII, The Prolongation of Established Credit Control Tech-
niques until June 1931.1158 DISINTEGRATION
Chart 75 A. Our analysis of the behavior of 'bankers balances,'
hoivever, has shown that during the last six months of i 931
the clearing banks were under pressure from loss of reserve
at the Bank of England. The steadiness of all the important
CHART 75
London Clearing Banks, Selected Balance Sheet Items, 1930-1935
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ratios of the clearing banks from the spring of 1930 to the
spring of 1932 is a noteworthy feature of Chart 75 B in which
the ratio system of the clearing banks is plotted for 1930—34.
With the ending of the pressure on the English banking
system incident to the loss and restoration of confidence in
sterling all the characteristic movements of 1920—21 and 1930
were resumed. Between April and August discounts increased












































——-STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1159
£140 million, the sharpest increases being in June, July, and
August. At this time tender bills outstanding rose about £100
million, while a large spread appeared between Bank rate and
market rate. The conditions under which an increase in the
short term public debt held by the joint stock banks was to be
expected were again present as in 1930. At almost the same
time, with the deepening of the depression, advances began
to fall off rapidly and were replaced by investments. Invest-
ments, however, increased faster than advances fell; conse-
quently deposits were built up both by a net increase in act-
vances and investments together and by an increase in
discounts (Chart 75 A). The most important characteristic,
therefore, of the behavior of the credit superstructure after
March 1932 was an increase in total deposits in the last nine
months of 1932 of about £300 million, from just under £1,700
million to just under £2,000 million. This was made possible
by the increase in the credit base. The ratio of 'cash to
deposits' did not decline, but the ratio of 'money at call and
short notice' to 'total deposits' declined slightly. Advances fell
from 55 per cent to under 40 per cent of total deposits, and
the relative importance of 'discounts' and 'investments' in-
creased pan passu.
The chief difference between the behavior of the credit
superstructure in England during 193 2—33 and during 1921—
22 and 1929—30 was the sharp increase in the total of 'ad-
vances plus investments' (Ap. Table 3 D) and the consequent
building up of 'total deposits.' In both earlier periods ad-
vances were declining steadily and were replaced by invest-
ments without increasing total deposits. But in 1932, after
the restrictions imposed by the defense of sterling were lifted,
there was a genuine expansion of bank credit by an increase
in investments greater than the decline in advances. In this
respect March 1932 was a major turning point in English
credit control policy. In order to show this contrast, and also
to provide a bird's eye view of the behavior of the creditInvestments Plus Advances
Inwitmmnts Plus AdvancesSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
superstructure during the entire post-war period Chart 76 is
presented.
Cultivating England's Garden
The general financial and economic policy we have designated
at the beginning of this chapter by the phrase Cultivating
England's Garden was made clearly apparent prior to the
abandonment of the gold standard by the United States. Only
the beginnings of the policy, however, fall within that
period, and consequently any account of its main features
must anticipate events that took place after the international
gold standard had entered the second and even the third stage
of its disintegration. In order, therefore, not to sacrifice a
bird's eye view of the new lines of policy as a whole, reference
will here be made to events falling outside the period to
which this section of our analysis is primarily devoted.
The Home Market
The brief deflationary pressure necessary to complete the
steps by which confidence in British fiscal policy and in the
pound sterling was restored was followed by a long period of
cheap and abundant credit. Together with a protective tariff
policy, this was the major instrument relied on by the govern-
ment for promoting a revival of the home market in England.
Under this stimulus, and without large scale government ex-
penditures for the direct increase of consumer purchasing
power at the sacrifice of a balanced budget, such a revival did
make its appearance in 1932 and By April '934 it had
gathered sufficient momentum to yield, at the high levels of
taxation then in force, a budget surplus of over £3° million,
and to make possible a reduction of io per cent in the British
income tax. The chief influence underlying this revival was
the widening margin between incomes and expenditure on
food due to low food prices and the use of the purchasing
power so released for other purposes such as installment pay-
ments on new houses. Low food prices were therefore not only1162 DISINTEGRATION
responsible for the development of production control in
agriculture and the support of agricultural prices in the
newly protected market, often by government subsidy, but
also in part for a revival of building construction, particularly
in dwellings,48 and a continued shift from old to new indus-
tries.
A 'shift' in the employment of the man power and resources
of a great nation from old to new employments is of course
an extremely complex process and a term of this kind can be
used only as a convenient label or caption to indicate a series
of economic changes which in themselves are material for pro-
longed study and analysis. As indicated in preceding chap-
ters, this process had been going on in Great Britain during
the entire Experimentation period but had not started early
enough or proceeded far enough to overcome the major dif-
ficulties of maintaining the gold standard. It was by no means
a product of the new post-1931 economic and financial poli-
cies, but cheap money and protection were powerful agencies
in accelerating and carrying it forward. This may be seen by
grouping the official British figures for employment in various
occupations under several main divisions, and noting the
shift in the number employed in each division from 1924 to
1934. In Table 83 four groups are set out, containing the fol-
lowing occupations:
I Engineering, Coal Mining, Shipbuilding, Iron and Steel, Tex-
tiles, Transport
II Chemicals, Clothing, Food, Drink, and Tobacco, Laundries,
etc., Printing and Paper, Sawmilling, etc., Public Works Con-
tracting, etc.
III Entertainment and Sport, Hotels, etc., Distributive Trades,
Building, Motors, etc., Metal Trades
IV Other Industries
From 1924 to 1929 the number employed in Group I, the
old staple trades of England, decreased 339,000, and the num-
The estimated cost of buildings for which plans were approved was for 1931,
£63million; for 1932,£66million; and for '933' £83 million(Statistical
Summary, Bank of England, Nov. 1934,p.'40).STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1163
ber employed in Group III increased 524,000. From 1929 to
1931thenumber employed in Group I decreased 699,000
while Group III lost only 5,000. With the beginning of
nomic recovery, from 1932 to 1934, Group I recovered onily
135,000 of its losses while Group III increased 41 i,ooo, and
TABLE 83
United Kingdom, Changes in Employment
by Groups of Occupations, 1924-1934
THOUSANDS EMPLOYED
1924 1929 1931 1932 '933 1934
I 4,150 3,811 3,112 3,024 3,082 3,247
II 1,923 2,035 2,034 2,027 2,069 2,094
III 2,838 3,362 3,357 3,361 3,556 3,768
IV 1,551 1,597 1,561 1,539 1,599 1,677
Total 10,462 zo,8o5 10,064 9,951 10,306 10,786
NET CHANGES
1924-29 1929-31 1931-34 1929-34 1924-34
I —339 —699 +135 —564 —903
II +112 —' +6o +59 +171
III +524 —5 +4" +406 +930
IV +46 —36 +ii6 +8o +126
Compiled from Statistical Summary (Bank of England, December 1934), p. 154
Group IV 1i6,ooo.For the whole decade 1924—34 the shift in
occupations was remarkable: Group Ideclined 903,000,
Group II increased 171,000, and Group III and IV together
increased 1,056,000. The older industries upon which British
prosperity in the nineteenth century was based, coal, steel, tex-
tiles and shipping, had declined, but new industries such as
the automobile industry, radio, and rayon arose in their place.
The industrial North of England was chronically depressed,
but the South was becoming industrialized. The
changes looked forward to by the Balfour Report were in
progress, and the home market was taking a larger share of
British output. The export trade had not recovered its losses,
but vigorous efforts were being made to promote it, especially
by the cultivation of closer financial and economic ties be-1164 DISINTEGRATION
tween Great Britain and the countries in which British eco-
nomic and financial influence was dominant.
The Sterling Area
In our analysis of the behavior of the exchanges from Septem-
ber 1931 to February 1932 the extent of the sterling area,
using the term in this broad economic sense, was understated
in several important particulars. First, since only 36 countries
were studied, several countries whose exchanges did from the
outset move with sterling were omitted. Second, the Crown
Colonies whose exchanges remained stable in sterling were
excluded, and these comprise a very substantial part of the
Empire. Third, countries attracted into the sterling area had
not, by February 1933, reached the full number afterwards
attained, and finally some countries whose exchanges did not
at any time closely follow sterling were still, from a broad eco-
nomic and financial point of view, within the dominant
sphere of British influence. The boundaries of England's gar-
den were in fact not marked with absolute precision, and it
cannot be said that the gardener never cast his eyes upon
neighboring plots.
The instruments used by Great Britain in binding the
diverse portions of the sterling area closer to herself have been
summarized by R. B. Stewart as follows:
"The particular instruments which Britain used in forging
closer links within the Sterling Area are the system of imperial
preference embodied in the Ottawa Agreements, the reciprocal
trade pacts with non-Empire countries, the establishment of stable
exchange rates with these countries, the securing of favourable
treatment under the Argentine system of exchange control, the
development of central banking in the dominions, and the prefer-
ential treatment, in the matter of international loans, extended to
the Dominions and to other countries within the Sterling area."
This summary is in many respects admirable but its sugges-
tion that the United Kingdom established stable exchange
of British Policy in the Sterling Area,' Political Science Quar-
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rates with sterling area countries cannot be accepted for two
reasons, one old and one new. In our discussion of the reasons
for the stability of the exchanges of many countries on
don before the war in Chapter 19 the passive role of the Lon-
don market was stressed. It was to the interest of other coun
tries before the war to have stable rates on London, and we
have suggested that this was a major factor in making the pre-
war international gold standard a sterling exchange standard.
The sterling exchange standard after September 1931 was not
essentially different. The sterling area was formed by other
countries pegging their exchanges on sterling. Yet the fact
that they were pegged made the sterling area a reality and
provided a stable basis for trading within it. This was the
old reason. The new one was that the Exchange Equalization
Account was concerned with the relations of sterling to the
gold currencies and would not buy and hold Swedish kronor,
Australian pounds, or other sterling area currencies.
fore the pegging was carried out at rates satisfactory to the
sterling area countries. Except for the rupee, the Egyptian
pound, and the South African pound all the sterling area cur-
rencies were pegged at a discount from the old parity.
The general policy of imperial preference embodied in
eleven treaties negotiated between different portions of the
British Empire at the Ottawa conference in the summer of
1932 cannot be described with greater condensation than in
Mr. Stewart's summary in the article from which the above
quotation is taken (pp. 181—2), except at the sacrifice of all
pretense to accurate statement:
"In return for concessions on the part of the dominions, Great
Britain undertook to give definite advantages in the English
market: (i) to continue (with certain reservations to protect the
United Kingdom producer) free entry for all Empire products
already admitted free under the Import Duties Act of 1932;(2)
to impose fresh duties—by putting on new duties, increasing
existing ones, and consolidating ad valorem into specific duties-—
on certain foreign imports, including wheat, maize, butter, cheese,ii66 DISINTEGRATION
raw and canned or dried fruits, eggs, condensed milk, etc; to
continue certain existing preferences, by not reducing the general
ad valorem duty of io per cent imposed by the 1932 Act on cer-
tain foreign goods, as timber and leather, without consent of the
dominion government concerned; toestablish an import
quota, restricting quantitatively imports of frozen mutton and
lamb and frozen and chilled beef from foreign countries, with a
view to raising meat prices in the British market to the point re-
quired for efficient production at home and in the dominions and
to give the dominions a greater share of the British market;
toprohibit the imports of any foreign country which appeared
likely to frustrate the preferences granted or guaranteed at Ot-
tawa.
There were, however, some very definite limitations upon the
preferences granted. The United Kingdom reserved the right, if
at any time in consequence of restrictions upon foreign imports
of meat and wheat the supplies became inadequate, to remove
any such restriction until supplies were again adequate. The
duties on foreign wheat, copper, lead and zinc imported into the
United Kingdom were made conditional in each case on Empire
producers continuing to offer those commodities on first sale in
the United Kingdom 'at prices not exceeding the world price.'
The concessions granted by the dominions differed in each case.
New Zealand was to reduce the British preferential duty on
specified items; clothing, confectionary, hosiery, silk and rayon
piece goods. South Africa agreed:(i) to grant new or increased
preferences on a list of manufactures; (2)to leave the existing
British preferential tariff on cotton and rayon piece goods un-
changed; andto maintain existing margins of preference on a
long list of British manufactures. India, Newfoundland and
Southern Rhodesia made similar promises of preference.
Canada, Australia and New Zealand entered into a common
undertaking, first, that tariff protection should be offered 'only
to those industries which are reasonably assured of sound op-
portunities for success,' and, second, to keep or reduce duties to a
level which would give United Kingdom producers 'full op-
portunity of reasonable competition on the basis of the relative
cost of economical and efficient production,' with special con-
sideration, however, to 'industries not fully established.'... AsSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
soon as practicable the Dominion Tariff Boards were to review
existing rates and, after permitting United Kingdom producers to
appear before the Boards, to vary the tariffs in accordance with
this compensatory principle.
Canada agreed that all existing surcharges on imports from the
United Kingdom should be completely abolished as soon as the
finances of Canada would allow, and further undertook 'to give
sympathetic consideration to the possibility of reducing and
ultimately abolishing the exchange dumping duty in so far as it
applies to imports from the United Kingdom.'"
These concessions from the Dominions were far from sub-
stantial, and many of them were not lasting, nor were the
principles of the Ottawa Agreements new in tariff history.
The Agreements, however, when they went into effect on
October 12, were sufficient, combined with Great BritaiLui's
general tariff of February 1932, to raise serious problems in
connection with British trade relations with other sterling
area countries. In April and May 1933 four reciprocal trade
agreements were entered into—with Norway, Sweden, Den-
mark, and Argentina. Mr. Stewart describes the treaties with
the three Scandinavian countries (pp. 181—2)
"The treaty which Denmark finally concluded with Great Britain
guaranteed to Denmark 62 per cent—compared with her 67 per
cent in 1932—of the total permitted imports into the United
Kingdom of bacon and hams from foreign countries. Yet, as was
pointed out by The Economist, in view of the reservations which
Great Britain made in favor of the marketing of her own domestic
supplies, it was altogether possible that Denmark might find heir-
self 'guaranteed 62 per cent. of nothing.' Denmark also secured
an export quota of butter slightly under 1932 exports to Great
Britain, and a quota of egg exports, also slightly less than 1932
exports. Reservation was made, however, as to action necessary Lo
maintain a remunerative price level in Great Britain.
In return, Denmark agreed to redress the balance of trade
which was heavily in her favor as follows:(i) a wide range
British goods—including machinery, coal, coke, iron and steell,
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classes of British goods, such as cotton piece goods, were to enjoy
a reduction of duties; anothervery wide range of goods, in-
cluding woolen and cotton piece goods, other than those in the
second class, were to be free from any increase of duties. Den-
mark agreed, further, to buy from Great Britain 8o per cent of
her total coal imports and all the jute, salt, saltpeter and wrap-
ping paper required for the export of bacon, hams and butter to
Great Britain. The treaties with Norway and Sweden followed
much the same line as the Danish agreement."
The conclusion of these treaties was followed by the ad-
mission of these three countries to the list of preferred bor-
rowers in London, to which the Dominions had already been
admitted. It was also followed early in 1934 by a definite
stabilization of the exchanges of two of these countries in
terms of sterling: the Swedish krona was pegged at 19.40 and
the Danish krone at 22.40 to the pound in January 1934. Nor-
way continued as before to be a faithful sterling country.
The negotiations with Argentina were more difficult and
more important. Argentine competition in the British market
was a serious concern of some of the chief members of the
Empire and also of certain sections of British agriculture.
Furthermore Argentina, since the imposition of her exchange
restrictions in September 1931, had maintained a stable ex-
change relationship to gold, first as represented by the Ameri-
can dollar and then as represented by the French franc. The
solutions of the problems arising from these facts are de-
scribed by Mr. Stewart (pp. 182—3)
"Argentina agreed (i)toreduce to the 1930 level existing duties
on certain goods, a large proportion of which, particularly cotton
goods, come from the United Kingdom, (2)to levy no new or
increased duties, thus continuing to admit coal free. Great Britain
similarly agreed to impose no new or increased duties or quantita-
tive restrictions on certain goods and to take as much Argentine
chilled beef as she had imported during the corresponding quarter
of the year ending June 30, 1932, subject to a io per cent reduc-
tion, if necessary, to keep the price at a remunerative level. No
restrictions were to be imposed on frozen meat except thoseSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD U69
agreed to at Ottawa. The underlying principle of this agreement
is 'the home supply first, next the Dominions, then the Argentine.'
The Argentine agreement, however, was 'cast in a different
mould' from the Scandinavian agreements. In the first place, the
restrictions on frozen beef embodied in the Ottawa agreements
were not to be tightened unless further limitations were applied
equally to the dominions. Britain, in return, secured preferential
treatment in the matter of blocked remittances: Argentina was to
make available sterling remittances equal to the exchange arising
from Argentine sales in the United Kingdom, after retaining 'a
reasonable sum' to service other foreign obligations.
The Argentine agreement was also supplemented by a financial
arrangement under which a long-term loan was raised in the
United Kingdom for the liquidation of frozen short-term debts
due to British nationals. Under this financial arrangement Great
Britain has received, in return for her trade concessions and a
sterling loan, first, the conversion of a large sum of blocked peso
balances into direct obligations of the Argentine government.
These balances had been 'frozen' in Argentina during the period
October toMay 1,1933, thatis, from the date of the institu-
tion of Argentine exchange control until the conclusion of the
Anglo-Argentine agreement. Secondly, Great Britain has enjoyed
exceptionally favorable treatment in the allotment of Argentina's
available supply of foreign exchange. Moreover, this supply of
exchange has been provided to Great Britain at a substantially
lower rate—as much as 20 per cent lower—than that available to
other countries. Finally, Argentina has been induced to abandon
her formal adherence to the French franc and to peg her peso to
the British pound, a change of policy initiated in February 1934."
Theeffort of Great Britain to cultivate the more distant
portions of her garden encountered serious difficulties, of
which perhaps the most important was the strong protection-
ist feeling in both the Dominions and the United Kingdom.
Yet the boundaries of the sterling area were gradually ex-
tended, and in spite of all obstacles and contradictions of
policy, there was a degree of cohesion within the world of
sterling that exercised a continued and powerful influence
over the world of gold.CHAPTER. 32
The World of Gold, a Patchwork Quilt
One of the first and most conspicuous results of the rapid de-
cline of sterling in terms of the dollar, the franc, and of all
gold standard currencies that remained at their old gold
parities after September i 931 was a series of large and wholly
unprecedented foreign exchange losses for the central banks
of many gold standard countries. The contingency that these
losses might be suffered was present in the minds of many
central bankers before they were actually realized, but it was
on the whole felt to be rather remote. The credits of the Bank
of France and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to the
Bank of England were extended in the confident expectation
that they would be adequate to tide over the British crisis,
and informal assurance was given other central banks on the
continent concerning the safety of their sterling balances.
Some of these were surprised to learn that any part of the
Bank of England's gold reserve was considered as pledged to
its American and French creditors. The most illuminating
account of their relations to the Bank of England on the eve
of sterling's departure from gold is given in the following
passages in the Annual Report of the Netherlands Bank for
193 1—32. The Bank refers to its losses on its sterling balances
and comments (official English translation,pp. 44—6)
"And as to the loss itself, the decisive factor here lies in the ques-
tion whether the Bank, in exercising a careful management,
should not have discarded its holding of sterling in time. The
Management were of opinion that they should not do this be-
cause they were convinced that the British Government and the
Bank of England firmly intended to maintain thegold standard
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andto make the gold stock of the said Bank entirely available for
this purpose. This conviction was based on the conversations
which Dr. Vissering and Dr. Tetrode had with the Management
of the Bank of England on August 26th. 1931,whenanxiety con-
cerning the financial position of England began to prevail. )Lm-
mediately after this interview the said gentlemen put down
writinga summary of the discussions which had taken place.
The statements which had been made to them, according to that
summary ... placedbeyond doubt that it was intended that the
proceeds of the loan of £80,000,000 which the British Govern-
ment had obtained from abroad to support sterling, should be
employed in order to maintain the gold standard together
the entire gold stock of the Bank of England then available.
This intention also appears from the telegram received on Augusc
2gth, from the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England,
which reads as follows: 'With reference to our conversation on
Wednesday last you will no doubt have seen the official announce-
ment to-day of the conclusion by our Government of large credits
in New York and Paris. I trust this announcement will serve to
abolish all doubts as to the safety of foreign funds in London.'
On the grounds of these facts, the Management considered that
they were entitled to continue their efforts towards international
co-operation and to refrain from liquidating the Bank's sterling
assets, a liquidation which would inevitably become known and
give rise to a most alarming increase in distrust. They considered
that they were bound, in view of their public function, to main-
tain the relationship as it had grown entirely in accordance
the views and the desire of the Bank of England, as long as they
might expect, from the discussions held and the assurances re-
ceived, that England would maintain the gold standard.
expectation received strong support from the fact that the gold
stock of the Bank of England between the dates of the conversa-
tions referred to and that of the last weekly return before the
suspension of the gold standard, not only exhibited no diminu-
tion, but even showed an increase. On these two dates the gold
stock stood at £133.300.000and respectively.
In the light of the developments described above, the Manage-
ment was so convinced that the Bank of England would consider
themselves in equity bound by the exigencies of international co-1172 . DISINTEGRATION
operation to safeguard The Netherlands Bank against all losses
on its sterling assets, that they drew up and published on Septem-
ber 27th. 1931,theircommunique of that date.
The Management of The Netherlands Bank has, however, been
disappointed in this conviction, as it has since become clear that
the Bank of England takes the view that the responsibility for the
suspension of the gold standard rests exclusively with the British
Government and that there existed a connection between the gold
stock which, according to the weekly returns published, was at
the disposal of the Bank at the time when the gold standard was
abandoned, and the loans which had been taken up abroad by the
British Government and the Bank of England in order to sup-
port sterling. It is obviously unnecessary to state here that such a
connection could by no means be surmised by third parties."
Since even for central banks in closest touch with the Lon-
don market the losses incurred came as an unexpected shock,
this was even more true of many central banks in smaller
countries; for example, the newly established central bank in
Peru, whose sterling assets were the basis for newly won mem-
bership in the world of stable money. These losses were not
only largely unexpected, but also for the most part unavoid-
able. Important central banks felt a strong moral obligation
to refrain from adding to the difficulties of the moment by
themselves taking the lead in runs on one another's markets.
No such considerations restrained the actions of private banks
whose object, in fact, whose duty it was, to avoid loss. Conse-
quently, when the sterling exchange did depreciate, many
central banks held substantial gold exchange balances
abroadand were at once faced by the double problem of how
to deal with their losses in sterling and how to safeguard
themselves against similar losses in other currencies in the fu-
ture. The first part of this problem was met in many countries
by calling in the aid of government to shoulder part of the
1.Thisterm is used in the broad meaning assigned to it in Ch. 20,TheDefini-
tion of the Gold Exchange Standard. In order to avoid needlessly cumbersome
forms of expression used in this connection includes short term
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centralbanks' losses, legislation to this effect being passed,
for example, in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The second part gave rise to
earnest discussion among central bankers concerning various
forms of mutual guarantee against such losses, but was in
practice met by the liquidation of foreign exchange by central
banks. This liquidation was sufficiently large and sufficiently
general to leave its impress upon the movement of central
banking reserves the world over, not only in the last quarter
but also in the last half of (Table 67)
In analyzing the consequences of the breakup of the nu-
cleus on the behavior of reserves the use of figures for the
half year has obvious disadvantages, but it also has one great
advantage. The last six months of 1931 have strong claims
to be considered a unit in one important respect. They cover
nearly the whole period from the outbreak of the confidence
crisis to the restoration of confidence in sterling, and within
them occurred nearly all the events that brought to an end
the Experiment of the Gold Exchange Standard without a
Focal Point.
The Fate of the Gold Exchange Standard
The Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves of Central Banks
and Governments, July—December 1931
InTable 84 the 32 countries included in Table 67 are
grouped according to the changes in their reserves after June
1931. The salient features of the redistribution of reserves
shown by this table are:
i)heavy losses of gold by the two active partners in the nucleus
of center countries—Great Britain and the United States—and
large gains by the inactive partner in the central nucleus—France,
and by the smaller European creditor countries, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Switzerland
2)losses of gold by two periphery countries—Argentina and
Japan
lossof gold and of foreign exchange by Germany1174 DISINTEGRATION
4) general reduction by European central banks of foreign ex-
change reserves, partly by recording their losses on sterling
balances, partly by genuine liquidation, and partly by con-
version into gold
5)the presence of a psychological gold export embargo through-
out the group of countries pegged to gold, as evidenced by the
concentration of their entire losses in reserves in the form of
losses in foreign exchange while gold holdings were little changed
6) an increase in foreign exchange reserves by Australia, char-
acteristic of the general building up of London balances by
sterling standard countries
7)the influence of hoarding, indicated by a net loss in gold re-
serves by the 32 countries at a time when additions were being
made to the gold supplies of the West, not only by the whole
amount of new production but also by shipments from the East
8)the elimination from the world's central banking systems of a
total of 3,742 million Swiss francs ($722 million) in reserve funds
either through a depreciation in the valuation of foreign ex-
change in the currency of the holding central bank or through
the sale of foreign exchange to purchasers other than central
banks (when such sales were made, not in order to purchase gold,
but to support the exchanges of countries whose currencies were
under pressure, this meant that balances previously accumulated
abroad were being used, as in 1919—20,tosettle international in-
debtedness) 2
Thegeneral movement of central banking reserves from
July to December 1931maybe divided with reasonable accu-
racy into two periods, that immediately preceding and that
immediately following England's abandonment of the gold
standard, by referring to our discussion of the position of in-
dividual countries. Except for the shipments made to repay
foreign credits in November 1931,theBritish gold losses are
accounted for by the withdrawals during the crisis of July
1931. Germany's entire foreign exchange reserve losses dur-
ing the six months, and about one-third of her gold losses,
took place before England left the gold standard, as did the
2Cf.Ch. 9, The Pull of the Dollar over the Exchanges.TABLE 84:Goldand Foreign Exchange Reserves of Central
Ban/cs and Governments, Net Changes, July—December 1931
GOLD FOREIGN EXCHANGE TOTAL
(millions of Swiss francs)
COUNTRIES LOSING GOLD RESERVES ONLY
United States —2,571 —2,571




COUNTRIES LOSING BOTH GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
Germany —539 —157 —696
Sweden —45 —34' —386
Austria —i8 —23! —249
Denmark —39 —56 95
COUNTRY LOSING GOLD AND GAINING FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES, BUT LOSING
RESERVES ON BALANCE
Spain —179 175 —4
COUNTRIES LOSING GOLD AND GAINING FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES, BUT GAINING
RESERVES ON BALANCE
Portugal —2 6g
Australia —120 137 17
Hungary —9 12 3
COUNTRIES GAINING GOLD AND LOSING FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES, BUT LOSING
RESERVES ON BALANCE
Italy 70 —478 —408
Czechoslovakia 17 —132 —115
Poland 19 —79 —6o
Finland —59 —58
Chile 3 —39 —36
Greece 25 —6i —36
Routnania 26 —6i —3
Yugoslavia 20 —46 —2
Lithuania 6 —i8 —12
Bulgaria I —9 —8
Latvia 8 —9 —i
Norway 12 —13 —I
COUNTRIES GAINING GOLD AND LOSING FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES, BUT GAINING
RESERVES ON BALANCE
France 2,448 —1,134 1,314
Switzerland 1,507 —316 1,191
Netherlands 812 —306 506
Belgium 803 —630 173
Danzig 22 —8 14
COUNTRY GAINING FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES ONLY
Brazil 46 46
COUNTRY GAINING GOLD RESERVES ONLY
India 57 57
Grand Total —264 —3,742 —4,006
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bulk of Argentine gold losses. During the confidence crisis,
also, substantial additions were being made to the gold re-
serves of France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland,
either through purchases in the London market or by ear-
markings in New York. The chief characteristics of the move-
ment of reserves during the first three months after England
left the gold standard were the large gold losses of the United
States to France and to the smaller European creditor coun-
tries, renewed gold losses by Germany, heavy gold exports
from Japan to the United States, the growth of continental
hoarding, and the general liquidation of foreign exchange
reserves on the continent of Europe. It was during these three
months also that the Bank of France determined upon a
method of meeting her sterling losses and reached the decision
to liquidate her position as a country using the gold exchange
standard as a half-way house.
France Leaves her Half-Way House
On account of the magnitude of the foreign assets of the Bank
of France the domestic problem occasioned by the deprecia-
tion of sterling was very serious and the international prob-
lems presented by the Bank's determination to escape further
losses of the same kind were exceptionally acute.
THE TREATMENT OF THE STERLING LOSSES OF THE BANK OF
FRANCE
When England left the gold standard the Bank of France still
held sterling assets of over £60 million,3 amounting at par to
about 7,750 million francs, or aboutper cent of her total
foreign exchange holdings of 25,194 million francs. For sev-
eral months the Bank continued to carry this sterling on its
books at the old par value, but it was clear that the actual
loss involved would have to be revealed when the Bank
presented its annual balance sheet to the stockholders in
Bank of France, Annual Report for 1931 (Federal Reserue Bulletin, March
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December.Since this loss far exceeded the Bank's total capital
and surplusit was also clear that the government must inter-
vene. Accordingly three conventions were entered into on
December 7 between the Bank, the Treasury, and the Caisse
d'Amortissement, and approved by the Law of December 23,
1931, that is, the day before the annual report had to be sub-
mitted. The content of these conventions is summarized by
Miss Myers:
"The Bank was to revalue the items 'Sight deposits abroad' and
'Negotiable bills and other short-term assets abroad,' according
to the value of sterling on the day before the gold standard was
suspended in England. A special account was to be opened on the
books of the Bank for these items, and all operations made after
that date were to be entered at the rate of exchange then prevail-
ing. On December 24th, 1931,theBank was again to evaluate
these two assets at the rate of exchange on that date. The differ-
ence between these two figures, which represented the amount of
the Bank's loss on December 24th, 1931,wasto be covered by a
Treasury note for that sum, without interest, maturing on De-
cember 3ist, 1945.Asimilar evaluation was to be made by the
Bank at the end of June and of December each year, and the
amount of the Treasury note was to be adjusted to cover the
actual loss at each date. If sterling were again made convertible
into gold, the Bank was to make a final evaluation and the ac-
count closed; but if sterling did not return to a gold basis before
'945, the Treasury was at that time to pay the note and thus
finally settle the matter."
The conventions provided also that the Treasury note to the
Bank should take the form of bills issued by the Caisse
d'Amortissement similar to those issued to the Bank in 1928
in connection with its losses on Russian bonds. These bills
were to be amortized partly by a contribution of 200 million
francs by the Bank on December 24, 1931 and partly by addi-
4Cf. M. G. Myers, Paris as a Financial Center (Columbia University Press,
1936),p.94.
Ibid., p. Thewriter has taken the liberty of altering the sequence
of tenses in this passage because of the context in which it is here used.
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tional taxes on the circulation and profits of the Bank. In
addition, the Bank made a further contribution of 50 mil-
lion francs toward reducing these bills on December 24, 1931.
The Bank therefore made a total contribution of 250 million
toward meeting a total loss, estimated at the end of the year
at 2,343 million francs ($gi,8o6,00o) •6 The balance, 2,092
million francs, was taken care of by the government's notes.
The changes in the balance sheet brought about by these ar-
rangements are shown in the accompanying table.7
Selected Items from the Balance Sheet of the Bank of France showing the
Loss on Sterling Exchange in 1931(millionsoffrancs)
ASSETS DECEMBER DECEMBER 24 CHANGE
GoldReserve 68,064 68,48! +417
Sightfunds abroad 15,335 13,040 —2,295
Negotiable bills, etc., abroad 8,288 7,560 —728
Commercial portfolio 7,287 7,969 +682




Notes in circulation 82,527 83,547 +1,019
Treasury deposits 295 340 +45
Deposits of Caisse d'Amortissement 5,542 5,533 —9
Other deposits 24,695 23,639 —1,056
Miscellaneous 2,107 1,778 —329
Between September 25, 1931 and December 24, 1931 total
foreign exchange holdings of the Bank of France fell from
25,194 to 20,600 million francs, or 4,594 million. Deducting
from this the write-down on sterling assets of 2,343 million
francs a genuine liquidation in these holdings of 2,251 million
francs($88 million)is indicated. At the same time the
Bank's gold holdings increased 9,135 million francs ($296
million).Thesefigures reflect the development of the Bank's
policy with respect to the second half of its foreign exchange
problem.
6Bankof France, Annual Report for 1931(Federal Reserve Bulletin, March
1932, p.
7 This table is presented by Miss Myers, cit., p. 97.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1179
LIQUIDATION OF FRENCH DOLLAR BALANCES AND THE DEFENSE
OF THE DOLLAR
Ever since the de jure stabilization of the franc in 1928 it had
been the policy and aim of the Bank of France, as clearly
stated in its annual reports, to liquidate its foreign exchange
holdings. As indicated in Chapters 20 and 27, it had been
restrained from doing so only because such action would
have had serious repercussions in London and New York, and
would have endangered the stability of the international ex-
changes. It is not surprising, therefore, that the losses sustained
on sterling balances produced in France an uncompromising
hostility to the gold exchange standard, well illustrated by
M. Flandin's bitter attack on it during the debate in the
French Chamber over the ratification of the December con-
ventions. More than ever the question to be decided was not
whether to dispose of the Bank's foreign exchange, but when
and how to do so. The decision to liquidate in good earnest
was not made until December 1931, but by June 1932 the
bulk of the Bank's holdings of exchange had been converted
into gold.
This major change in the assets of the Bank is brought out
in Chart 58. This chart, however, gives a misleading im-
pression in one respect, for it suggests a larger conversion of
foreign exchange into gold in the last quarter of 1931 than
actually took place, because half of the reduction in foreign
exchange during these months was a bookkeeping transac-
tion. For the first six months of 1932, however, it portrays
faithfully the departure of France from her half-way house.
The considerations that led the Bank of France to postpone
the liquidation of itsdollar balances immediately after
September 21, 193 i derive from the peculiar difficulties of the
New York market at that time. Because of the depreciation
of the pound in terms of gold currencies, confidence in the
dollar on the part of continental holders of dollar assets was
seriously undermined. At the same time, foreign centralii8o DISINTEGRATION
banks and commercial banks were eager to strengthen their
own positions quite independently of any question of distrust
in New York. Consequently, immediately after September
21, 193 ilargesales of dollars took place and large transfers
were made to Europe. The demand for francs in particular
was overwhelming. During October gold exports from New
York to Paris were $324 million, and $63 million in gold was
shipped to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, but
New York was still drawing gold in substantial amounts from
Argentina, Japan, and several other countries, so that the net
exports for October were $337 million, only slightly larger
than the gold movement to France. The export figures, how-
ever, tell less than half the story of American gold losses at
this time,8 as is evident from the accompanying statement of
the changes of the monetary gold stock for September and
October. Under these circumstances international considera-
Changes in She Monetary Gold Stock of theUnitedStates, September—October
1931
Imports+, Exports —(millionsof dollars)
SEPTEMBER OCTOBER
Net gold import +20.6 —334.7
Net release from earmark —279.1 —107.6
Excess of domestic production over
non-monetary consumption +4.2 —8.2
Net change in gold stock —254.3 —450.3
tions of the type that had prevented the wholesale conversion
of sterling balances by the Bank of France just before
September 2 i weighed heavily against wholesale conversions
of Bank of France dollar balances immediately after. The
conditions under which these balances, which were probably
not far from $6oo million, would be retained in New York
became a matter of negotiation between New York and Paris,
and it soon became very clear that, in view of her recent
experience with sterling, France would have to be offered
substantial inducements to refrain from carrying out her
long cherished program of conversion of Bank of France
8 Cf. Ch. 27, The United States, Preparing for Trouble.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
devisen into gold. Those which the United States was able to
offer were two—first, assurances or guarantees that no policy
would be pursued that would endanger the maintenance of
the gold standard in the United States; second, an increase
the interest rate that would make the employment of French
funds in New York more profitable. The attitude the
American banks immediately after Great Britain's suspension
of the gold standard was favorable to an agreement or under-
standing on these lines. Withdrawal of Bank of France
balances on a large scale would have been seriously incon-
venient to the New York money market as a whole and to the
particular banks holding French balances. These banks made
their views felt in Washington where apprehension for the
preservation of the gold standard had already created a re-
ceptive state of mind.
For the first time, in fact, since 1914theUnited States
found itself earnestly defending the gold standard. Between
September 19 and Octoberi money in circulation increased
$404 million, the monetary gold stock declined $725 million,
and in spite of an extraordinary increase in Federal Reserve
credit of million, member bank reserve accounts de-
dined $169 million. Fear gripped the American market as
these changes began to disclose themselves, and it became
necessary to give official assurance that the American gold
standard was not in danger. For this purpose Randolph
Burgess went to Basic at the time of the October meeting of
the Board of the Bank for International Settlements. In
October also two emissaries of the Bank of France were sent to
America to discuss with the Federal Reserve officials and
with the Treasury the conditions on which Bank of France
balances would be left in New York. Meanwhile, the dis-
count rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had
been raised from 11/2 to 21/2percent on October 9 and to
3½percent on October 15. A general understanding seems
to have been reached by the bankers which was reflected in
the following passage in the Joint Communique issued by
11182 DISINTEGRATION
M. Laval and President Hoover as a result of M. Laval's brief
visit to Washington at the end of the month:
"Our especial emphasis has been upon the more important means
through which the efforts of our governments could be exerted
toward the restoration of economic stability and confidence. Par-
ticularly we are convinced of the importance of monetary stability
as an essential factor in the restoration of normal economic life
in the world, in which the maintenance of the gold standard in
France and the United States will serve as a major influence.
It is our interest to continue to study methods for the main-
tenance of stability in the international exchanges."
Behind these financial and currency considerations was the
question of the American attitude toward the renewal of the
Hoover Moratorium upon its expiry in July 1932. Mr.
Wheeler-Bennett, in fact, states unequivocally that the object
of French withdrawals and threats of withdrawals of funds
from New York was to regain for France the initiative in
reparation matters.9
As a result of these negotiations gold exports from the
United States to France temporarily ceased in November
but the whole episode had important psychological
repercussions in the international financial world. The ap-
parent yielding of the United States to French views on cer-
tain aspects of American financial policy came as a shock to
the views of many people in Europe concerning the relative
financial strength of the two countries. This together with
the American policy of huge open market purchases to offset
the effects of the gold exports and gold hoarding combined to
produce a genuine lack of confidence in the American dollar
on the European continent.
The cooperation of France with the United States during
the crisis of September and October, moreover, did not mean
The Wreck of Reparations, p. 12 I.
10 In this respect also Chart 58somewhat misleading. It does not showthis
break in the gold movement, for a large proportion of the gold shipped to
France, and included in the American figures for October, appears in the
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a change in the settled policy of the Bank of France toward
its foreign exchange holdings, and in December gold with-
drawals were resumed and were continued without interrup-
tion until June 1932, when the New York balances were ex-
hausted. During this period the gold holdings of the Bank
of France rose to 82 milliard francs, an increase of 14 milliard
between December 30, 1931 and June 24, 1932. This increase
by no means represented a simple conversion of Bank of
France dollar balances, though that was undoubtedly the
major element contributing to it. From December 1931 to
June 1932 France was a steady importer of gold from Eng-
land as well as from the United States and also drew gold on
balance from the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland.
Total French gold imports exceeded considerably the
inBank of France holdings, and imports from the
United States and England were not distributed in the exact
proportion in which Bank of France dollar and sterling bal-
ances were drawn down. The movement probably combined
in some proportion the following elements: first, the Bank
of France purchased gold with its sterling and dollar balances
wherever it was cheapest, that is, alternately in New York and
London in accordance with the fluctuations of the triangular
system of rates that joined Paris, London, and New York;
second, a considerable volume of imports from the United
States represented the satisfaction of a hoarding demand for
gold coins in Europe. Since the United States was the sole
remaining gold standard country that continued to coin
gold and maintain a gold circulation, and gold coins were
desired for hoarding, this was almost inevitable. In a sense the
United States was the source from which the world's hoard-
ing demand was satisfied, and there was a steady movement
of American gold eagles through the Paris bullion market,
some of them bearing the date 1932.
During April, May, and June the amount of gold taken by
France from the United States became very large, and once
more produced a substantial net export movement and a1184 S DISINTEGRATION
repetition on a smaller scale of all the American credit
phenomena of October 1931. It also caused a repetition of
one special aspect of the defense of the dollar: the need for
banking support in Paris on account of the inadequacy of
transport to move gold to France in the volume demanded.
To prevent the dollar from going below gold export point
from New York to Paris the Guaranty Trust Company, which
had special facilities at the Bank of France, bought, at the
height of the two major gold movements, all dollars offered at
25.32½, just above gold export point from New York to
Paris, and sold dollars at 25.35, i.e., at the Bank of France
buying price for gold. The gold movement was thus spread
over time and the bad psychological effect of extreme weak-
ness in the dollar quotation avoided. Even at the height of
the French liquidation of her dollar balances international
financial cooperation was thus brought into play to carry out
the operation technically with a minimum of disturbance to
the market.
The Babel of Tongues
The losses incurred by central banks on their sterling bal-
ances placed the whole question of the future serviceableness
of the gold exchange standard in the forefront of central
banking discussion. Notwithstanding these losses strong hopes
were entertained in many central banking quarters that some
way could be found to preserve its advantages and guard
against its risks.
At the time the gold exchange standard received the
severe shock of sterling depreciation the general idea of an
actual or at least a potential gold shortage had gained a
strong hold over many minds. Many central bankers in the
smaller debtor countries felt that in the international com-
petition for gold produced by such a shortage their banks
would be unsuccessful bidders and would be unable to add
to their holdings. Such bankers therefore wished to find
some means for rehabilitating the gold exchange standardSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1185
since they foresaw that in any event they would have to
continue to use foreign exchange reserves. The reasons that
had led to the development of the gold exchange standard
in pre-war days as a technical convenience in maintaining
exchange stability between the smaller countries and the
center countries were not obliterated by the depreciation of
sterling, and a return to it at some future date was considered
both probable and desirable by some central banks on that
account. In addition, the central banks of smaller countries
wished to hold foreign exchange reserves rather than gold
because these were earning assets. Behind this was the deeper,
and often unacknowledged motive several times stressed in
these studies—the psychological gold export embargo im-
posed by public opinion. The fact that a gold inflow was con-
sidered almost universally as a sign that 'all is well,' while a
gold outflow was, irrespective of its causes, considered a sign
of the reverse, was a serious impediment to the operation of
the gold standard. Though central bankers of the debtor
countries were not wholly immune from this feeling them-
selves, they were in general prepared to admit that from the
point of view of the central bank the question of whether
they had gold or gold exchange was of no consequence
nically. They were, however, faced with the fact that gold ex-
ports from their countries were practically impossible be-
cause of the public alarm they occasioned. This was not true
of the drawing down of foreign exchange balances. There-
fore the only way by which any genuine two-way connection
between the movement of central banking reserves and the
changing international position of the country could be
established was by the gold exchange standard. In addition,
even after September 1931, the gold exchange standard re-
ceived considerable support as a general measure of gold
economy and efficient gold standard administration among
central bankers in the smaller European creditor countries—
an attitude that was a direct inheritance from the time of the
Genoa conference (cf. Ch. ii)ii86 DISINTEGRATiON
Accordingly, the utmost ingenuity was devoted to devising
schemes whereby the dangers to which the operation of the
gold exchange standard without a focal point was exposed
could be overcome. Four possible methods at least were at
this time suggested in various discussions to eliminate the ex-
change risk involved in the holding of foreign exchange re-
serves by central banks:
i)someform of insurance against losses from foreign exchange
depreciation
2)apool contributed by all central banks to be used to make
good the losses due to depository banks going off the gold stand-
ard—a form of self-insurance by central banks
3)the continued covering of the exchange risk by a regularly
maintained volume of forward exchange contracts
4) some form of gold guarantee given by the depository bank.
Of these, the last two were seriously considered, and the
fourth was in part put into practice.
The terms and conditions under which a 'gold clause' by
central banks could be given and received were the subject
of earnest debate by central bankers, and the utilization of
the B.I.S. in connection with it was proposed in different
ways. It was stated to the writer, for example, by a Dutch
authority that the gold exchange standard could be restored
under the following conditions:
i)centralization of all gold exchange deposits with central banks
2)conferenceamong central banks through the B.I.S. concern-
ing the size of these deposits
3)a guarantee by the respective governments acting through the
B.I.S. of repayment of central bank foreign exchange deposits
up to an amount deemed by the central bankers in conference to
be not too large.
Finally, the B.I.S. itself was an active advocate of the
development of a system of inter-central bank gold guarantees,
and the centralization of inter-central bank deposits in its
hands. Such a plan was in harmony with the general purposes
of the BI.S. and it also had a special reason of a more practicalSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1187
kind. With the breakdown of the reparation and war debt
system a large reduction in its working funds was at least a
possibility. If, then, the B.I.S. was to continue to function as
an agency of inter-central bank cooperation it would need
to develop other sources of funds. The proposed centraliza-
tion of gold exchange balances with the B.LS. seemed desira-
ble and appropriate from this viewpoint.
These various suggestions, however, foundered upon the
rock of central banking opposition in France and the United
States. The officials of the Bank of France were during 1932
so convinced of the shortcomings of the gold exchange stand-
ard that they could not imagine ever considering it again,
and invited its advocates to glance at the balance sheet of the
Bank of France after England left the gold standard, if rea-
sons were sought for their attitude. The suggestion of govern-
ment guarantees did not appeal to the realistic French mind,
since governments cannot be obliged to keep their promises,
and, when responsible to parliaments which are not bound by
the promises of their predecessors, often cannot keep them.
In the view of the Bank of France the only solid basis for
international financial obligations was gold and a domestic
portfolio of bills. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
had also consistently taken a stand against the gold exchange
standard under the leadership of Governor Strong and con-
tinued to do so after his death. This opposition was rooted in
a conviction that its use exposed the Federal Reserve banks
to the repercussions of financial disturbances originating far
from the United States and with which the United States had
no concern, and in the general view that the gold exchange
standard was a fundamentally inflationary device. The
era! Reserve Bank of New York was also opposed to the
central bank gold clause on the following grounds:
i)If the Federal Reserve banks gave other central banks a gold
guarantee on their deposits they would have to keep larger
serves, as they would be assuming a special type of liability calling
for special treatment.
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2)If the Federal Reserve banks gave such a special guarantee to
other central banks and not to their own American banking
depositors, they might, by inference, be casting a doubt upon the
safety of their domestic deposits which were in the general form
of promises to pay in gold.
In general it was the attitude of the Federal Reserve banks
that gold exchange standard countries were asking too much
—all the safety of gold and all the flexibility and earning
power of exchange.
In actual practice a very small beginning was made toward
a realization of the inter-central bank gold clause. Italy,
which, together with some other countries, had raised special
objections to the proposals for safeguarding other central
bank deposits in Italy by forward exchange operations on the
ground that this was bad for the Italian exchange, consented
to give a gold clause for the deposits of the B.I.S., as did
Belgium. But other central banks refused, and the general
movement was still-born.
The fundamental bar to the survival of the gold exchange
standard as a major form of the gold standard was the absence
of confidence. In a world in which the international financial
structure was divided and decentralized this was a fatal
obstacle. In the post-war world the gold exchange standard
was, like Janus, two-faced—the British blamed their troubles
on French withdrawals, but the French raised their eyebrows
when speaking of their losses on sterling balances.'1 The inter-
central bank gold clause had two faces also. Its advocates
pointed out that if these mutual guarantees had been in effect
before the confidence crisis the panicky withdrawals that led
to the breakdown of the gold standard would not have taken
place. Its opponents pointed out that if such mutual guaran-
tees had been in effect the B.I.S. would have been ruined. If
the B.I.S. had given a gold guarantee to its own depositors
and received similar guarantees for its own funds deposited
"For these expressions the writer is indebted to his colleague C. J. Smit.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
with central banks, they said, the result would have been that,
despite the gold clause, the B.LS. would have found its assets
frozen, but would have had to meet the demands of its de-
positors in gold.
Gold Standard Countries and Countries
Pegged to Gold
The general retreat from the gold exchange standard was a
milestone marking a definite stage in the journey the world.
had traveled since the gold exchange standard and the
ling exchange standard were for practical purposes indistin-
guishable terms, and sterling deposits could be described by
the expression 'gold plus interest.' Considered in this light it
was a sign of the disintegration of the international gold.
standard system. Another such milestone was the division of
the world of gold into a small group of gold standard coun-
tries and a large group of countries pegged to gold.
The Basis for the Distinction
The basis for this distinction was not to be found, after Sep-
tember 1931, by dividing the gold countries into those which
strictly adhered to the legal forms of the gold standard and
those which did not, for the movement of gold to the
banks of some of the European creditors was resisted by
various forms of gold repulsion policy, and gold was not made
available by all such countries to all corners. In the middle of
1932, for example, the National Bank of Belgium was not
always willing to purchase gold. Bullion dealers on the
continent had to call up the Bank in advance to
abuyer. For long periods the belga was pegged
at just above gold export point by the central bank and there
was no private arbitrage in gold between Paris and BrusseLs.
At the same time the Swiss National Bank would not buy
gold upon demand. It was, in fact, not obliged to do so, but
from time to time three large Swiss banks, the Credit
Société de Banque Suisse, and Union de Banques Suisse came1190 DISINTEGRATION
into the bullion market as buyers of gold, from which it
could be inferred that the Swiss National Bank was a buyer
and that these banks would pass the gold on to it. Nor could
gold be bought at all times in Switzerland. A rigid and literal
interpretation of the statutes of the Bank for International
Settlements, in fact, would have excluded the Swiss National
Bank from representation on its Board, whose membership
was to be drawn from gold standard countries. The raising of
such a point may, especially in view of the continued rep-
resentation of the Bank of England and the Reichsbank on
the Board, smack of ridiculous pedantry, but it is made here
to reinforce our contention that it is not by looking to the
legal maxims governing the gold standard that a distinction
is to be drawn between gold standard countries and coun-
tries pegged to gold. Nor is such a distinction to be founded
on the ground that in the gold standard countries the gold
standard continued to fulfil its ancient economic role and
that in the countries pegged to gold it no longer did so.
All the gold countries except those adhering to gold at
levels below the parities in force at the beginning of the
depression experienced in common the full impact of sterling
depreciation, and many members of the central group of
gold standard countries traveled a long distance in adopting
'the new protection' to counteract its effects. France, for
example, not only raised her tariff rates continuously but
used most of the new devices for checking imports. In Sep-
tember 1931 certain import prohibitions were imposed, and
these were followed by the development of an elaborate and
ever growing system of import quotas. The driving force be-
hind this was the special and organized interest of groups of
French producers,12 to which the general interests of French
consumers and of France as a creditor nation were sacrificed.
By the early months of 1933 the quota system covered over
1200 tariff items, about one-sixth of the whole tariff schedule,
12 An extreme example is the demand for a special quota on the import of
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including many of the chief import groups. It was strength..
ened by milling regulations imposed on behalf of French
agriculture. In February 1932, for example, it was decreed
that go per cent of the wheat used for flour in France must be
of French growth. Such developments in the gold standard
countries were by no means confined to France. In Belgium,
also, tariff increases were supplemented by a quota system
which was extended from month to month. The same thing
was true of Switzerland which added to its protective devices
the use of import monopolies in 1932, while in the Nether-
lands also the quota and licensing system was developed
steadily during the first six months of 1932. FurthermoTe
these countries were parties to clearing or compensation
agreements with countries in Central and Eastern Europe
and in one or two cases even outside Europe.'3 If direct
regulation of items entering into the balance of payments
may be considered a form of exchange control, using the
term in a broad sense, then it may be said that the gold stand-
ard as a device for facilitating trade and correcting one-sided
movements in the balance of payments had broken down
even in these countries. The United States alone among the
gold standard countries did not practice exchange control in
this sense, and on this basis the United States alone could be
called a true gold standard country. This conclusion, also,
like the one based upon strict observance of the gold standard
obligation to buy and sell gold at fixed prices to all corners,
is extreme and open to the charge of pedantry, but is drawn
here for the same reason.
It is clear from the movement of central banking reserves
that the European creditor countries did not adopt the new
protection primarily, or even mainly, as a means of maintain-
ing their exchanges. The motive of protection and the
sity for arriving at some basis of carrying on trade with, and
securing repayment of debts due from, countries that did
Thespread of 'the new protection' and of exchange control is presented in
tabular lorm in the World Economic Survey, 1931/2,Ap.I, pp. 319—22.1192 DISINTEGRATION
find themselves driven along this road by the weakness of
their exchanges were dominant. They did not interfere
directly in the exchange market, except as an incident of
such clearing and compensation agreements, and the neces-
sity of supporting the exchange was not, in the gold standard
countries proper, the initiating force in the spread through
their internal economy of ever increasing waves of economic
regulation. Our distinction therefore rests upon the view that
a country in which direct interference with foreign exchange
operations was considered necessary to force the balance of
payments adjustments, formerly accomplished through the
mechanism of the gold standard, as they have been described
in these studies was a country pegged to gold.'4 Yet the line
is not easy to draw. Poland, for example, was a borderline case.
In France early in 1933 over one-third, in Switzerland one-
fourth, and in the Netherlands one-tenth of total imports were
subject to quotas, and in Poland about one-fourth of total
imports were subject to prohibitions mitigated by licensing
systems. Whether any distinction should be drawn between
quotas and prohibitions mitigated by licensing systems, as
forms of exchange control, is a question to be decided more
by the way the regulation was administered than by its form.
Poland, moreover, of all the countries in the world of gold,
was the most rigorous in its application of long continued
deflation 15inharmony with the strictest canons of the gold
standard as applied to periphery countries in time of crisis.
Nevertheless the fact that the purpose of Polish restrictions
on imports was to maintain the exchange and that a form of
exchange control was instituted in July 1932 has caused us
14Cf.Ch.Peggingand Exchange Control. The same distinction, of course,
could be drawn between sterling standard countries and countries pegged
to sterling.
15CI.Charles Rist, 'Memorandum on the Depression Experiences of Gold
Bloc Countries,' The Problem of Stabilization (International Cham-
ber of Commerce, Paris, 1936) ,pp.252—3.ProfessorRist includes Poland in
the gold bloc, and after 1933,indeed,Poland was one of the major members
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to include Poland in the group of countries pegged to gold
(Chart 65).
A bare recapitulation of the spread of foreign exchange
control in the narrower sense includes all the countries in
each of the classifications: countries pegged to gold; countries
adhering to gold at different levels; and countries attempting
to stabilize in both gold and sterling. Spain, Hungary, and
Germany entered the Disintegration period with exchange
control already in force officially. In September 1931 ex-
change control was instituted in Greece and in October in
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Estonia,
Latvia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. In December Italy and Chile
imposed restrictions, followed by Roumania in February
1932 and Poland in July 1932. In most of these countries the
system was elaborated and extended almost from month to
month and became the central mechanism of the new protec-
tion. It is clearly impossible here to go into any extended
analysis of this process. Its relation to the gold standard as an
international institution may be brought out adequately by
stressing certain aspects of the experience of Austria, Hun-
gary, and Czechoslovakia.
Countries pegged to Gold, Illustrative Cases
AUSTRIA
One of the consequences of the dramatic events in Austria
associated with the confidence crisis 18wasinternal inflation
due to the discounting by the National Bank of hundreds of
millions of Credit Anstalt notes. Great difficulty was conse-
quently encountered in maintaining exchange stability and
this led to three important financial and economic steps in the
control of Austria's international relations:
i)Exchangerestrictions were enforced to correct the balance of
payments.
2)Clearing agreements were negotiated with Switzerland and
other countries to finance trade at the official parity.
10Cf. Ch. 24,Austria,and Ch. 28, The Austro-German Crisis.1194 DISINTEGRATION
3)Private clearing agreements were entered into, which were
clearing in name only, and gave rise to a dual system of exchange
rates.
In the interrelation of these three may be found the measure
of Austria's contribution to the disintegration of the inter-
national gold standard.
In its annual report for 1931 the Austrian National Bank
tersely described the imposition of exchange restrictions in
Austria (Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1932, p. 306)
in accordance with the advice of the National Bank, the
government issued regulations on October g similar to those al-
ready in force in other Countries, providing for the control of
the foreign exchange. Following the suspension of the gold
standard in Great Britain on September 20 the Bank had de-
livered foreign exchange only after examining each application
and approving only such as represented legitimate requirements.
The decree, since amplified by three amendments, confined deal-
ings in foreign currencies to the National Bank and persons
whom it appointed; placed international clearing and credit
operations under the control of the Bank; and made it obligatory
to declare existing stocks and future receipts of foreign exchange,
and to surrender them to the National Bank on demand."
Allotments of foreign exchange under this system were at
first extremely small. In the first week of November, for
example, they were only 3 or 4 per cent of the amount de-
manded. This led to retaliatory measures abroad and throttled
trade with surrounding countries to such a degree that it
seemed likely to cease entirely, unless this could be prevented
by special arrangements for direct settlement with each
country individually. Consequently early in December a
clearing agreement with Switzerland was put into effect, fol-
lowed by agreements with other countries. The Swiss treaty
provided that payments for merchandise would be effected
only through the Austrian and Swiss National Banks, and
that an export surplus amounting to 33 per cent should be
guaranteed to Austria and should go to liquidate Swiss finan-STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1195
cial claims in Austria. Under this agreement the Swiss im-
porters paid the Swiss National Bank in Swiss francs, and the
Austrian importers paid the Austrian National Bank in
schillings. The two National Banks then made the required
offset at par. This meant that Austrian importers would get
a good price in schillings provided they could get exchange
at all. It meant, further, that the Austrian government could
get a good rate of exchange and pay off its external debt
which was expressed in gold with fewer schillings as long as
the National Bank had exchange to deliver to it. As long as
there was inflation in Austria relative to gold standard coun-
tries the importers and the government undoubtedly berie-
fited, but only at the expense of exporters. For the arrange-
ments also meant that under these conditions the exporters
had a difficult time. Their costs were rising, and the proceeds
of their shipments were not rising correspondingly, because
the exchange rate was pegged at par. Hence the clearing ar-
rangement that required that the exporter must sell his
foreign exchange to the National Bank was in fact a check to
exports) and since it was a check to exports it reduced the
amount of foreign exchange available. Therefore the Na-
tional Bank had to ration the available credit between the
government for its foreign debt service, the banks for their
foreign payments, and the importers. Hence the clearing ar-
rangement became also a check to imports.
This situation was of general significance, for it showed
that the condition of a successful working out of clearing
agreements is that the currencies of the participating coun-
tries must not be either under- or overvalued substantially
at the rate at which the clearing is made. Otherwise there is
a tendency for imports and exports to balance, not at som.e
point representing a genuine international division of labor
and determined by the general principles governing inter-
national trade in a free economy, but at zero.
The results of the clearing agreements first negotiated by
Austria soon became intolerable and led to illegal trading in1196 DISINTEGRATION
schillings. The National Bank was obliged to authorize what
were called private clearing agreements under which ex-
porters were allowed to sell foreign exchange to importers.
Importers began to advertise in the newspapers for export-
ers who wanted to sell foreign exchange, and the two went
hand in hand to the National Bank for a license to make
their barter of foreign exchange. The rate was fixed by mu-
tual bargaining and registered the real depreciation of the
Austrian crown. Exporters, however, were not allowed to sell
all their foreign exchange to importers. The producers of
some articles were allowed to sell all, the producers of other
articles, half, and of still others, a quarter, and other per-
centages, and some producers, i.e., producers of luxury goods,
none. The balance was bought by the National Bank at the
official rate. In the summer of 1932theNational Bank's
proportion was on the average about a quarter.
These distinctions were made according to rules laid down
by employees of the National Bank not in close touch with
the businesses involved, who in this came to fix in part
the price in schillings of exported articles and the cost of im-
ported articles. The business community soon complained
about the inconvenience of bringing together particular pairs
of exporters and importers (i.e., finding counter-parties) in
order to barter their foreign exchange, and the task of match-
ing these orders was then turned over to the Giro und
Kassenverein, the clearing house of the Austrian Banken
Verband. A free market thus came into existence, which
could be used legally only for offsetting the export and im-
port of goods. There were, however, ways of effecting dis-
guised capital exports and disguised payment of foreign
creditors. This was particularly true in connection with
'compensation' arrangements in which exporters of manu-
factures who were at the same time importers of raw materials
could get permission for the disposal of their own devisen for
import purposes. Moreover, since the National Bank con-
tinued to demand a certain, though varying, percentage of allSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1197
devisenthe market rate varied in every individual case. The
fact that 25 per cent had to be tendered at the gold par in one
case and only 5 per cent in another influenced directly the
market rate for the balance.
The free market thus created, with allits limitations,
served to finance a large share of Austrian trade and furnished
a rate, the recognition of which would have made an Austrian
devaluation easy. It was theoretically entirely outside the
banks, but the banks were able to save their foreign exchange
business by offering to carry out the transactions of thefr
customers at the Giro und Kassenverein. Furthermore, the
restrictions in force could be avoided in many ways. For ex-
ample, at one time an immense amount of quinine was im-
ported, giving the impression in Switzerland that Austria
was suffering from a sudden plague of malaria. This was
happily not so—the quinine being later exported to Germany
for foreign exchange. The concentration of offsetting foreign
exchange transactions at the Giro und Kassenverein also
made possible the conclusion of triangular transactions in the
exchanges without physical imports and exports. In spite of
all bonds, the essentially multilateral character of
tional trade found some slight avenues of expression.
Finally, most of the tourist traffic was financed outside
Austria. Tourists purchased schillings from Austria's
tors, buying from them smuggled notes or schilling drafts.
This produced another free market, but between the two
free markets there was no arbitrage, so that the rates mighc.
differ by as much as 8 per cent.
Notwithstanding this struggle of her commercial life to
find appropriate expression Austria continued officially to be
a country pegged to gold. In the official view the quotations
daily published for schillings at below the old par were held
to be of no significance.'7
17Inthe preparation of these paragraphs on Austria the writer was greatly
assisted by interviews with Gottfried von Haberler, Fritz Machiup-Woif, and.
Frau Leiser, Director of the Giro und Kassenverein when he visited Vienna
with Mr. Smit in 1932.1198 DISINTEGRATION
HUNGARY
In Hungary there was no counterpart of the Austrian tolera-
tion of a regulated free market to meet the exchange needs
of trade. The governing authorities, the League of Nations
Commissioner and the National Bank, were fearful that such
a practice would lead in Hungary only to the appearance of
a second illegal market with quotations at a much lower level.
They were not sure that any rate could be named that would
lead to the development of a sufficiently large favorable bal-
ance of trade to enable the country to meet its annual obliga-
tions abroad. They were disillusioned by the unfavorable
results of clearing agreements. For example, the first Hun-
garian clearing agreement with Switzerland provided for the
sale of cattle in Switzerland, but almost as soon as it was
signed the agricultural interest in Switzerland got the ear
of the government and veterinary regulations were made
which effectually excluded the Hungarian cattle. In general
Hungary found that while financial reasons led to the con-
clusion of clearing agreements, special industrial and agricul-
tural reasons nullified them, or if not, fiscal reasons did so,
for the growth of imports interfered with the revenues of the
government by reducing the business of the domestic pro-
ducer. Finally, the financial authorities were convinced, for
psychological reasons, that any abandonment of the gold par
of exchange would lead to uncontrolled inflation in Hungary.
Hungarian policy, therefore, was to hang on to the ex-
change restrictions like grim death in spite of all difficulties,
to stop the leaks, and to bring the balance of payments into
equilibrium by restricting imports. The leaks were, neverthe-
less, substantial, for during the first ten months of the life of
the restrictions, August 1931 to May 1932, Hungarian exports
were 395 million pengö and only 252 million pengö were
notified to the National Bank. There were two main causes
for this deficiency: permission granted during part of the
period to export goods in packages of not over pengö inSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1199
valueand differences between the values declared at the
custom house and at the National Bank. Of the 252 million
pengö notified, 135 million pengö, that is only 34 per cent of
the value of exports, were actually delivered. About of
this difference was due to items not yet matured, but fi
indicates the constant vigilance demanded of the authorities
in countries pegged to gold. In Hungary adherence to the
gold standard meant holding the fort until economic
sufficiency could be attained, or an outlet for Hungarian
products found by negotiation with or between the great
powers. Under these circumstances it became the function
the private foreign exchange banker to find ways of doing
legally what it was formerly his duty to do legally.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
In Czechoslovakia neither the extreme position of Hungary
nor the intermediate ground taken up by Austria prevailed
after the confidence crisis. Exchange restrictions were
posed on October 2, 1931, following the exchange restrictions
in Germany, Austria, Hungary, and England. These
tries were the principal customers of Czechoslovakia, and
when Czechoslovakian exporters could not get payment
their exports action was taken.
Under the system as it was developed by
the summer of 1932 all exporters were obliged to notify the
National Bank that they were exporting certain commodities
and the amount of foreign exchange expected in payment.
Permission to deal in the foreign exchanges was restricted to
a few large banks, which had to have all their exchange
actions, subject to certain minor exemptions, passed on by
the National Bank. Great precautions were taken to prevent
capital exports, but exchange was freely made available for
interest and for merchandise imports. Imports were con-
trolled directly. Certain commodities could be imported oniy
by permission of a committee on which various ministries,
such as agriculture, commerce and finance, and various inter-1200 DISINTEGRATION
ests, such as the Chamber of Manufacturers and the National
Bank, were represented. The list of these commodities was
continually increasing and gradually the bulk of Czecho-
slovak import trade came under control. Hence the same sort
of intricate questions of priority arose in Czechoslovakia as in
Hungary where direct exchange control was much more se-
vere.
These examples could be elaborated almost indefinitely,
but without adding much to the general picture already
given of the position of the countries pegged to gold. Some-
thing, however, should be said of the interactions of systems
of exchange control in countries closely connected by trade.
The Austrian-Czechoslovak trade will be used as our ex-
ample.
The major difficulties in clearing between Austria and
Czechoslovakia arose because there were more exports from
Czechoslovakia to Austria than the reverse. Since blocked
schilling accounts were released in Austria only when counter
parties were found, blocked schillings owned by Czechs ac-
cumulated. But an active trade balance with Austria was a
regular feature of Czechoslovakian trade, and in the absence
of exchange control and of a regulated trade it had been
settled by remittance of schillings to Czechoslovakia through
other countries where Austria was a creditor. This was not
done consciously but by means of free arbitrage dealings in
the foreign exchange market. Under the system of exchange
control the Czechs were credited in payment of their surplus
of exports to Austria with schillings which they could not sell
in their natural markets. These 'blocked' schillings therefore
depreciated, and this depreciation, being due not to a general
decline in the purchasing power of the schilling or the state
of Austrian trade as a whole but to the state of the balance of
bargains between the two countries, might easily have led to
•uneconomic exports from Austria to Czechoslovakia.It
would not have been a cause for wonder under such condi-STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1201
tions to see shoes moving from Austria into the country of
Bata. Unless something of this sort did happen, Czechoslo-
vakia could not be paid for its export surplus, and in the end
there could be no such surplus. That portion of the trade be-
tween the two countries which was a part of multilateral
trade would be cut off.
Countries pegged to Gold, the General Case
The system of exchange control described in the illustrative
cases of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, when put into
effect simultaneously in many countries was self-perpetuating
and progressively destructive of international trade. It was
part of the process described in Chapter 29 as Forcing a Ba!-
ance on the World's Books. In the paper upon which our dis-
cussion of the Boundaries of the World of Sterling and of the
World of Gold was based Charles Wilson admirably states the
dynamic nature of the forces at work. The countries that
chose to remain on the gold standard by the use of exchange
controls did so:
"because they feared that the suspension of the gold standard
would lead to panic among the population after the inflation
acollapse of the domestic credit
system, and because suspension would have made the burden of
their foreign debts expressed in gold heavier rather than lighter.
They accordingly endeavored to check both the further with-
drawal of foreign credits and the flight of capital by the introduc-
tion of foreign exchange restrictions and the conclusion of
standstill agreements for certain categories of credit, while
amore or less artificial gold parity.
The foreign exchange restrictions thus served the two-fold
pose of restraining the further outflow of foreign credits and
checking the flight of capital. A new feature was very shortly
added, when foreign exchange restrictions came to be employed
as a means of cutting down imports. In their efforts to maintain
the interest and amortisation service on their long-term foreign
debts and the service of interest on the short-term foreign credits1202 DISINTEGRATION
protected by means of stapdstill agreements and exchange re-
strictions, and in their endeavor to make the repayments required
by standstill agreements or other contracts, the debtor countries
were driven to a policy designed to obtain a corresponding sur-
plus of exports over imports in the balance of trade. They ac-
cordingly made desperate attempts to force the pace of exports
and to cut down imports. Dearer and scarcer credit, price and
wage reductions enforced by the Government, curtailment of
foreign exchange supplied for import purposes and (in certain
cases) refusal to surrender exchange for other than vital imports,
these are the stages of the path followed by some countries with
success so far and by others with no success at all. These efforts
were however increasingly obstructed by the fact that almost
every country, in order to protect its own social life, likewise in-
troduced higher customs duties, import quotas, import prohibi-
tions and foreign exchange restrictions while in some countries
the gold standard was suspended. The measures introduced with
the object of obtaining an export surplus had accordingly to be
tightened over and over again, with the result that the measures
taken abroad were likewise rendered more severe. The greater,
therefore, the difficulties encountered by the individual debtor
country in the fulfillment of its foreign obligations, the greater
the compulsion on that country to restrict its imports or—as
ultimately happened in the case of Hungary, Greece and Austria
—to suspend the fulfillment of its foreign obligations in whole or
in part."
In this whole development, particularly as it applied to
Central and Eastern Europe, the position of Germany was
crucial. Her effort to attain self-sufficiency in agriculture un-
der the pressure of reparation payments was one of the major
causes of the shutting off of outlets for the exports of Eastern
European countries, and the continual pressure to increase
German exports was one of the earliest causes of clearing and
compensation agreements. In fact, such agreements had been
concluded secretly between Germany and Yugoslavia, Hun-
gary, and Roumania before England had left the gold stand-
ard. Germany had become a country pegged to gold in theSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1203
sense in which that term has been here defined even before
September 21, 1931, and the depreciation of sterling led to a
development of, rather than a change in, German policy.
The Place of Germany in the World of Gold
The Annual Report of the Reichsbank for 1931, presented to
the shareholders on March 6, 1932, contains the following
passage (our italics)
"An important contribution to the restoration of confidence
within the country was the fact that the Reichsbank, in complete
accord with the Government of the Reich refrained strictly from
experimenting with the currency. In the future as in the past the
bank will consider it its highest duty to insure the stability of the
reichsmark by all available means."
The determination of Germany to stay 'on' the gold stand-
ard recorded in this passage was steadfastly adhered to in spite
of an invitation to join the world of sterling conveyed by a
high British Treasury official on a visit to Berlin shortly after
Great Britain left the gold standard. It was based on strong
and compelling considerations which may be formulated as
follows:
i) The whole German middle class was still painfully at-
tempting to establish a new backlog of savings, and, in com-
mon with all other elements in German society, retained a
well founded and ineradicable fear of currency inflation.
With the national experience of hyper-inflation only six
years in the background, the psychological effects of a depre-
ciation of the reichsmark in terms of gold standard currencies
would have been disastrous.
2) The statutes of the Reichsbank bound Germany to the
gold standard, and the statutes of the Reichsbank were still
an integral part of the Young Plan.'8 When sterling began to
depreciate in terms of gold standard currencies Germany was
on the eve of initiating new negotiations for a final settle-
18 Cf. Ch. 25, The Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves of the Reichsbank
during the Period of Chronic Emergency, March 1930 to May 1931.1204 DISINTEGRATION
ment of reparations through a drastic revision of that plan.
German abandonment of the gold standard would have made
a successful outcome of these negotiations impossible, and the
reparation problem would have had to be solved by unilateral
German action in an atmosphere of extreme international
recrimination and distrust.
3) On the eve of sterling depreciation Germany had con-
cluded the first Standstill Agreement with her banking cred-
itors. This agreement had a duration of only six months at
most and did not include municipal and other German pub-
lic indebtedness to private foreign creditors. Depreciation of
the reichsmark would have made it extremely difficult to ar-
range for a new Standstill Agreement governing 'municipal'
foreign debt and for an extension of the first Agreement when
it expired, and would have threatened seriously the protec-
tion secured by these agreements against further sudden and
indiscriminate international runs on Germany.
4) Just before the depreciation of sterling the Reichsbank
and the Gold Discount Bank had received very substantial,
but very short term credits. The renewal of these credits was
vital to the Reichsbank in its efforts to provide for domestic
credit needs, but was subject at least in part to political con-
siderations. Moreover the very existence of the Standstill
Agreement was, by its explicit terms, 'dependent' upon their
continuation.
5)Sterling depreciation was a substantial benefit to Ger-
many in the repayment of that part of her foreign debt ex-
pressed in sterling. Depreciation of the reichsmark in terms
of francs and dollars and other gold currencies would have
eliminated this advantage and produced an added burden in
the repayment of that very substantial proportion of German
foreign debt payable in dollars and other gold standard cur-
rencies. Since the Standstill Agreements provided for sub-
stantial initial repayments and gradual liquidation this was
a serious consideration affecting their execution as as the
payment of obligations not included in them.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
6)Germany was dependent for the maintenance of her eco-
nomic life upon the uninterrupted inflow from abroad of cer-
tain important commodities, notably cotton, copper, iron,
and wool. A sudden increase in the cost of these imports,
which would have followed from a depreciation of the reichs-
mark, would have been disastrous to the German economy.
Furthermore, this dependence gave to the powers largely con-
trolling the production of these commodities a strategic posi-
tion in negotiations with Germany which could not be over-
looked.
On psychological,financial,economic, andpolitical
grounds, therefore, devaluation of the or pegging
it to the pound sterling were not practical politics in Geir-
many after September 20, 1931. Strictly speaking, Germany
did not decide to remain on the gold standard any more than,
strictly speaking, England after the war decided to return to
gold.'9 Germany was simply confronted with the problem of
how, in the face of sterling depreciation, to free herself from
her excessive dependence on foreign capital, reach a final
reparation settlement, maintain her essential imports and
preserve her international credit standing without permitting
the reichsmark to depreciate in New York and Paris. The so-
lution of this many sided problem was closely bound up with
her success or failure in building up her export trade, or at
least securing an export surplus against the new competition
of sterling and the sterling area.
The German Reply to Sterling Depreciation
From 1928 to 1930 German exports increased steadily in
value relative to imports. Including reparation payments and
'°Cf.Ch. g, The Recognition and Measurement of the Problem by Great
Britain; cf. also a speech of Dr. Luther, President of the Reichsbank, in which
he said that the decision of the Reichsbank and the Reich not to let the
reichsmark slip after September 20,1931was not a decision, but simply the
expression of a conclusion rendered inevitable by Germany's state of indebted-
ness and the German people's past experience of inflation. Samuel Montagu
& Co., Weekly Review, Nov. 26,1206 DISINTEGRATION
deliveries in kind the trade balance for the last quarter of
1930 showed an export surplus of over 6oo million reichs-
marks. The surplus declined early in butin the third
quarter reached a new peak of nearly a milliard. Immediately
after the onset of the depression this trend had been due to
the favorable terms of trade, the decline in Germany's ca-
pacity to buy imports owing to a reduced domestic purchas-
ing power, and steady pressure by the government to direct
German energies toward production for export. But the i931
peak was entirely due to other and special causes. Before the
conclusion of the first Standstill Agreement, raw material im-
ports fell and exports of manufactured goods rose as
a direct reflection of a state of financial panic, and early in
the fourth quarter exports of manufactured goods continued
on a high level owing to purchases by the United Kingdom
in anticipation of higher tariffs.
After October 1931,however,these special causes ceased to
operate and were replaced by new tariffs, trade barriers, and
exchange depreciation. The German export surplus conse-
quently began a rapid decline which did not taper off until
the middle of 1932.20Thesupport given the reichsmark by
German exports was, moreover, less than the trade figures
suggest. In spite of the foreign exchange restrictions imposed
after July 1931, a substantial proportion of the proceeds of
German exports was not remitted home, but was retained
abroad. In addition, a further large part of German exports
was to Russia and was financed by 54 month (4½year)cred-
its, which did not begin to be repaid until after October 1932.
These exports to Russia were of fundamental importance for
German internal economic life, particularly in providing
work for her heavy industry. Without them, for example, the
German steel industry could not have operated, in the opin-
ion of qualified observers, at over 17 per cent of capacity. The
bills drawn under the long credits that financed the Russian
orders were essentially work-creation bills, and through them
20Cf.Review of World Trade, 1932,chartsand tables, p.39.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLDR207
theBruening government was building up a foreign
change reserve for the future payment of Germany's private
foreign debt. At the time of the first depreciation of
however, this part of German export trade did not support
the reichsmark.
At the same time, the first Standstill Agreement, though it
had stopped the unregulated foreign run on Germany, gave
rise to special drafts on the diminishing supplies of foreign
exchange accruing from trade. This agreement provided that
forward exchange contracts were to be settled when they
matured and that the necessary reichsmark balances shouid
be released for this purpose. It provided also that the reiths-.
mark balances of the banking creditors were to be placed at
their free disposal as follows: 25 per cent of each creditor's
balance was to be set free upon the adherence of the creditor
to the agreement, and 15 per cent monthly thereafter, subject
to certain safeguards if the Reichsbank represented to the
B.I.S. that these withdrawals were endangering its position.
The importance of these provisions is illustrated by the state-
ment of the Frankfurter Zeitung, quoted by Samuel Montagu
and Company in their Weekly Review, October 22, 19311,
thatof the foreign currency withdrawals from the Reichsbank
during the first half of October only one-thIrd was needed for
imports, the other two-thirds going for the repayment
seasonal credits, the settlement of forward transactions, pay-
ment of interest, and the release of bank balances under the
Standstill Agreement. The Agreement, moreover, was based
on the principle that foreign banks should keep open credit
lines for German borrowers of not less than the amounts out-
standing at the time it was signed, so that in case repayments
were made, and the new requirements of German borrowers
were not sufficient to utilize the full amount of the
credits, an actual withdrawal of capital from Germany would
take place, and an unutilized credit line would be established.
This actually happened in many cases. Finally, the Standstill
Agreement covered only banking credits, and capital1208 DISINTEGRATION
ments continued to be made in the autumn of 1931 on debts
not included under it.
For these various reasons the reichsmark was under severe
pressure during the last quarter of i 931, and the Reichsbank
gold reserve continued to be drawn down as shown in Chart
56. Since this contraction of reserves was not accompanied by
any contraction of Reichsbank credit, but on the contrary
was more than offset by increases in the portfolio of domestic
bills, the reserve position became continuously weaker. Un-
der these circumstances a renewal of the central banking
credits of $ioo million falling due on November 4 became of
urgent necessity. On October 12 the Council of the Bank for
International Settlements decided to renew its $25 million
share in these credits for another three months, and under-
took to negotiate with the Bank of England, the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, and the Bank of France for similar
extensions off their shares. This was arranged and the whole
amount was renewed for three months.2'
Meanwhile, as stated in the passage from the Reichsbank
Annual Report quoted above, the stability of the reichsmark
was being promoted by the use of "all available means."
Among the first of these means was the issue on September 26
of a decree preventing German nationals from making use of
the proceeds of securities sold abroad. On October 2 a new
series of foreign exchange regulations was published, requir-
ing all holders of foreign exchange, of German securities
issued in foreign currencies, and of gold to declare their hold-
ings if in excess of 200 marks and offer them to the Reichs-
bank. All newly accruing foreign exchange, especially that
derived from exports, was to be declared as it accrued and
sold to the Reichsbank. A monthly maximum amount of for-
eign exchange which an importer might acquire was also to
be fixed, and the foreign exchange control was obliged to con-
suit the Reichsbank before granting general import permits
21.Cf.Ch. 28, the Austro-German Crisis, for the political implications of such
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of over 250,000 reichsmarks a month or individual import
permits of over 20,000 reichsmarks.
The essential principles of German exchange control as a
means of forcing an adjustment in the balance of payments
were thus established:(i) centralization of the nation's for-.
eign exchange resources in official hands; (2) restriction of
imports by withholding the means of payment. In order to
prevent the evasion of the first principle, a decree was issued
on November 17, 1931 providing that whenever goods were
exported from Germany a declaration containing the full de-
tails of their value had to be made to the Reichsbank and
that in order to retain any part of the foreign exchange pro-
ceeds the exporter had to obtain special authorization from
the Reichsbank.
By the beginning of November Germany was already in
possession of an elaborate code of foreign exchange regula-
tion. On November 4 the Frankfurter Zeitung performed the
arduous task of summarizing this code:
"Devisen (foreign exchanges) are: Foreign notes, coins, claims,
bills of exchange, cheques, as well as gold in any shape or form
(excluding manufactured articles, as for instance jewelry).
Foreign exchanges have to be delivered: Within three days
after acquisition by sale to the Reichsbank, or to the customary
bank (a devisen bank).
Foreign exchanges may be retained: On permission received
from the Reichsbank, which it gives under certain exceptions and
on documentary evidence.
Foreign exchanges may be utilised, as well as sent abroad or to
the Saar District or taken over there: After permission has been
obtained from the Reichsbank and only with the consent of the
local finance office acting as substitute for the Central Exchange
office.
Foreign exchanges may be purchased: From the Reichsbank or
the usual bank (devisen bank) as follows:
Up to R.M. Within any one month without special permis-
sion, but against presentation of an official passport. This does
not concern gold.
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Over R.M. 200:Withspecial or general permission of the local
finance office acting as substitute for the Central Exchange Office.
Foreign exchanges may be dealt in on forward terms: Only with
the permission of the local finance office, acting as substitute for
the Central Exchange Office and with the consent of the Reichs-
bank.
Cash credits may be granted abroad or in the Saár District: Only
with the permission of the local finance office, etc.
Cash debts abroad or in the Saar District may be paid: When the
creditors are banks, only with permission of the Reichsbank
Directorium, Berlin, (still-holding agreement) in every particular
case; when the creditor is not a bank, only with the permission
of the local finance office, etc. in every particular case.
Debts in foreign currencies owing to banks in Germany when the
latter act as guaran toTs towards foreign banks may be paid: Only
with the permission of the Reichsbank Directorium in Berlin.
Credits in account in Reichsmarks which are kept abroad or in
the Saar District, Cession of claims in Reichsmarks to persons
domiciled abroad or in the Saar District,
Disposals of persons residing abroad or in the Saar District over
credit balances in Reichsmarks in Germany which existed before
the i6th July, 'p3', and which belong to other persons than
banks,
Payments on deposit or transfers in Reichsmarks in accounts kept
in Germany belonging to persons abroad or in the Saar District,
Handing over of Reichsmark media of payment in Germany to
a person residing abroad, and
Transmission or bringing over of Reichsmark media of payment
a broad or to the Saar District
May be effected only with the permission of the local finance
office acting as substitute for the Central Exchange Office(free
maximum limit R.M. 200).
Balancesin Reichsmarks belonging to foreign banks which
joined the still-holding agreement . ..arefree in the meaning
of the rules set down in the still-holding agreement." 22
Twoof the above provisions go to the heart of the new
position of Germany as a gold standard country. First, that
22QuOted in Samuel Montagu & Co., Weekly Review, Nov. 12,1931, p.693.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
purchasesof foreign exchange of over 200 marks could bce
made only with special or general permission of the
finance office acting as a substitute for the Central Exchange
Office. This regulation raised the whole thorny question
priority of imports, and its influence extended potentially
into every nook and cranny of the German economy.
that payments on deposit or transfers in reichsmarks in ac-
counts kept in Germany belonging to persons abroad could
be effected only with the permission of the local finance office
acting as substitute for the Central Exchange Office.
made possible numerous distinctions between marks owned
by foreigners but available only in Germany and only for
certain purposes. Marks with these different characteristics,
blocked in various degrees, soon became the subjects of trad-
ing, and this regulation became the basis for the multiple cur-
rency system employed by Germany in her international rela-
tions.
The administrative machinery for closing the gaps in the
balance of payments having thus been set up, Germany en-
tered into negotiations, late in 1931,forthe renewal of the
Standstill Agreement with the bankers, the expiry date of
which had become definitely fixed as February 1932 by the
extension of the centra' bank credits to the Reichsbank. One
of the major obstacles to an extension was the fear of the
banking creditors that, while their claims were postponed,
the transfer capacity of Germany might be exhausted to their
prejudice by capital repayments outside the Standstill. To
meet this difficulty official control was imposed over the re-
payment of all German foreign indebtedness, a proceeding
that was practicable within the framework of the foreign ex-
change control system. The solution of this problem is de-
scribed in the Report of the Foreign Creditors' Standstill
Committee of January 23, 1932(p.7):
"The schedule of future repayments is to depend upon the trans-
fer capacity of the Reichsbank, which in turn must be largely
dependent upon the developments in the German export situa-1212 DISINTEGRATION
tion. Instead of a fixed schedule of repayments at fixed dates, it
has seemed best to leave the future determination of what can be
repaid to an Advisory Committee representative of the Creditors,
who will from time to time consult with the German authorities.
Arrangements are being made by which Continuous information
will be available, both as to incoming and outgoing foreign ex-
change, and as to payments which have been made or are con-
templated, both within the Standstill and outside the Standstill.
The future schedule of repayments, determined in the light of
this information, will be one which will safeguard both the
Reichsbank and the Standstill creditors.
But this forbearance on the part of the Standstill creditors for
the purpose of strengthening the German situation renders it
necessary that German resources should not be dissipated to meet
other claims outside of the Standstill Agreement.
The Reichsbank has by letter informed the Foreign Creditors
Committee of the intention of the German Government, with the
concurrence of the Reichsbank, to create a Committee for Foreign
Debts (Ausschuss fuer Auslandsschulden), to exercise under the
authority of the Government and the Reichsbank a general con-
trol over all payments in respect of all German external indebted-
ness, whether within or without the Standstill Agreement. The
Foreign Creditors Committee are satisfied that this will safeguard
the interests of the Standstill creditors, and ensure that, so long
as they do not receive further repayments of capital, no such pay-
ments will be made to creditors outside the Standstill, except
when they are deemed essential for the maintenance of German
credit."
In addition to these radical measures in support of the
reichsmark, Germany met the new situation created by ster-
ling depreciation by pressing forward the negotiation of clear-
ing and compensation agreements and bilateral trade treaties
to encourage or force German exports, and imposed retalia-
tory tariffs, some equipped with sliding scales moving with
the depreciation of the exchanges, against countries whose
exchanges moved with sterling. Finally, after long diplomatic
negotiation, Germany also took the initiative required by theSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1213
terms of the Young Plan to bring forward the whole question
of a new reparation settlement. On November 19 the German
government requested the B.I.S. to appoint a special Advisory
Committee as provided for by the Plan, but concluded its
application in the following language:
"In accordance with the New Plan the application requires a
declaration by the German Government to the effect that 'they
have come to the conclusion in good faith that Germany's ex-
change and economic life may be seriously endangered by the
transfer in part or in full of the postponable portion of the annui-
ties.' In making this declaration, the German Government must
expressly state that such a declaration does not do justice to the
present situation. Since the New Plan was framed, the economic
and financial situation in the world, and particularly in Germany,
has been fundamentally altered by a crisis without parallel. As
the New Plan requires the Committee to examine the situation
from all points of view, the Special Advisory Committee must in-
vestigate the problem in its entirety by taking into consideration
all its factors, with special reference to the circumstance that the
question of Germany's private indebtedness must duly form the
subject of a new settlement before the end of the month of Feb-
ruary next, by means of an agreement to be reached between for-
eign creditors and German debtors." 23
TheSpecial Advisory Committee was duly formed; it met
and deliberated from December 9 to December 23, 1931, and
reached the conclusion that the German government was
fully justified in asserting its inability to resume in the follow-
ing July the transfer of the conditional annuities under the
Young Plan, that the character of the crisis was far graver
than any contemplated when the Young Plan was drawn up,
and that the governments concerned should take a very broad
view of the whole matter and arrive at a general solution of
the whole question of intergovernmental debts in the light of
economic realities. Among these economic realities were the
claims of private creditors upon German resources and the
consequences for the whole structure of international trade
23TheEconomist, Reparation and War Debts Supplement, Jan. 23, 1932,p.8.1214 DISINTEGRATION
of placing German production for export under an ever in-
creasing forced draft. This was brought home to the creditor
powers, and to Great Britain in particular, by the fact that
the heart of the German reply to sterling depreciation did not
lie in any of the measures described above but in a rigorous
deflationary policy, which, in the words of the Basle Commit-
tee, was "unparalleled in modern history."
As early as the end of September comprehensive decrees
embodying this policy were prepared by the German govern-
ment. Early in October official pensions were further cut, the
wages of miners in the Ruhr were reduced, and steps were
taken to reduce high salaries in trade and industry even
where these were of a contractual character. The major de-
crees embodying heroic measures of deflation were withheld,
however, for some time, until it should be clearer what the
course of the sterling exchange would be. By late November,
however, the principles to be applied were fully presented to,
and approved by, an Economic Advisory Council formed by
the government to assist it in working out its economic pro.
gram. The conclusion reached by the Council was that prices,
wages, and rents must be reduced simultaneously, that the
price cartel system and wage agreement system must be ren-
dered more elastic, that prices that had been proportionately
too high must be reduced, and that interest rates must be
lowered. The major decree embodying this program was the
Fourth Emergency Decree for the Safeguarding of Economy
and Finance and for the Protection of Internal Peace, issued
on December 8, 1931. This decree provided for a reduction
of wages to the level of January 10, 1927—in most cases a io
and in many cases a 15 per cent reduction. To make it pos-
sible to relieve the wage earner's budget by a reduction in
rents, interest rates on all mortgages and private mortgage
bonds were reduced so as not to exceed 6 per cent. The inter-
est relief thus obtained was in the case of houses built after
the war distributed among tenants, and rents were reduced on
pre-war houses by io per cent of the pre-war rent. All cartelsSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
and price associations were put on notice to reduce prices to
io per cent below those of June 30, 1931, and the prices
coal and potash, which were subject to government controL
were forthwith reduced io per cent. Such a sweeping horizon-
tal reduction in wages, rents, and long term interest had
course many repercussions in German life. Among these were
the necessity of agreeing upon a reduction of short term
terest rates,24 the further drastic reduction in government ex-
penditures required by the loss of government revenue from
income and land taxes, and the provision of new agencies to
provide a market for the mortgages whose interest had been
reduced. Into a discussion of these measures, and of the
fluence of such deflation upon the political life of Germany,
these studies cannot enter. That they were, in their main pur-
pose and effect, a reply to sterling depreciation, and that they
were therefore a direct consequence of the disintegration of
the international gold standard system was explicitly stated
on many occasions by Dr. Bruening. They contained a mes-
sage that could not be misunderstood concerning German
competition in the export markets, and they had a direct
24TheEconomist correspondent in Berlin wrote on Jan. 12(TheEconomist,
Jan. i6, 1932,p.ii8)
"After much toil, the agreement of the bankers' associations relating to in-
terest on short-term debts, which was foreshadowed by the emergency Decree
of December 8th, has been completed. Subject to the following exceptions, a
maximum rate of 4 per cent. has been established for bank and savings bank
deposits; for sums not exceeding Rm. 25,000,subjectto notice of at least a
month, the rate isper cent.; for sums over Rm. 25,000therate is to vary
with the Reichsbank discount rate, but must be at least 1/2percent. below it.
On sums exceeding Rm. 50,000,evenof 15—30 days' maturity, the rate may
vary with the Reichsbank rate, but must be at least 2 per cent. below it. An
exception is made for end-of-month money. Local credit committees may
further reduce the amounts for which it is permissible to vary the charges
according to discount rate. Extensive departures from the regulations are
permitted in the dealings of banks with each other, but they are not likely
to be very frequent in practice. Small and medium-sized banks and private
firms are allowed to exceed the maximum rate by 14—1/2percent. The regula-
tions do not apply to stock exchange credits against securities, except in so
far as the Banking Commissioner may decree."1216 DISINTEGRATION
bearing upon the attitude of Great Britain at least in the
final negotiations concerning reparation.
The End of Reparation
During the first six months of 1932 the policies initiated im-
mediately after Great Britain left the gold standard were in
some respects consolidated and completed. In February the
bankers' StandstillAgreement was renewed for one year, from
March 1, 1932 to February 28, 1933, on the terms already de-
scribed, and at the same time the $ioo million Reichsbank
foreign credit was renewed, though only after difficult ne-
gotiations and only for one month. In March, however, a
three month extension was agreed to with a io per cent reduc-
tion in the principal; and thereafter, in common with other
foreign credits of the Reich and of the Gold Discount Bank
and private short term debt,it began gradually to be
amortized and reduced.25 In April 1932 the principle of the
Standstill was extended to public and municipal loans by
a Municipal Standstill Agreement. With these preliminary
matters arranged, and with the German deflationary measures
an accomplished fact, the Powers assembled at Lausanne on
June i6, 1932 to deal finally with reparation. Their first act
was to postpone, for the duration of the Conference, the pay-
ment of the reparation obligations falling due on July i.
Their last act was to continue this postponement until a new
agreement between Germany and the creditor powers made
at the Conference should come into force or until the govern-
ment of any one of the signatory powers, Germany, Belgium,
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, or Japan should signify
its intention not to ratify. This new agreement recognized
that, once the continuity of payments had been broken by
the Hoover Moratorium and the course of the world depres-
sion had completely undermined all the calculations upon
which the Young Plan was based, any revival of the old sys-
25 Reichsbank, Annual Report for 1932 (Federal Reserve Bulletin, May
p. 296).STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1217
tern was impossible. It therefore put an end to the Young
Plan and provided that "the obligations resulting from the
present agreement will completely replace the former obliga-
tions of Germany comprised under the annuities of the new
Plan." 26Thesenew obligations consisted in the delivery by
the German government to the B.I.S. of three milliard marks
of 5 per cent bonds to be sold by the B.I.S. at 90 or better,
but not until three years had elapsed. Such bonds as could
not be sold at this price within 15 years were to be canceled.
The Lausanne Agreement was negotiated for Germany by the
Von Papen government, for on the eve of the Conference the
Bruening government fell. For lack of ratification, it never
came into effect and German reparation was left, legally, in
a state of suspended animation from which it never recovered.
Hesitant Revival, 1932
Whilethe last chapter in the reparation controversy was be-
ing written, the measures taken in reply to sterling deprecia-
tion were contributing to some relaxation in the internal
strains in the German economy. As a result of the Bruening
decrees Germany was the only country in which the gap be-
tween raw material prices and the prices of manufactured
goods was to some degree closed.27 Industrial production,
which during the confidence crisis had been insufficient to
meet current needs, revived somewhat. The downward pres-
sure on prices lessened. The prolonged fall in savings deposits
was checked. Commercial bills drawn and the demands of the
commercial banks on the Reichsbank both declined and the
money market became more liquid. Germany, in fact, seemed
in the spring of 1932 to be entering a period of hesitant re-
vival. This was checked by seasonal factors in the winter of
1932—33 but was resumed again in the spring of 1933 under
the stimulus of German rearmament. Before the fall of the
Bruening government tentative agreements had been reached
26B.!.S.,Third Annual Report, p.28.
21WorldEconomic Survey, 1932/3, pp.6i,129.1218 DISINTEGRATION
for a disarmament program based on the then existing Ger-
man armament, but these were subsequently rejected largely
at the insistence of German heavy industry which strongly
emphasized the work-creation aspect of rearmament.
The forces of recovery, however, were far from strong
enough to alter the basic system of exchange control or to re-
lieve the reichsmark from pressure. In German Business
Cycles Carl Schmidt describes the underlying position (pp.
59—60):
"But difficulties that had become increasingly apparent during
the course of the depression hindered the progress of revival. De-
spite the easing of the money markets, the supplies of long-term
credits for industrial expansion remained meager. Domestic banks
and business enterprises and foreign lenders were primarily in-
terested in the continuing liquidation of debts. The presence of
a large reserve of domestic consumer purchasing power might
have acted as a support and stimulus for industrial activity, once
prices were steady. However, the long depression had greatly re-
duced both the incomes and the savings of individuals and busi-
ness enterprises. The downward pressure on wages continued into
1933,andsuch business profits as accrued were applied to a con-
siderable extent to the reduction of liabilities. Also, the growing
resistance of world markets to German goods made improbable
a stimulus from export trade. Although construction costs were
at a low point, the meager purchasing power in domestic and
foreign markets, together with the large surplus productive ca-
pacity of many industries, threatened that returns on new invest-
ments wou'd be inadequate. There was, then, little incentive to
make extensive additions to the existing plant."
The Multiplicity of Marks
In spite of slightly better economic conditions Germany con-
tinued in 1932 to have difficulty in repaying her private for-
eign debt. Though the export surplus for the first half of
1932 was 540 million reichsmarks, foreign debt payments
made drafts on the reserves of the Reichsbank. En the first
week of July, for example, the Reichsbank lost 17 millionSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1219
reichsmarks in gold and foreign exchange in connection with
the service of the Dawes and Kreuger loans, and in the second
week of July anothermillion reichsmarks through the
partial repayment of the $125 million Lee Higginson credit
of 1930.28AlthoughRussia began in the autumn of 1932 to
repay her 54 month credits, which had previously been con-
sidered by the German government as a reserve to meet just
such a contingency, these transfer difficulties persisted into
1933. Consequently, on June 9 Germany entered a new phase
in her relations with her foreign creditors. A transfer mora-
torium was decreed on all foreign liabilities incurred before
July 1931, except those covered by the Standstill Agreements.
German debtors were to continue to pay in reichsmarks, but
foreign exchange was no longer to be made available pending
an increase in the Reichsbank foreign exchange and gold re-
serves.
The imposition of this transfer moratorium was justified
on two major grounds: (i) the difficulties met by Germany
in developing her export trade;(2)the depletion of the
Reichsbank reserves. To demonstrate the real state of these
reserves, the millionrediscount credit of the Gold Dis-
count Bank was repaid.29 In an official statement by the Ger-
man cabinet announcing the moratorium, the following
words were used:
•.therepresentatives of the short and long term foreign cred-
itors have in full agreement with the Reichsbank unanimously
recognized that a further decline in the gold and foreign ex-
change reserves will jeopardize the plain function of the Reichs-
bank as a central note issuing institution. .
Thusin the name of preserving the gold reserves of the
Reichsbank still another form of blocked marks was created.
28Figurespublished by Deutsche Bank and Discontogesellschaft and quoted
in Samuel Montagu & Co., Weekly Review, Aug. 25, 3932.
29 repaymentbeing made in dollars after the United States had left the
gold standard, a profit ofmillion reichsmarks accrued to the Reichsbank.1220 DISINTEGRATION
Germany still remained legally a gold standard country, but
the landmarks in her journey away from that standard as a
code of practice were clearly revealed in the state of her cur-
rency. The reichsmark, as far as its international uses were
concerned, was broken up into fragments described by the
World Economic Survey, 1932/3(pp.223—4) as follows:
in Germany, the following classes of blocked accounts are
recognized: foreign mark claims accumulated before July i6th,
1931,butnot subject to the standstill agreements (Altguthaben),
foreign property claims acquired after August 3rd, 1931(Kred-
itsperrmark), bank-notes brought into Germany after February
i9th, 1933 (Notensperrmark), claims created by the sale or re-
demption of stocks and bonds (Effectensperrmark). Scrip issued
in even amounts, with a minimum of Rm. 40,maybe issued to
the owners of Konversionssperrmark and marketed on German
and foreign stock exchanges. All of these blocked marks can be
used, with the consent of the Exchange Control Office (Devisen-
bewirtschaftungsstelle), to buy mortgages or fixed property, or to
give credit to Germans in Germany, or to share in a German en-
terprise, provided always that the investment is for five years at
least. Under certain conditions, also, they may (except in the
case of Effectensperrmark) be used to pay for purchases of Ger-
man commodities destined for 'supplementary exports.' The price
paid for such blocked marks varies with the uses for which per-
mission is given. At the end of July the current values ranged
from about 28 per cent toper cent (Effectensperrmark) below
the gold parity. In the same way, tourists may buy blocked marks
below the official rate. The credits subject to the standstill agree-
ment of February 1933(Registermark)may also be used exten-
sively for certain purposes within Germany at about the same
parity. Finally, the blocked marks now being accumulated as the
result of the transfer moratorium on interest and amortisation
payments on long-term loans which began on July 1st, 1933 (Kon-
versionssperrmark), will provide another large amount of cur-
rency valued below gold parity. On the other hand, German ex-
porters who have acquired the right to make 'supplementary ex-
ports' may use part of the proceeds to buy German bonds abroadSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1221
and re-sell them in Germany. This right is marketable and its
value depends mainly upon the relative prices of German bonds
at home and abroad. In July 1933,thevalue was about 20 per
cent of the foreign price of such bonds."
The Juridical Concept of Gold as Standard
Though still preserving a traditional attitude toward the gold
reserves of her central bank, Germany had long since
doned all but the external symbols and the juridical concepts
of the gold standard. Her position was that of a country that
could no longer employ any of the traditional means of finan••
cial adjustment associated in the past with the international
gold standard, but was nevertheless determined to maintain
its psychological advantages. For the international solidarity
of money markets which in the past had prevented wholesale
withdrawals of foreign capital, she had substituted elaborate
agreements with her creditors. For the long run influences of
the international investment cycle upon her merchandise bal-
ance she had substituted direct control of imports and govern-
ment promotion of exports. For the competitive price mech-
anism she had substituted price fixing by decree. For one
system of commercial treaties she had substituted a series of
special bargains. For one exchange rate she had substituted
many. Yet her central bank was able to say that it had "re-
frained strictly from experimenting with the currency." Such
a statement could have only a legal significance in a country
connected by a multiplicity of marks with a world of gold
whose boundaries were steadily shrinking, and which ex-
emplified in the highest degree the atrophy of the interna-
tional banking and credit functions called in these studies the
substance of the international gold standard. Against such a
background the juridical concepts of gold as reserve and gold
as standard in Germany stood out like the weatherbeaten ribs
of some old sailing vessel long since cast ashore by a tropical
hurricane.1222 DISINTEGRATION
The Defense of the Gold Standard in the United States,
September 1931 to April 1933
The position of the United States in the world of gold after
September 1931 appears upon the surface much simpler and
susceptible to much more concise description than that of
Germany. Yet fundamentally the forces at work were just as
complex. There is hardly a thread in our whole historical
analysis of the post-war period that is not woven into the pat-
tern of events in the United States during this period. In
particular, the latent conflict between the responsibilities of
New York as an international money market and its responsi-
bilities as the domestic money market for a continent (cf. Ch.
18) was brought sharply to the surface by the interplay of
three major influences: (i) a foreign drain of gold incident
to the liquidation of the gold exchange standard in Europe
at a time when the United States was endeavoring to mitigate
the rigors of a domestic deflation;(2)the accentuation of
deflationary pressure in the United States by the depreciation
of sterling in terms of the dollar; theripening of the
harvest sown during the long inflationary development of the
One-Way American Banking System. Behind all this, and
coloring the interaction of these forces at every turn was the
necessity of finding some solution to the problem of the basic
disharmony existing in the structure of American prices,
which in turn was a reflection of structural maladjustment of
the world economy inherited from the war.
Meeting the Foreign Drain
The first factor, the foreign drain of gold, has already been
partly described. It lasted from September 1931 to June 1932.
Within this time there were two periods of intense foreign
gold demand, amounting to 'runs' on the United States and
sometimes described, in our judgment incorrectly, as attacks
upon the dollar. The first was in September and October
1931, the second in May and June 1932.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
Inanalyzing the position of the American economy on the
eve of the European confidence crisis we said that within
ownborders the United States exemplified in the highest de-
gree the fundamental economic deadlock of the world depres-.
sion, the maintenance of agricultural production in the face
of declining prices, and the maintenance of industrial prices
by means of restricted production. During the entire period
of the foreign drain of gold this deadlock continued and was
evenaccentuated. The high production levels in the major
crops were preserved. In 1932 the crops of corn and oats were
13.5and10.3 per cent, respectively, larger than the 1929
crops,while the cotton, wheat, and hay crops were only 1.2,
10.7, and 6.5 per cent, respectively, less than those of 1929.
Pricesat the farm were 61.5 per cent lower in June 1932
in June 1929. In contrast, prices of non-agricultural products
were, in June 1932, still oniy 28 per cent less than in June
1929, while the composite index of industrial production for
1932 was 56.5 per cent less than in 1929. No sign of genuine
economic recovery appeared before June 1932. Security prices
continued to fall, unemployment increased, there was a scar-.
city of good borrowers, and the liquidity of the whole
ing system was even more seriously impaired. Bank failures
continued, and there was persistent pressure for further credit
and monetary expansion, running counter to the fundamen-
tal objectives of banking reform measures proposed in the
United States immediately after the Stock Exchange crisis
1929 and also to the policy of raising interest rates which, as
already shown, was one of the conditions imposed upon the
United States for the maintenance of Bank of France balances
in New York during September and October i and which
was appropriate, in general, to the defense of the dollar
against a foreign drain.
From October i6, to February 26, 1932 a 31/2 per
cent rate was in force at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. The downward trend of short term interest rates in the
New York money market, in progress since the end of 1929k1224 DISINTEGRATION
was sharply interrupted. In addition, rates charged to cus-
tomers by New York banks, which had fallen from a 6 to a
4 per cent level, were increased about 3,4 per cent. The de-
fense of the dollar against the foreign gold drain was a dis-
tinct check to the Federal Reserve policy of easy money to
promote recovery. It also brought into the foreground cer-
tain peculiarities of American central banking legislation,
and consequently altered in a significant way the techniques
employed when, in March 1932, this easy money policy was
resumed.
Between September ig and October 31,1931 FederalRe-
serve credit was increased million to offset the effect of
gold exports. Just over one-half of this increase was provided
by purchases of bills by the Federal Reserve banks, whose
'bills bought' increased $514million.Slightly under one-half
was provided by member bank borrowing. 'Bills discounted'
rose $444 million. The gold drain was not fully met by these
means, however, and member bank reserve accounts fell $169
million. The technical conditions necessary to make the
higher discount rates at the Reserve banks effective were thus
fulfilled.
In November and December 1931thegold drain tempo-
rarily ceased, but was resumed at the end of the year. The
pressure on the member banks, however, was uninterrupted.
Until February 1932thejoint influence of currency and gold
movements on their reserves was about neutral, chiefly be-
cause the resumption of gold exports coincided with a sea-
sonal return flow of currency, but the Federal Reserve banks
allowed their portfolio of 'bills bought' to run off to the
extent of $547 million. Against this deflationary pressure
there were three offsetting factors: declines in foreign central
bank balances, in required reserves, and in excess reserves.
The deposits of foreign central banks with the Federal Re-
serve banks, which had been increased just before England
left the gold standard,8° were now drawn down $134million,
Cf.Ch. 27,TheUnited States, Preparing for Trouble.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
partlyto buy gold, a transaction without effect on membeT
bank reserves, but also partly to acquire earning assets in
New York market. Required reserves were reduced by a
steady fall in time and demand deposits from $30,500 ifl Sep-
tember 1931 to $25,715 in February 1932 (Chart 37) almost
wholly due to repayment of commercial loans. Consequently
the effectiveness of previously accumulated excess reserves as
a cushion against deflationary pressure was increased, but this
did not prevent their falling to a very low level. In October
1931 they were $129 million and in February 1932 only $43
million.In spite of these 'cushions,' the decline in the
portfolio of the Federal Reserve banks was great enough to
force the member banks to go $129 million further into debt.
On February 26, 1932 'bills discounted' at the Federal Re-
serve banks reached $842 million.
The growth of this indebtedness at a time when the Fed-
eral Reserve system and the government were fundamentaL1y
committed to an easy money policy was directly connected
with the resumption of the foreign drain of gold.
central bank balances, particularly those of the Bank oT
France, were still very large and it was clear that further
withdrawals were to be expected. Under these circumstances
the peculiar legislative provisions governing the issue of Fed-
era! Reserve Notes imposed an effective bar against simull-
taneously meeting a new foreign drain and resuming an easy
money policy by means of open market purchases of securi-
ties. They even threatened the ability of the United States to
maintain the gold standard. In technical language the ques-
tion of 'free gold' at the Federal Reserve banks suddenly came
to the forefront of America's central banking problem.
Under the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act as they
then stood, the Federal Reserve banks were required to hold
a reserve of 35 per cent in gold or lawful money against their
deposits, a reserve of 40 per cent in gold plus 6o per cent in
either gold or commercial paper against Federal Reserve
Notes in circulation, a reserve of ioo per cent in either gold1226 DISINTEGRATION
or commercial paper against Federal Reserve Notes issued
but not in circulation, and a redemption fund in gold of not
less than 5 per cent of Notes outstanding not covered by gold.
Three points are to be noted concerning these requirements.
First, that lawful money as well as gold could form part of the
reserve against deposits, and that the Federal Reserve banks
on February 24 held $202 million in reserves other than gold.
Second, that notes printed and held in stock but not in cirdu-
lation had to be secured by a ioo per cent reserve which might
be entirely in the form of commercial paper, and that on
February 24, 1932suchnotes amounted to $266 million.
Third, that commercial paper eligible as collateral against
Federal Reserve Notes included member bank promissory
notes secured by government bonds. Member banks held at
the end of 1931 over $5 billion of government bonds, but
belief was widespread that many individual banks had ex-
hausted their supplies of eligible paper and therefore could
not bring to the Federal Reserve banks the type of asset re-
quired for pledge against the issue of notes.
On February 24thedeposit liability of the Federal Reserve
banks was $1,973millionand their notes in actual circula-
tion were $2,643 million. Had they been in possession of
enough commercial paper to provide 6o per cent of the ioo
per cent collateral required against notes in actual circulation
and the i00 percent collateral required against notes issued
but not in circulation, they could have met their legal reserve
requirements as shown in the accompanying tabulation.
Required reserve against deposits
in lawful money $202,000,000
in gold 489,000,000
Total 691,000,000
Requiredcollateral against 'notes issued'
in gold 1,057,000,000
in commercial paper 1,951,000,000
Total 2,908,000,000
5per cent Redemption Fund against notes in cir-
culation, but not secured by gold, in gold 79,000,000STERLING. AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1227
That is, if the Federal Reserve banks had possessed $1,951
millionin commercial paper, they would have had to set
aside only $1,625 million in gold to meet their reserve re-
quirements. Since they actually held $2,938 million in gold,
they would, under these circumstances, have had an excess
over requirements of million in gold. Gold held in
this way was technically called 'free gold,' because it could
be exported without impairing the legal reserve requirements
of the banks, but it was 'free' even in this sense only upon
the assumption that it could be exported without causing
any changes in the note and deposit liabilities and the hold-
ings of commercial paper of the Reserve banks.
Instead, however, of $1,951millionin commercial paper,
the Federal Reserve banks on February 24, 1932heldonly
$921million.Their actual reserve requirements, therefore,
were as follows:
Required reserves against deposits
in lawful money $2o2,000,ooo
in gold 489,000,000
Total 6g 1,000,000




5per cent Redemption Fund against notes in cir-
culation, but not secured by gold, in gold 46,000,000
Thistabulation shows that, instead of $1,625 million,
required for reserve was $2,522 million. Deducting this
amount from the total gold holdings of $2,938 million only
$461 million was left in 'free gold.'Thiswas the amount
actually available to meet a foreign drain provided the de-
posit and note liabilities of the Reserve banks and their hold-
ings of eligible paper remained constant. It was less than the
amount of foreign central bank balances remaining in New
York.
81Cf.Feäeral Reserve Bulletin, March 1932,andFederal Reserve Board,
Annual Report, 1932,p.17,chart.1228 DISINTEGRATION
The Federal Reserve banks were therefore in a dilemma.
If they offset the deflationary effects of actual gold exports
their 'free gold' would be diminished by exactly the amount
of the exports. If they more than offset the gold exports and
built up member bank reserves by such purchases they would
put the member banks in a position to pay off a portion of
their bills discounted. This would reduce their holdings of
eligible collateral for pledge with the Federal Reserve Agent
against notes, and still further reduce their 'free gold.' If the
Federal Reserve system desired to bring about easy money
conditions this is what they had to do, for there could be no
really 'easy money' with the member banks indebted to the
Federal Reserve banks by over $8oo million. But such a poi-
icy might easily lead, in view of the probable magnitude of
impending withdrawals by foreign central banks, to the ex-
haustion of the 'free gold' and the suspension of the gold
standard. If, on the other hand, the Federal Reserve banks
permitted gold exports to exert their full effect on member
bank reserve accounts and thereby forced the member banks
to borrow from them, and thus provide them with eligible
paper with which they could obtain gold from the Federal
Reserve Agent for export, then they would have to abandon
all thought of a really easy money policy. They had to choose
one of three alternatives—to continue an easy money policy
at the sacrifice of the gold standard, to defend the gold stand-
ard at the sacrifice of an easy money policy, or to change the
reserve requirements laid down in the Federal Reserve Act.
The third choice was made by the passage of the Glass-
Steagall Act on February 24, 1932, which provided that gov-
ernment bonds purchased by the Federal Reserve banks in
the open market might be pledged with the Federal Reserve
Agent as part of the 6o per cent collateral other than gold
required against Federal Reserve Notes. As applied to the
statement of February 24 this meant that the 'free gold' of the
system could be increased $897 million, i.e., from $416 to
1,313millionprovided the Reserve banks purchased enoughSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1229
government bonds to bring their holdings up to $897 million.
On February 24 their actual holdings were $741 million.
Thus by the purchase of $156 million of government bonds
the Federal Reserve banks could put themselves in a position
to lose $1,313 million of gold without violating their own
reserve requirements. By the purchase of $1,313 million of
government securities they could lose an equal amount of
gold without imposing any deflationary pressure upon
member banks.
Certain parallels could be drawn between the Glass-Steagali
Act and the British Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1928,
based upon the similarity of function between the Federa
Reserve Agent and the Issue Department of the Bank of
England. Both acts were measures of gold economy, and both
introduced greater flexibility into a system of note issue based
upon the principle of the segregation of assets against notes.
Both increased the proportion of such assets that could take
the form of government bonds. The differences are obvious,
but the similarities have perhaps been too often overlooked.
With the great addition to its 'free gold' given by the
Glass-Steagall Act the Federal Reserve system was able to face
with confidence further large outward movements of gold,
and at the same time to renew its easy money policy. On
February 26 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reduced
its rate toper cent and other short term rates resumed their
downward trend. A policy of providing and maintaining
'excess' reserves in the commercial banking system and ena—
biling the member banks to free themselves from debt was
decided upon, and large purchases of government bonds were
begun. The first result was to encourage the repayment by
the member banks of their indebtedness to the Federal Re-
serve banks and the second was to build up excess reserves.
During March and April 'bills discounted' fell $299 million
and the average of excess reserves increased from million
in March to $152 million in April. The Federal Reserve
system seemed to have escaped from the dilemma caused by1230 DISINTEGRATION
the collapse of the gold exchange standard and the breakup
of the central foreign exchange nucleus.
Other obstacles, however, had to be overcome before an
easy money policy could be really effective. The first was the
generally weakened position of the American banking system.
During 1931 the closing of banks throughout the country had
immobilized approximately $1,700 million in deposits, and
many banks were finding their assets increasingly frozen. The
government therefore turned its attention toward a general
strengthening of the banking system. The first step was the
formation of the National Credit Corporation on October
13, 1931. The principle on which this corporation was organ-
ized was cooperative lending by the banks. In each Federal
Reserve District associations of banks were to be formed, the
members of which were to subscribe to the notes of the Na-
tional Credit Corporation up to a maximum of 2 per cent of
their time and demand deposits. The Corporation was then
to lend to individual banks against security collateral and
the joint guarantee of the banks forming the Association of
which the borrowing bank was a member. Under the con-
ditions prevailing this plan of having the strong banks help
the weak was foredoomed to failure. Of the one billion dollars
of National Credit Corporation notes authorized only $135
million were ever issued. In January 1932 more effective
action was taken by the establishment of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, which was given a capital of $500 mil-
lion entirely subscribed by the government, and was author-
ized to sell its own bonds, at first up to $1,500 million, and
later, under the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of
July 21, 1932, up to $3 billion. In practice these bonds, when
issued, were subscribed by the Treasury and not offered in
the market. The Corporation was, by the original act, author-
ized to lend to banks and other financial institutions and to
the railroads under certain conditions, and its powers were
many times broadened and extended. An institution thus
came into existence which functioned as a channel for dis-STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
tributing part of the existing bank credit, secured by
government through increasing the public debt, to those
points in the national economy where the need seemed most
urgent. During the first two months of its life the Corporatio.
lent $192 million, of which $125 million was to banks, By
Juneit had lent $805 million, of which millionwas
to banks. By December 31,1932loans had been made to
5,600 banks, including over 500 institutions in receivership,
and $6oo million of such loans were outstanding on that date.
In eleven months the Corporation had advanced $1,525
lion to borrowers of all kinds, of which $300 million had been
repaid.82
The establishment of the Reconstruction Finance
tion to strengthen the banks directly was followed by
action to meet popular pressure for credit expansion. The
conviction was widespread that the banks were adding to the
existing deflationary pressure by refusing to lend, owing to an
inordinate desire for liquidity, and it was also widely believed
that many banks could not expand their operations for lack
of eligible paper with which to replenish their reserves
the Reserve banks. Consequently certain segments of the
proposed general banking legislation were acted upon sepa..
rately. In the Glass-Steagall Act provision was made permit-j
ting member banks to borrow from the Federal Reserve banks
on non-eligible assets under certain conditions, and also per..
mitting the Federal Reserve banks to make direct loans to
industry where ordinary banking accommodation was not
obtainable. In the event, these facilities were little used, for
the banks already had ample supplies of government bonds
on which to borrow, and no amount of additional borrowing
facilities for industry could produce a great increase in the
number of eager and solvent borrowers in a basically unbal-
anced economy.
These measures were the domestic side of a battle against
82 Quarterly Reports of the R.F.C.; Federal Reserve Board, Annual Report,
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deflationary pressure, of which the steps taken to deal with
the foreign drain of gold were the international side. With
the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, the resumption of open
market purchases by the Reserve banks, and the reduction in
interest rates, the American government felt that this battle
had been won. In April 1932 President Hoover celebrated
this victory in a remarkable speech in Des Moines in which
he said:
"I wish to describe one of the battles we have fought to save this
nation from a defeat that would have dragged farmers and city
dwellers alike down to a common ruin. This battle was fought
parallel with other battles on other fronts. Much of what I will
tell you has been hitherto undisclosed. It had to be fought in
silence, for it will be evident to you that had the whole of the
forces in motion been made public at the time there would have
been no hope of victory because of the panic through fear and
destruction of confidence that the very disclosure would have
brought.
Happily we have won this battle. There is no longer any danger
from disclosure.
Our own speculative boom had weakened our own economic
structure, but the critical assaults and dangers swept upon us
from foreign countries. We were therefore plunged into a battle
against invading forces of destruction from abroad to preserve
the financial integrity of our Government; to counteract the ter-
rific forces of deflation aligned against us; to protect the debtor
class who were being strangled by the contraction of credit and
the demands for payment of debt; to prevent our being pushed
off the gold standard, which in our country would have meant
disaster to every person who owned money; and finally to pre-
serve the savings of the American people.
We were fighting to hold the Gibraltar of world stability, be-
cause only by holding this last fortress could we be saved from a
crashing world, with a decade of misery and the very destruction
of our form of Government and our ideals of National life."
At the time these exultant words were spoken, however, a
complicated interaction between the withdrawal in gold ofSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1233
foreign central bank balances from New York and the de-
velopment of the American policy of creating and distrib—
uting 'excess' reserves still remained to be worked out.
The Creation and Distribution of Excess Reserves
The uninterrupted large scale purchases of government Se--
curities by the Federal Reserve banks seemed in the eyes
foreigners to be evidence of approaching inflation in the
United States. The gold outflow to the continental credrtor
countries was consequently sharply accelerated as this poliicy
was vigorously pressed forward. The heavy exports in May
and June, in which the smaller continental creditor countries
participated heavily as shown by the accompanying table,
were sometimes referred to as a second attack upon the dollar,
and were sufficiently great to call into play again the
cal measures of defense first employed in October 1931(d.





Jan.—April 244,145 37,432 34,036 2,134 317,637
May—June 174,627 46,180 81,641 116,157 518,605
p. 1184).Duringthis period the New York Federal Reserve
Bankwas aided in meeting the situation by receiving advance
notice of intended withdrawals through the B.LS.33
The preparations for this contingency proved amply suf--
ficient, and late in June the New York market was intensely
relieved by the final repayment of the New York balances of
the Bank of France. Immediately thereafter, on June 24, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York reduced its rate from
to 2½ per cent. This was, however, not quite the end of the
matter. The concentration of such heavy gold losses in a few
months had an unfortunate psychological effect upon a pub-
lic already shaken by past events, alarmed by recurrent bank-
ing troubles, and newly made aware, on the authority of the
88 E. L. Dulles,TheBank for International Settlements at Work, p. 486.1234 DISINTEGRATION
President himself, that the suspension of the gold standard
had only a few months before been a distinct possibility, if
not a probability. From June 18 to July g there was a wholly
non-seasonal increase in money in circulation. The dehoard-
ing movement of the first quarter of 1932wasmore than
reversed, and on July 9 money in circulation was at a record
—$925 million greater than in July of the preceding year.
The Reserve bank policy of relieving member banks from
debt and creating excess reserves by the purchase of govern-
ment securities thus encountered obstacles partly of its own
creating. To be effective, therefore, the open market opera-
tions had to be carried out on a grand scale. From February
27, when the purchases began, to August 13, when they
ceased, government securities held by the Federal Reserve
banks increased $i,io6 million. Half of the new Federal ke-
serve credit created was absorbed by a net gold export of
million and an increase of money in circulation of $133mil-
lion. The other half was divided between a decrease of $384
million in 'bills discounted' and an increase in member bank
reserve accounts of $119million.Since member bank deposits
continued to fall (Chart 77) the rise in excess reserves was
somewhat greater. In May excess reserves reached $277 mil-
lion, but by July gold exports and hoarding had reduced
them to $204 million.
The ending of government security purchases by the Fed-
eral Reserve banks in August 1932 did not mean a change in
the basic credit policy of excess reserves. During the whole
period of gold loss to the continental creditor countries gold
imports from Canada, South America, and the Far East con-
tinued. They were widely distributed and regular, and when
once the European pressure was lifted, added substantially
to the American gold stock. In December these imparts were
swelled by large gold receipts from England on War Debt
account.84 This, together with a return flow of currency from
hoarding during the late summer, made possible a still fur-
Forthe full year 1932,indudingearmarking, there was a small net import.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1235
ther reduction in member bank indebtedness and a further
building up of member bank reserves. Though deposits of
the member banks increased $748 million from the low point
of July, excess reserves also increased rapidly.
CHART 77
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The force of the stimulus to credit expansion resulting
from the Federal Reserve banks' credit policy from February







Theinfluences bringing about these results, and in particular
the shift from open market operations to gold imports as the
principal initiating force in July, are brought out in Chart 77.
By these means a large volume of new potential lending
power was introduced into the American banking system in
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Europe and the retirement of the New York money market
from its international role as a holder of foreign balances.
There were surface indications that in the late spi-ing and
summer of 1932 the problem of finding outlets for this lend-
ing power was on the road to solution, even though the New
York market had almost completely retired from its intçr-
national role as a long term international lender. From July
to September the Federal Reserve Board index of industrial
production rose from 58 to 66; factory employment and car-
loadings increased, security prices rose and bank suspensions
declined. The position of the banking system appeared to be
favorable for financing a business revival. Interest rates were
falling and member bank 'loans and investments' were in-
creasing.
During these months, however, the underlying difficulties
of American banking were not really solved. Commercial
loans continued to decline, and the increase in member bank
deposits was wholly due to an increase in government bond
holdings. Interest rates to borrowers throughout the country
were not substantially reduced, and the gap between short
term money market rates and other rates of interest, which was
one of the most persistent phenomena of the depression, con-
tinued to be wide. A substantial part of the new excess reserves
continued to be concentrated in New York where, in large
measure, they were first introduced into the banking system.
The balanco of payments of the western parts of the country,
and to a less degree of the southern districts, with the eastern
seaboard, was unfavorable during the last six months of 1932.
As surplus reserves were piled up in New York, they were in
large part transferred to the West by the government through
the R.F.C., but there was a strong tendency for funds to flow
back again to the East since banks in distress continued to lose
cash and since agricultural purchasing power continued at a
low ebb. New York banks, having freed themselves from the
dangers involved in holding large mobile balances for foreign
accounts subject to sudden withdrawals, became increasinglySTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1237
holdersof mobile balances for the rest of the country. In the
first quarter of 1933 these balances were suddenly withdrawfl.
From February i to March 8 the excess of 'due to' over 'due
from' banks of banks in New York City declined $834 miJi-
lion. For the Federal Reserve District of New York the de-
cline was $878 million. During the months
preceding the American banking crisis of March ireserve$
in the East declined, while those in the West increased.
Closing the Banks
The events leading up to, and taking place during, the
American banking crisis of March 1933,likethose of the
confidence crisis of 1931iflEurope, are so familiar that they
will not be described in detail here except as they bear di-
rectly on America's relation to the gold standard. After Sep-
tember i931an almost uninterrupted series of events tended
to undermine confidence in the American banking system
and in particular banks. In September a Democratic victory
in Maine foreshadowed a change in the political leadership
in the country, and a four month political interregnum fol-
lowed the election of President Roosevelt during which no
effective action could be taken. The decline in sterling which
followed the War Loan refunding operationswas very
turbing to American opinion and constituted a threat to
American export trade. This was followed by the receipt of
notes from America's foreign debtors clearly indicating that
the end of reparation meant also the end of war debt repay-
ments. The negotiations over the British payment of Decem-
ber 15werecarried on in an atmosphere of unfriendly
political discussion. Meanwhile, American bankers as a class
were being subjected to persistent and long continued attack
in connection with the hearings on the Glass Bill, and the
evidence presented at these hearings was reducing public
confidence in banks in general to a low ebb.
These general psychological influences were earily trans-
Cf. Ch. TheControl of Sterling, March—December1238 DISINTEGRATION
lated into distrust of particular banks. The R.F.C. was
obliged by Congress to make public the names of banks to
which it was lending, a procedure that immediately disclosed
the identity of banks in difficulties and contributed to the
uneasiness of depositors. Bank failures increased, and when
runs on particular banks began to involve other banks, series
of state 'bank holidays' were proclaimed. The first was in
Nevada on October 31, 1932, followed by Iowa on January
20, 1933, Louisiana on FebruaryandMichigan on February
14. The subsequent spread of the movement is described in
the Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board for 1933
(pp. 9—10):
"While the Michigan holiday arrested withdrawals of deposits
from banks in that State, outside Michigan there was an increase
in the movement of funds from weaker to stronger banks and in
currency withdrawals. Funds were withdrawn from banks in other
States to send to Michigan or to meet payments that would other-
wise have been met from deposits in Michigan banks. Develop-
ments of this nature were partly responsible for the rapid spread
of the bank-holiday movement among other States. On February
25, the Governor of Maryland declared a bank holiday, chiefly on
account of conditions in Baltimore, and at about the same time
restrictions were authorized on withdrawals of bank deposits in
Indiana, Arkansas, and Ohio. In a number of States new laws
were passed to provide for safeguarding bank depositors or for
readjusting the liabilities of banks without establishing receiver-
ships. With a view to enabling the banking situation in any par-
ticular State to be better handled as a whole, a joint resolution
was adopted on February 25 by the Congress of the United States
authorizing the Comptroller of the Currency to exercise with
respect to national banks such powers as State officials might have
with respect to State banks.
On March i Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Nevada de-
clared bank holidays, and similar action was taken by 6 other
States on March 2 and 7 others on MarchOnthe morning of
March 4, the Governor of the State of New York issued a proc-
lamation declaring that day, which was a Saturday, and the fol-STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
lowing Monday to be bank holidays. Similar action was taken in
Illinois,Massachusetts, New Jersey,Pennsylvania, and
where."
During February and the first days of March, as the rapid
collapse of the American banking system spread throughout
the country, a hoarding movement of unprecedented
portions developed, accompanied by a foreign drain of gold
largely through earmarking. Its effects are brought out in
Chart 78 in which the changes in the principal items making
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uptotal Federal Reserve credit and the factors influencing
member bank reserve accounts are plotted weekly, from Feb-
ruary 4 to April 29. Since these figures are weekly averages
of daily figures, the full effect of the changes from early
February to March 4 is shown by comparing the figures for
the week ending February 4 with those for the week ending
March i i during which the Reserve banks were partly closed.
During this period money in circulation increased $i,868
million and monetary gold stock declined $305 million. To1240 DISINTEGRATION
meet this immense draft of $2,173 million on member bank
reserve accounts the Federal Reserve banks increased their
portfolio of bills bought $386 million, their government se-
curities $i 13 million, and their bills discounted $1,152 mil-
lion. But though Federal Reserve credit rose $1,587 million
member bank reserve accounts were drawn down $623 mil-
lion. Of the increase in money in circulation about $320
million was in gold withdrawn for domestic hoarding so that
the gold loss of the Federal Reserve banks was over $600
million. Together with the net increase in their liabilities of
over $8oo million this reduced the reserve ratio of the Reserve
banks to a point not far from the legal minimum. On March
3 the ratio of the reserves of the Federal Reserve banks to
their note and deposit liabilities combined was 45.3 per cent.
Their lending power was not quite exhausted, for on March
4 they still had excess reserves, as Rufener points out, of $416
million on which they could legally have extended an addi-
tional one billion dollars in Reserve credit.36 Moreover, on
March 3 the Federal Reserve Board suspended the reserve
requirements of the Federal Reserve banks for thirty days
subject to a tax on deficiencies as provided by law. In a legal
sense the utmost limits of the power of the system to expand
its credit had not been reached but they had been reached in
practice. The gold drain was proceeding at an accelerated
pace and would have continued through the stronger member
banks, while the weaker member banks, being unable any
longer to find the means of borrowing at the Reserve banks,
could not be helped by further Federal Reserve credit. In
addition, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, upon
which the major burdens of meeting the general run on the
Federal Reserve system were concentrated, had completely ex-
hausted its own lending power and was being carried by the
other Federal Reserve banks, a circumstance distinctly ad-
verse to any further large credit extensions by the system as
a whole.
86 op. cit., p.68g.STEkLING DtVIIiE
ThePosition of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Some of the most important aspects of the central banking
crisis in America are obscured by considering the figures of
the twelve Federal Reserve banks as a whole. During the six
weeks preceding the closing of the banks the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York was subject, in extreme degree, to the
specialdifficulties, often referred to in these studies, that had
their origin in the fact that New York was an internationa'
money market and at the same time the domestic money
market for a continent. The system as a whole was subject to
a double drain, but the New York bank was subject to a
triple drain, a foreign drain of gold, a domestic gold hoarding
demand from within the New York district, and an outflow
of gold to the interior through the Gold Settlement Fund,
During the three weeks from February i to February 21 the
New York Bank met these demands almost entirely from iits
own resources, and the entire gold loss for the system was
borne by it. During the next two weeks it was able to meet
the situation only by exploiting to the uttermost every device
for the mobilization of reserves of which the Federal Reserve
system was capable. Almost the entire gold loss of the system
was then borne by the eleven interior banks. This is brought
out clearly by examining the behavior of the principal assets
and liabilities of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and
comparing it with the behavior of the principal assets and
liabilities of the other eleven banks as a group. In Table 85
the relevant figures are given weekly from February ito
April 26, and on Chartthe cumulated changes are plotted.
Between February i and 21 the note circulation of the
eleven interior Federal Reserve banks increased $218 million,
and in addition, these banks paid out a substantial amount
of gold to meet a domestic hoarding demand. Far from
ing a corresponding decline, however, their member bank
reserve accounts increased $26 million. They must therefore
have been replenished from some source by at least $244TABLE 85
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million, Of this, millionwas provided by an increase in
bills discounted at these banks and at least$84 million by
transfers from New York, for the eleven interior banks gained
gold in that amount. This leaves at least $107 million to be
accounted for. During the three weeks the eleven banks in-
CHART 79
Federal Reserve Bank of New Tork and the other Eleven Reserve Banks,











creased their bills bought $86 million and their government
securities $44 million, a total of $130 million. The difference
is accounted for by changes in the float and other minor
balance sheet items.
This is not, however, an accurate picture of what actually
happened. The principal means by which the member bank
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40STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1245
transfers from New York.37 The bulk of the bills and se-
curities purchased by the interior Reserve banks were not
bought in their own districts but from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, to offset the effects of such transfers. Had
these purchases not been made, the interior Reserve banks
would have gained not $84 million in gold but $214 million
at the expense of the New York Bank. The bills and securities
were bought in the first instance in their principal market,
New York City, by the New York Reserve Bank. Member
bank reserve accounts in New York were therefore increased
by nearly this amount. They were then drawn down by trans-
fers to the interior, and these transfers were prevented from
causing a corresponding drain of gold from New York by
the sale of the bills and securities to the interior Reserve
banks. By this means the gain in gold by the interior Reserve
banks was kept down to $84 million. This was less than their
total gain in gold from the New York Bank through the Gold
Settlement Fund, for they gained sufficient additional gold
in this way to meet the interior hoarding demand.
At the Federal Reserve Bank of New York note circulation
increased onlymillion during the three weeks, but mem-
ber bank reserve accounts were reduced $192 million. This
is accounted for in the main by the following operations:
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (millions of dollars)
TRANSACTIONS INCREASING MEMBER TRANSACTIONS REDUCING MEMBER
BANK RESERVE ACCOUNTS BANK RESERVE ACCOUNTS
Increase in portfolio of Bills Increase in Notes in
and Securities +84 Circulation —53
Increase in Bills Discounted +6 Gold supplied for Export and
Bills and Securities bought for Domestic Hoarding
for interior Reserve Banks+ 130 (partly through transfers
to the interior) —137
+220 Other transfers to the
interior —214
—404
Effect of these transactions on Member Bank Reserve Accounts —184
Actual decline in Member Bank Reserve Accounts —192
37From February itO 21 the excess of 'due to' over 'due from' banks for
banks in New York City fell $329 million.1246 DISINTEGRATION
Though both interior Reserve banks and the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York had to meet a hoarding demand,
the gold losses of the system were distributed as follows:
the system as a whole lost $137 million, the New York Bank
lost $221 million, the interior Reserve banks gained $84
million. Consequently, the decline in the gold reserve ratio
of the whole system from 61.7 to 57.7 per cent was due largely
to a decline in the ratio of the New York Bank. In spite of an
increase in their note and deposit liability of $244 million,
the gold reserve ratio of the eleven interior banks fell only
from 65 to 63 per cent, while in spite of a decline in its note
and deposit liability of million, the gold reserve ratio
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York fell fromto 47
per cent.
Between February 21 and March 8 38thissituation was
reversed. In less than two weeks the twelve Federal Reserve
banks lost $425 million in gold and $86 million in cash other
than gold. Their note circulation increased $1,215 million,
and in addition, the Federal Reserve float was contracted $7g
million. In order to meet this extraordinary draft of $1,805
million on member bank reserve accounts, bills bought, bills
discounted, and government securities together rose $1,375
million, leaving a net reduction in reserve accounts of $430
million as a result of these items. The actual reduction was
$472 million. The position of the New York Bank within the
system was remarkable. The triple drain to which it was ex-
posed was accentuated in all its components. Its calls, there-
fore, upon the interior banks for assistance were carried to
the point where it became dependent upon that assistance
for its entire gold reserve, and had shifted to the interior
banks virtually the whole burden of meeting the gold losses
of the system.
During the two weeks from February 21 to March 8 the
bills bought of the twelve banks increased $243 million, but
88Moreaccurately March 4, for the March 8 statement was issued while the
Federal Reserve banks were still partly dosed.STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1247
of this increase only $13millionwas at the New York Bank
and $230 million at the interior banks. As indicated above.
this undoubtedly meant a substantial addition to member
bank reserve accounts in New York with which to meet
transfers to the interior, and also prevented corresponding
losses of gold by the New York Bank through the Gold Settle-
ment Fund. At the same time, bills discounted by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York increased $709 million, repre-
senting a further replenishment of member bank reserve
accounts by that amount. Of these bills discounted, $210
million were rediscounted with other Federal Reserve banks,
Chicago in particular, thus further replenishing the gold
reserves of the New York Bank. Finally the government se-
curities of the system were increased $46 million. To the
extent that these purchases, like those of bills, were made in
New York, this also represented an increase in member bank
balances in New York. The main feature of the government
security holdings, however, was the transfer by the Federal,
Reserve Bank of New York not only of its small net purchases,
but also of a large part of its existing holdings to the interior
banks. Government securities held by the New York Bank
declined $210 million, while those of the interior banks in-
creased $256 million. A further large amount of gold was
thus provided for the New York Bank.
An approximate statement of the size of the foreign gold
drain, the domestic hoarding demand in the New York dis-
trict, and the interior drain combined can be gleaned from
these figures. If it is assumed that the increase in bills bought
and government securities held by the system as a whole
represented in the first instance increases in member bank
balances in New York, then the additions to these balances
during the two weeks were $998 million, as shown on page
1248. This great increase was offset in part by an increase in
the note issue of the New York Bank of $359 million and by
the operation of the Federal Reserve clearing system. Checks
throughout the system were being collected faster than they1248 DISINTEGRATION
were being credited and the Federal Reserve float became a
negative quantity, changing from +$2 to —$77 million. The
consequent reduction in member bank reserve balances was,
for the system, $79 million. If the New York member banks'
Factors increasing Member Bank Reserve Balances in Xew rork, February
21toMarch 8, 1933
MILLIONSOF DOLLARS
Bills bought by the whole system +243
Bills discounted by the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York +709
Government securities bought by the whole
system +46
Total +gg8
share in this contraction was approximately a third, the pro-
portion of New York clearings to the whole, member bank
balances in New York were reduced about $26 million. In
addition, there was a reduction of $37 million in 'cash other
than gold' at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, indicat-
ing a further reduction in member bank reserve balances.
When these three items, amounting together to $422 million,
are taken into account, the indicated increase is still $576 mil-
lion. There was, however, an actual reduction of $i 8o million,
indicating a total gold drain from the New York Bank of
$756 million.
The actual gold loss of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York was million, so that the help obtained from the
interior banks was about $700 million. The way in which
this help was secured is shown in the accompanying state-
Replenishment of Gold Reserves of the Federal Reserve Bank of .Wew rork
by the Other Reserve Banks, February 21toMarch 8, 1933
MILLIONSOF DOLLARS
Increase in bills bought by the interior
Reserve banks +230
Increase in government securities held by the
interior Reserve banks +256
Billsrediscounted by the interior Reserve
banks for the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York +210
Total +696STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1249
ment. On March 8 the total gold reserves of the Federal.
Reserve Bank of New York were $697 million. Had no help
been given to the New York Bank by the interior banks they
would have been reduced to zero and the reserves of the
interior banks, instead of declining $388 million, would
tually have increased $308 million. Even if it were assumed
that none of the bills bought by the interior banks were
bought in the first instance in New York, it would still be
true that the gold obtained by the New York Bank from the
interior banks was greater than the entire net loss of gold
by the system as a whole.
Under these circumstances the interior banks were obliged
to meet an increase in their note circulation of $856 million
with declining gold reserves. Though their bills and securi-
ties increased $899 million, their member bank reserve ac-
counts declined $292 million, leaving a net increase in their
liabilities of $564 million. But with the loss of $388 million
in gold this reduced their gold reserve ratio from 63 to 46
per cent. At the same time, the ratio of the New York Bank,
notwithstanding the assistance rendered it, fell to 40 per cent.
Interregnum, March 4—April 20,1933
Onthe eve of the inauguration of the new President of the
United States it was clearly recognized that the Federal Re-
serve banks could not long remain open. On March 3 the
Federal Reserve Board and others endeavored to induce the
outgoing President, Mr. Hoover, to sign a proclamation for
a National Bank Holiday on the ground that if he did not
there would be an immediate and total collapse of the who]e
banking system. Mr. Hoover agreed to take action only if the
incoming President would share the responsibility. This Mr.
Roosevelt refused. On March 4 the Federal Reserve banks
closed, all the leading exchanges ceased operations, and in
the words of the Federal Reserve Board Annual Report for
1933,"businessin general was practically at a standstill."
March 4 was a Saturday, and on the following Monday1250 DISINTEGRATION
President Roosevelt issued a proclamation declaring a nation
wide bank holiday to continue until March g, a period later
extended. Under this proclamation banks were forbidden to
pay out any coin, bullion, or currency, or to transact any
other banking business except as permitted by the Secretary
of the Treasury. The gold standard in the United States was
thus suspended temporarily, but no final decisions concern-
ing it were made. An interregnum was begun, during which
the legal forms of the gold standard as they had existed since
the lifting of the war-time gold export embargo in June 1919
wereprofoundly changed by a series of steps. As a result of
decisions made during this interregnum the United States
not only ushered in an entirely new phase in the exchange
relationships of the center countries, but, by indirection,
broke down the overwhelming obstacles that, under any other
circumstances, would still have stood in the way of her ac-
ceptance in the future of some form of the gold bullion
standard.
At the time of England's abandonment of the gold stand-
ard, the opinion had been seriously expressed in the United
States that the export of gold should be prohibited in order
to make possible continued domestic inter-convertibility be-
tween currency and gold, and thus to 'preserve the gold
standard' in America. American opposition to proposals for
an inter-central bank gold clause had been largely on the
ground that foreign banks should not be given a favored
position with respect to the conversion of dollars into gold
as compared to American banks. Even in March 1933Ameri-
can opinion was not prepared to accept the view that the
essential economic function of gold reserves was to meet
foreign demands, and that the gold standard was essentially
an international institution. It was unalterably opposed to
the idea that gold should be made available for export while
denied at home. For• this reason the measures taken concern-
ing the domestic gold circulation immediately after the cbs-STERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD
ing of the banks have a peculiar technical interest for these
studies. The argument for the gold bullion standard
vigorously advanced within the Federal Reserve Board. It
was pointed out that since domestic hoarding was overwhelm
ingly the most important single factor in bringing the
Reserve banks to the position in which they found themselves
on March 4, 1933, the time had come to deprive domestic
convertibility of all real meaning and to continue on the gold
standard internationally. An order was drafted that legally
continued the right of convertibility of the dollar, but pro..
vided that gold could not be held within the country, thus
in effect, if not in form, suspending domestic convertibility.
This proposal, however, was rejected by the Board and by the
government. Steps were nevertheless taken to eliminate gold
from circulation, but on quite other grounds. The Presidenfs
original Bank Holiday proclamation was issued under section
5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6,
which empowered him to "investigate, regulate, or prohibit
•.. anytransactions in foreign exchange and the export,
hoarding, melting or earmarkings of gold..." TheProc-
lamation itself declared that, except as authorized by the
Secretary of the Treasury with the approval of the
no bank could, during the holiday, "pay out export, earmark
or permit the withdrawal or transfer in any manner or by any
device whatsoever, of any gold or silver coin or bullion or
currency or take any action which might facilitate the hoard.
ing thereof." In Treasury regulations issued on March 7
providing for the extension of Federal Reserve credit and the
issue of currency to banks during the holiday for specified
purposes, the giving of such help was made conditional on the
delivery by the bank seeking assistance of all gold and gold
certificates held by it to the Reserve banks. On March 8 the
Federal Reserve banks prepared a list of large holders of gold,
and in the President's Proclamation of March g extending the
Bank Holiday the purpose of preventing hoarding was1252 DISINTEGRATION
stressed. On March io in an Executive Order permitting
banks to reopen under license from the Treasury, the follow-
ing language was used:
"Until further order, no individual, partnership, association, or
corporation, including any banking institution, shall export or
otherwise remove or permit to be withdrawn from the United
States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof any gold
coin, gold bullion, or gold certificates, except in accordance with
regulations prescribed by or under license issued by the Secretary
of the Treasury.
No permission to any banking institution to perform any bank-
ing functions shall authorize such institution to pay out any gold
coin, gold bullion or gold certificates except as authorized by the
Secretary of the Treasury, nor to allow foreign exchange except
such as may be undertaken for legitimate and normal business
requirements, for reasonable traveling and other personal re-
quirements, and for the fulfillment of contracts entered into prior
to March 6, 1933."
Notwithstandingall this emphasis upon hoarding none of
these regulations and orders contained any provision that
made it illegal for private individuals to hold gold. There was
in fact no 'gold hoarding' order up to this time, but only a pro-
hibition of the export of gold and a suspension of the con-
vertibility of the currency. Not unnaturally, however, the
public gained the impression that gold hoarding was now
illegal and small holders began to turn in their gold. Large
holders, on the other hand, taking advice of counsel, were
told that no such order had been issued and kept their gold.
This seemed unfair and unjust to the Federal Reserve Board,
and resulted in the issue of a genuine gold hoarding order on
April 5, which explicitly prohibited "the hoarding of gold
coin, gold bullion and gold certificates within the continental
United States."
On April 5, 1933 the United States had by a curious route
arrived at the following position: gold could be exported un-
der license from the Secretary of the Treasury, but the dollarSTERLING AND GOLD DIVIDE THE WORLD1253
wasnot convertible into gold, and gold could not be heidi
legally by the citizens. A simple restoration of convertibility
would have been sufficient to put America on the gold bullion
standard.
Meanwhile, the banking crisis had been successfully met.
On March 9 at a special session of Congress an Emergency
Bank Act had been passed giving the President the emergency
powers under which the two gold orders were issued, provid.
ing for the appointment of conservators for closed or illiquidi
banks, for the issue of preferred stock by banks and its sale to
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, for the issue of
Federal Reserve Bank Notes, and for further relaxation of eli-
gibility requirements. On March i ithe Federal Reserve
banks were reopened, and the process of reopening the banks
under Treasury license was begun. In the main it was com-
pleted within the next four days. Banks, with approximately
$4 billion in deposits, however, remained closed pending
liquidation or reconstruction. As shown in Chart 78 gold and
currency immediately returned from hoarding. Between
March iiandApril 19FederalReserve Notes fell $838 mil-
lion, the gold holdings of the Federal Reserve banks rose
$672 million, and the member banks repaid $i billion of their
indebtedness to the Reserve banks. The Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, as funds flowed back to New York, paid off its
rediscounted bills at the other Federal Reserve banks, took
back the government securities it had placed with them, and
secured the lion's share of the increasing gold reserves. The
system's portfolio of bills was allowed gradually to run off,
and by the end of April, as Chart 79 clearly shows, the posi..
tions of both the system as a whole and the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York were not far different from those existing
just before the crisis.
While the American banking system was thus returning to
what might be described as 'normal,' the dollar remained reF-
atively stable in the foreign exchanges. Trading in the ex-
change markets had been suspended from March 4 to March1254 DISINTEGRATION
12 but quotations were resumed on March iAftera pent-up
commercial demand for dollars had been satisfied the under-
lying trend of the dollar was weak in London, but the inter-
vention of the British Exchange Equalization Account pre-
vented sterling from rising. From March 14 to April 15 ster-
ling kept within the range of 3.46 to 3.41, most of the time
closer to the bottom of this range than to the top (Table 79).
It will be recalled that it was during March and April that the
Bank of England was accumulating the bulk of its new gold
reserve.89 The dollar-franc rate remained within the gold
points and the whole period of the acute banking crisis in
America passed without serious disturbances in the world's
exchange markets, owing to the apparently temporary nature
of the suspension of the international gold standard in Amer-
ica. During the Bank Holiday itself the Secretary of the Treas-
ury was granted the power to permit the export of gold ear-
marked at the Federal Reserve Bank by foreign central banks
and governments prior to March 6, and the Secretary granted
such licenses freely. Under the gold order of March io the
Secretary was authorized to issue licenses for export. On April
13 licenses were granted to a New York bank to export $6oo,-
ooo in gold bars to the Netherlands, and on April 15 to 17
licenseswere granted for the export ofmillionin gold bars
to France. When these licenses were issued the dollar stood
at gold export point against gold standard currencies and
these exports steadied the market.4° They constituted the last
acts in defense of the gold standard in the United States. On
April i8 licenses applied for were refused though the ex-
changes were weak, and on April 19 it was officially announced
that no further licenses would be granted. On April 20 an
Executive Order was issued prohibiting gold exports, except
for gold already earmarked. The power of the Secretary of the
Treasury to issue licenses was restricted to such transactions
89 Cf. Ch. 31, Building up a New Gold Reserve; cf. also Chart 72.
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